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THE NEW SURVEILLANCE
Sonia K. Katyalt
INTRODUCTION
A few years ago, it was fanciful to imagine a world where in-
tellectual property owners - such as record companies, software
owners, and publishers - were capable of invading the most sacred
areas of the home in order to track, deter, and control uses of their
products. Yet, today, precisely that is taking place. Emboldened
by courts and legislators, copyright owners now undertake a wid-
ening degree of control over cultural products through the guise of
piracy detection. As is now clear, the Internet is no longer a
smooth-functioning patchwork of anonymous possibilities for
peer-to-peer communication. Instead, lurking behind the faqade of
such potential connections lies an increasing and subtle host of
opportunities for legal accountability and detection, particularly
where the use (or misuse) of intellectual property is concerned.
In late July 2002, the Recording Industry Association of
America ("RIAA") contacted Verizon, which provides Internet
services for its customers, seeking the identity of a user of "a com-
puter... that is a hub for significant music piracy."' Verizon, cit-
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I Brief for the Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") at 1, In re Verizon
Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003) (No. 02-MS-0323). Since then, a num-
ber of actions have been filed on both procedural and substantive grounds to challenge the le-
gitimacy of the subpoena process. See, e.g., Pac. Bell Internet Servs. v. Recording Indus. Ass'n
of Am., No. C03-3560SI, 2003 WL 22862662 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2003); Recording Indus.
Ass'n of Am. v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, No. 1:03MC138 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 21, 2003);
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ing consumer privacy concerns, refused to provide the information,
and the RIAA filed suit under the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act ("DMCA"), amidst a flurry of media attention. As Verizon's
Vice President Sarah Deutsch explained, "If the RIAA's interpre-
tation [of the DMCA] is accepted, there is no way we can continue
to ensure our customers' privacy rights as we understand them to-
day."3
Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit rebuked the RIAA's position.4
Some fear, however, that this recent ruling simply marks a tempo-
rary setback in the onward march to undermine consumer privacy
in the name of intellectual property. In recent months, strategies
of copyright enforcement have rapidly multiplied, each strategy
more invasive than the last. Today, the RIAA and other copyright
owners maintain automated Web crawlers that regularly survey
and record the Internet Protocol addresses of computers that trade
files on peer-to-peer networks.5 After the RIAA's initial victory at
the trial court in Verizon, hundreds of subpoenas were issued -
sometimes numbering seventy-five per day - each unveiling the
digital identities of various Internet subscribers.6  Schools, re-
sponding to threats from the recording industry, have implemented
programs that track and report the exchange of copyrighted files.7
A few have even decided to audit and actively monitor files traded
by their students, at the RIAA's request. 8 And last session, there
Boston Coll. v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Misc. Act. No. 1:03-MC-10210-JLT (D. Mass.
Aug. 7, 2003); Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Misc. Act. No. 1:03-MC-
10209-JLT (D. Mass. Aug. 7, 2003).
2 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
3 Chris Marlowe, RIAA, Verizon TiffRevolving Around Customer Privacy, HOLLYWOOD
REP., Aug. 22, 2002, at I.
4 Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C.
Cir. 2003).
5 See infra Part II.
6 Ted Bridis, Music Lawsuits Amass 75 Subpoenas Per Day, AP ONLINE, July 19, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 57309557; Katie Dean, RIAA Legal Landslide Begins, WIRED NEWS, at
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0, 1412,60345,00.html (Sept. 8, 2003).
7 See, e.g., Leonie Lamont, Firms Ask to Scan University Files, SYDNEY MORNING HER-
ALD, Feb. 19, 2003, at 3 (reporting that recording companies asked for permission to scan all
computers at the University of Melbourne for sound files, in order to gather evidence of alleged
breaches of copyright); see also Electronic Frontier Foundation, Universities Should Resist
Network Monitoring Demands, at www.eff.org/EP/P2P/university-monitoring.pdf (last visited
Jan. 20, 2004); Letter from Electronic Privacy Information Center on P2P Monitoring to Col-
leges and Universities (Nov. 6, 2002), available at www.epic.org/privacy/student/
p2pletter.html; Kristen Philipkoski, University Snoops for MP3s, WIRED NEWS, at
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,32478,00.html (Nov. 13, 1999); VIRGINIA E.
REZMIERSKI & NATHANIEL ST. CLAIR II, FINAL REPORT NSF-LAMP PROJECT: IDENTIFYING
WHERE TECHNOLOGY LOGGING AND MONITORING FOR INCREASED SECURITY END AND VIO-
LATIONS OF PERSONAL PRIVACY AND STUDENT RECORDS BEGIN (2001), available at
http://www.aacrao.org/publications/catalog/NSF-LAMP.pdf.
8 See Lamont, supra note 7, at 3. In April 2003, the RIAA also filed suits directly against
four college students accused of operating file sharing networks for the purposes of copyright
(Vol. 54:2
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were proposals before Congress that placed intellectual property
owners in a virtually unrestrained position of authority over ordi-
nary consumers. 9 During the summer of 2003, Senator Orrin
Hatch proposed destroying the computers of individuals who ille-
gally download material, pointing out that damaging someone's
computer "may be the only way you can teach somebody about
copyrights. ' 1°
All of these strategies have one thing in common: They rely
upon online surveillance to monitor potential copyright infringe-
ment of music, film, and software. There are, of course, powerful
arguments to be made on their behalf. Digital technology has of-
fered an ever-widening number of possibilities to illegally procure
copyrighted products; and profits have unquestionably dropped in
recent years." But these strategies of surveillance are not solely
limited - by any means - to the music industry. While the music
industry has perhaps attained the highest degree of notoriety for
employing them, other industries - for example, motion picture
studios and software makers - have utilized them as well. And
there is no reason to think that the surveillance will stop there.
This new surveillance exposes the paradoxical nature of the
Internet: It offers both the consumer and creator a seemingly end-
less capacity for human expression - a virtual marketplace of
ideas - alongside an insurmountable array of capacities for pan-
optic surveillance. As a result, the Internet both enables and si-
lences speech, often simultaneously. This paradox, in turn, leads
to the tension between privacy and intellectual property. Both ar-
eas of law face significant challenges because of technology's
ever-expanding pace of development. Yet courts often exacerbate
these challenges by sacrificing one area of law for the other, by
eroding principles of informational privacy for the sake of unlim-
ited control over intellectual property.
This outcome is not solely attributable to the development of
peer-to-peer technologies, or the explosion of piracy in cyber-
space, as some might suggest. Rather, the outcome involves the
infringement. RIAA Sues College File Traders, WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.comnews/
technology/0,1282,58340,00.html (Apr. 3, 2003).
9 For example, Representative John Carter recently suggested that jailing college students
for piracy would deter other infringers. Katie Dean, Marking File Traders as Felons, WIRED
NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,58081,00.html (Mar. 19, 2003). See
also infra Part II.
10 Ted Bridis, Senator Takes Aim at Illegal Downloads, AP ONLINE, June 18, 2003, avail-
able at 2003 WL 57309557.
11 The RIAA claims that revenues from music sales dropped to $12.6 billion in 2002 from
$14.6 billion in 1999 due to music piracy. See Fight over Free Music on Web Coming to Con-
gress, USA TODAY ONLINE, at http://www.usatoday.comltechlnews/techpolicy/2003-09- 0 8-
riaa-congress-x.htm (Sept. 8, 2003).
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comparatively more subtle failure of law to resolve the troubling
and often rivalrous relationship between the protection of property
and privacy in cyberspace. Laws developed to address the prob-
lem of online piracy - in particular, the DMCA - have been unwit-
tingly misplaced, inviting intellectual property owners to create
private systems of copyright monitoring that I refer to as "piracy
surveillance." Piracy surveillance comprises extrajudicial methods
of copyright enforcement that detect, deter, and control acts of
consumer infringement. In the past, legislators and scholars have
focused their attention on other, more visible methods of surveil-
lance relating to employment, marketing, and national security.
2
Piracy surveillance, however, represents an overlooked fourth area
that is completely distinct from these other types, yet incompletely
theorized, technologically unbounded, and, potentially, legally un-
restrained.
The goals of this Article are threefold: first, to trace the ori-
gins of piracy surveillance through recent jurisprudence involving
copyright; second, to provide an analysis of the tradeoffs between
public and private enforcement of copyright; and third, to suggest
some ways that the law can restore a balance between the protec-
tion of copyright and civil liberties in cyberspace in the wake of
Verizon. Part I reviews some basic principles of the relationship
between privacy and property in real space, and then applies them
to cyberspace. Unlike property in real space, which protects one's
locks, doors, and private space by virtue of material seclusion, cy-
berspace often undermines the protection of privacy by enabling
third-party surveillance. Peer-to-peer transmissions have enabled
the rapid transfer of copyrighted content, facilitating a crisis of
intellectual property and privacy. By making one's online activi-
ties, identities, and preferences transparently visible, peer-to-peer
frameworks also create a culture of panopticism by other individu-
als. This culture of panopticism, in turn, permits a variety of enti-
ties - government, private individuals, and copyright owners - to
exploit the power of peer-to-peer frameworks to develop an in-
creasingly invasive system of surveillance to guard against piracy.
Part II describes the myriad of ways in which private entities
have successfully monitored transmissions to control uses of their
copyrighted materials. Piracy surveillance enables copyright own-
ers to utilize a type of monitoring that demonstrably trespasses on
12 David Lyon, The World Wide Web of Surveillance: The Internet and Off-World Power
Flows, in THE MEDIA READER: CONTINUITY AND TRANSFORMATION 353, 355 (Hugh MacKay
& Tim O'Sullivan eds., 2000) (asserting the proliferation of three main categories of cyberspace
surveillance relating to employment, security and policing, and marketing).
[Vol. 54:2
THE NEW SURVEILLANCE
a person's expectations of informational privacy and anonymity.
These regimes take on three basic types: monitoring, which in-
volves the use of automated systems to search for copyrighted ma-
terial; management, which involves a host of actions taken in real
space and cyberspace to limit certain uses of cultural products; and
interference, which involves a degree of preventative actions taken
to disable peer-to-peer file sharing from occurring.
Part III assesses the costs and benefits of such regimes, and
argues that these private regimes of copyright enforcement carry
significant disadvantages, among them the risk of transforming
copyright law into a regime of "panoptic publication," where po-
tential creators are monitored by third parties for the infringement
potential of their activities. Because these systems of copyright
enforcement are largely unregulated and fall outside of state con-
trol, piracy surveillance measures are capable of an unprecedented
scope of invasion and control over the expressive activities of or-
dinary citizens, particularly with respect to the protection of fair
use, free speech, and due process.
As Part III shows, piracy surveillance carries the potential to
transform the nature of copyright law from a liability-based regime
into a regime that governs the creation and use of all cultural
products in cyberspace, both illegitimate and legitimate. Here, I
argue that freedom from surveillance is a necessary and integral
component to an optimal level of creativity. As private modes of
piracy surveillance become more and more ubiquitous, fewer indi-
viduals will choose to engage in expressive activities that run the
risk of copyright enforcement. This risk is especially pronounced
in the wake of the DMCA, which fails to regulate the scope of pi-
racy surveillance in peer-to-peer communications.
Finally, Part IV explains how law can restore the balance be-
tween copyright law and civil liberties. The DMCA, and copyright
law generally, must be reinterpreted in the wake of Verizon to
square with principles of privacy, personal autonomy, and fair use,
that flow directly from our constitutional tradition. Towards that
end, Part IV argues for greater judicial supervision over the
DMCA and offers a potential solution that is derived from the Pri-
vacy Protection Act and that balances protections for freedom of
speech and privacy with the interests of law enforcement.
I. PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND IDENTITY IN CYBERSPACE
For the most part, scholars who write about the relationship
between privacy and property have concentrated on the proprietary
aspects of privacy, arguing that privacy originated as a type of
20031
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property right. While property and privacy protect different inter-
ests, they enjoy a mutually reinforcing relationship that has been
historically validated by the law governing real space. As the first
section will argue, property rights historically served as a defen-
sive shield to protect privacy. In contrast, the nature of cyberspace
destabilizes the relationship between property and privacy, creat-
ing a host of challenges for the protection of privacy. Unlike real
space, which is characterized by reified boundaries between pri-
vate and public space, boundaries in digital space are largely per-
meable and transparent, engendering a nearly limitless potential
for consumer surveillance.
A. Privacy and Property: A View from the Fourth Amendment
Both property and privacy have assumed venerable positions
in American constitutional law. As Bruce Ackerman has pointed
out, the core of both rights implicates the same abstract principle:
"the right to exclude unwanted interference by third parties."
1 3
Yet while our allegiances to property have been stated outright
throughout constitutional law, our commitment to privacy has been
slightly more elusive. As William Blackstone has written:
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination,
and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of prop-
erty; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in
total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the uni-
verse. 14
Of course, ownership of property also implies other rights; ena-
bling an owner to consume her property and use it harmlessly, to
transfer the property, and to exclude anyone from entering, infring-
ing, or interfering with her use and enjoyment of the property. 15
Private property is sacred; it is the critical element that ensures
human self-actualization.
At the same time, the panoply of different rights enjoyed by
property owners also rests upon another crucial facet of self-
actualization: the protection of privacy. Property ownership con-
fers a certain measure of privacy, and privacy rights derive their
'3 Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 347 (1992).
14 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2-1 I, reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTY LAW 45,45-46 (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 1995).
'5 See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism
in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1608 (1993) (discussing the
expansive set of property rights currently afforded by the intellectual property system and noting
that these rights exceed what a Lockean model would justify).
[Vol. 54:2
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judicial force from the same array of Lochner-era cases that also
established a right to property. 16 Yet curiously, to the extent that
any relationship between privacy and property has been men-
tioned, it has mostly been presumed. 7  For example, John Locke
observed that "every Man has a Property in his own Person. This
no Body has any right to but himself."' 8 Lockean notions of prop-
erty in one's person are inextricably linked to the protection of
privacy, because they suppose the ability to exclude others from
bodily invasion, suggesting that protection of bodily privacy also
involves a metaphor for ownership itself.' 9
Just as the term "private property" suggests, both property and
privacy enjoy a symbiotic relationship: Every person enjoys a
property right in her person, just as she enjoys the right to exclude
others from treading or trespassing on her privately owned prop-
erty.20  In addition, tort, trespass, and contract law ensure that in-
dividuals remain mindful of each others' private spaces. In this
way, property and privacy are each grounded in territorial meta-
phors that construct boundaries that provide some degree of physi-
cal or social immunity from state interference. 2' Property rights
confer a certain amount of spatial sovereignty in the property
owned, a shield that directly complements the right to be left
alone. This is why the Supreme Court, at various points, has em-
phasized that "one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls
property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy by virtue of this right to exclude. 23
16 Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 418
(2000).
'7 See, e.g., Carol Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73
(1985) (analyzing the origins of the common concept of ownership).
18 Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in
the Electronic Wilderness, I I BERKELEY TECH. L.J. I, 14 (1996) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TwO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 328-29 (Peter Laslett ed., 1965)).
'9 See Rao, supra note 16, at 422 (discussing individual "property rights" in one's body).
20 See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 158 (1998) (discussing
Locke's theory of property rights as the right to exclude).
2! Rao, supra note 16, at 425.
22 See, e.g., RUSSELL Scot, THE BODY AS PROPERTY (1981).
23 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978). As Professor Charles A. Reich has
echoed:
Property draws a circle around the activities of each private individual or organiza-
tion. Within that circle, the owner has a greater degree of freedom than without.
Outside, he must justify or explain his actions, and show his authority. Within, he is
master, and the state must explain and justify any interference.
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964). Citing this passage, Pro-
fessor Radhika Rao asserts that precisely the same observation could be made regarding the
right of privacy. She observes that the right to property, like privacy, decentralizes decision-
making power by placing it into the hands of owners, thereby policing "the fragile boundary
between individual autonomy and government authority." Rao, supra note 16, at 421, 426.
2003]
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Early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence further emphasized
property-based conceptions of privacy, producing an indelibly
trespass-based construction of this right.2 4 Part of this conception
was attributable to the presence of limited technologies of surveil-
lance. 25  This tendency also reflected the traditional, oft-repeated
presumption that "a man's house is his castle,, 26 which formed a
critical cornerstone in the development of the unreasonable search
and seizure jurisprudence. In the early eighteenth century, the pro-
tection of property rights served as a reasonable proxy for privacy
interests: Proof of trespass on one's private property, for example,
was necessary to establish the search and seizure liability of gov-
ernment agents.
27
Later, however, in the 1920s, the Supreme Court took a sharp
turn towards what Professor Morgan Cloud has termed "property-
based literalism," which limited Fourth Amendment protection to
tangible items placed within demonstrably private spaces. 28 Ironi-
cally, this renewed emphasis on clear boundaries constrained pri-
vacy protections, just as technology began to develop more and
more ways to pry into another's activities. For example, in
Olmstead v. United States, the Court addressed the question of
whether the use of wiretaps outside the walls of a suspect's home
24 See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy,
or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 308 (1998).
2 See Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869, 871
(1996).
26 See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958).
27 One English case cited often by the Supreme Court, Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St.
Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765), involved the search of a person's home and papers. The plaintiff had been
suspected of authoring several seditious publications, and the government searched and seized
his private papers (some unrelated to the charges at issue). The plaintiff sued under a trespass
theory, and the court agreed with him, observing that property rights played a fundamental and
determinative role in modem society. The court concluded that "every invasion of private prop-
erty, be it ever so minute," could be considered to be a trespass. Id. at 1066. Lord Camden
stated:
Papers are the owner's goods and chattels: they are his dearest property; and are so
far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection; and though the
eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass, yet where private papers
are removed and carried away, the secret nature of those goods will be an aggrava-
tion of the trespass, and demand more considerable damages in that respect.
Id. The court also stated that because the government had no right to seize one's private papers,
such acts would be considered tantamount to a government taking. Id. at 1044.
Commenting on this section in Entick, William C. Heffernan has observed that property
rhetoric served as the primary category of analysis for the inviolability of a person's privacy.
Even though the doctrine of privacy was not well-developed at this point, Lord Camden's treat-
ment of trespass, according to Heffernan, "evinced a profound respect for informational pri-
vacy," further demonstrating that property rights served as an adequate, though awkward, proxy
for privacy interests where government searches were concerned. William C. Heffernan, Fourth
Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 13-14 (2002).
28 Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property,
and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 59 1-92 (1996).
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and office constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 29 The Court first addressed the question of whether
conversations fell within the Amendment's scope, observing that
the Fourth Amendment clearly contemplated protection for mate-
rial things - a person, his house, his papers, or his effects - not the
exchange of words between two people. Because a conversation
was not a tangible, property-based object, the Court found that it
did not fall within the scope of protected elements under the
Fourth Amendment, concluding that its prior jurisprudence "can-
not justify enlargement ... beyond the possible practical meaning
of houses, persons, papers, and effects, or so to apply the words
search and seizure as to forbid hearing or sight. 3°
Aside from dismissing protection for conversations on the
ground of an absence of tangibility, the Court also followed the
trespass-requirement rationale that earlier cases had supported. 3'
However, in this case, the trespass requirement operated to erode,
rather than protect, individual privacy. Because there was "no en-
try of the houses or offices of the defendants" (because telephone
lines are placed outside of a house or office), the Court found that
the government did not invade a protected privacy interest: "The
language of the amendment cannot be extended and expanded to
include telephone wires, reaching to the whole world from the de-
fendant's house or office. The intervening wires are not part of his
house or office, any more than are the highways along which they
are stretched. 32
By viewing the Fourth Amendment through the prism of a tres-
pass requirement, the Court placed a primary value on the materiality
of the protected objects, rather than the individual's own expectations
of privacy. 33  "There was no searching," Justice Taft concluded.
Moreover, he observed, "[t]here was no seizure. The evidence was
secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. 34
Olmstead thus altered Fourth Amendment interpretation. The
Court ensured, for example, "that the Fourth Amendment would be
irrelevant as a device for regulating the use of new technologies
that allowed the government to invade formerly private places
without committing a common law trespass. '35 This requirement
29 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
30 Id. at 465.
31 Id.; see also Heffernan, supra note 27, at 17.
32 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465.
33 Heffernan, supra note 27, at 17.
34 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
35 Cloud, supra note 28, at 611; see also Richard S. Julie, Note, High-Tech Surveillance
Tools and the Fourth Amendment: Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in the Technological
20031
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of tangible trespass and invasion continued to infuse privacy juris-
prudence, even though, practically speaking, it excluded a wide
purview of potential invasions from the scope of the Fourth
Amendment.
In an eloquent dissent that has received much attention, Jus-
tice Brandeis observed in Olmstead that constitutional clauses pro-
tecting the individual from specific abuses of power "must have a
similar capacity of adaptation to a changing world. 36 In phrases
loaded with future significance, Brandeis observed that techno-
logical progress and invention have created subtler, but more far-
reaching, means of invading privacy and predicted that "[w]ays
may some day be developed by which the government, without
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court,
and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most inti-
mate occurrences of the home. 37 Given these startling possibili-
ties, Brandeis deemed it insignificant that the wiretapping connec-
tion was made outside of the home, pointing out that invasions of
privacy could easily occur without evidence of physical trespass.38
B. Modem Conceptions of Informational Privacy
Olmstead reveals a conflict between legal and social expecta-
tions of privacy, that has, in many ways, only deepened in the
modern era. While our loyalty to property remains stated - and
has even expanded - through the law, our commitment to privacy
in American law is far less apparent when we move outside of the
boundaries of real property. 39 As is now clear, there is no specific
constitutional right to privacy, informational or otherwise. In-
Age, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127 (2000) (arguing that the property-based conception of Fourth
Amendment rights embodied in Olmstead entailed many flaws).
36 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
38 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Much has been written about the Brandeis dissent
and its significance for later technological developments, particularly in the realm of electronic
surveillance. As Lawrence Lessig has observed on this point:
[E]ven in 1928, much of life had moved onto the wires; and in those first steps into
cyberspace, Brandeis argued, the Constitution should not leave citizens exposed.
What had changed, he argued, was a technology of surveillance and a technology of
communication. Life existed now in cyberspace, and the Constitution should be
read to protect the same interests of privacy in cyberspace that the Framers had pro-
tected in real space. Technology had changed, but, Brandeis argued, that change
should not be allowed to change the meaning of the Constitution. The Constitution
should protect now what it protected then.
Lessig, supra note 25, at 872.
39 For excellent commentary on United States privacy laws, see PAUL SCHWARTZ & JOEL
R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY OF UNITED STATES DATA PROTECTION (1996)
and Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private
Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 545-48 (1995).
[Vol. 54:2
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stead, the Supreme Court has developed a limited, "penumbral"
conception of this right flowing from a variety of constitutional
sources - the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, and a host of decisions that outline (and often com-
plicate) the borders of this right.4°
Given the multiplicity of sources and expressions of the con-
cept of privacy, it is small wonder that the very notion of privacy
evokes a complex set of different meanings that, both separately
and collectively, draw on privacy's informational, physical, pro-
prietary, and decisional facets.4' Cases like Griswold and Roe, for
example, have postulated a substantive type of privacy that is
thought to be a "right held against the state's power to legislate, 42
thereby honoring strands of personhood in protecting the delibera-
tive choices of individuals in areas like marriage, conception, and
child-rearing. Here, too, the Court has emphasized how property -
41 In addition, numerous federal and state enactments affect the enforcement of privacy
rights in various ways. U.S. CONST. amends. I, III, IV, V, IX, XIV; see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)
(Supp. 2002) (limiting the documentation and records the federal government may maintain on
citizens and residents); CAL. PENAL CODE § 630 (Deering 2003) (recognizing that the use of
wiretap devices has led to an invasion of privacy); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 214, § I B (Law. Co-
op. 2002) (codifying the individual's right against unreasonable, substantial, or serious interfer-
ence with his privacy); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2002) (criminalizing the use of
a living person's name, portrait, or picture for advertising or trade without the person's permis-
sion); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.1 (2002) (creating a right to privacy and a civil action for im-
pinging on that right); WIS. STAT § 895.50 (2002) (recognizing a right to privacy and creating
avenues for relief in civil court); Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (overruling Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and declaring that the Fourteenth Amendment confers upon
lesbian and gay individuals a fundamental right to engage in consensual acts of sodomy);
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (affirming Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), but adopting an undue burden test for analyzing state regulations on abortion); Cruzan v.
Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that when a statutory provision im-
pinges on First Amendment rights, the provision must be justified by a compelling state inter-
est); Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (upholding the privacy of family sanctity in
relation to a municipal housing ordinance); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (distinguishing
between the individual's privacy, the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the
interest in independence in making various types of important decisions); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that abortion is within the scope of the right to personal liberty guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the
right to privacy enjoyed by married people to unmarried people in relation to access to contra-
ception); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that mere possession of obscene
materials is not a crime); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that restrictions on the
freedom to marry based solely on racial classifications violate the equal protection clause);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding married people's right to privacy to use
birth control measures to be a legitimate right within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment);
see also Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 272 P.2d 177 (Utah 1954) (rejecting a
distinction between informational publications and fictional publications regarding the use of
the person's name or likeness without his permission).
41 RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW 25 (1999).
42 Adam Hickey, Note, Between Two Spheres: Comparing State and Federal Approaches
to the Right to Privacy and Prohibitions Against Sodomy, I ll YALE L.J. 993, 995 n.8 (2002);
see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 748-50 (1989).
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the property of the home, the property of the body - plays a pro-
tective, reinforcing role regarding the protection of privacy.
But the Supreme Court has traditionally been quite reticent to
extend the same rationale to the protection of informational pri-
vacy, drawing a firm line between informational and substantive
privacy. Informational privacy, according to the Court, involves
the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of certain matters,
and is actively distinguished from substantive privacy, which in-
volves an "interest in independence in making certain kinds of im-
portant decisions. 4 3  Of course, the two are often intimately
linked, as the Court has recognized, but it has tended to undervalue
informational privacy in contrast to substantive privacy. In the
1977 case of Whalen v. Roe, for example, the Supreme Court dealt
with the question of whether the collection, storage, and dissemi-
nation of names and addresses in government databases implicates
a constitutional right to privacy. 44 Despite the Court's insightful
formulation of the differences between informational and substan-
tive facets of privacy, the Court upheld the program, holding that
neither the immediate nor threatened impact of disclosure was suf-
ficient to constitute an invasion of any right or liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees.45
Indeed, Whalen's distinction between informational and sub-
stantive privacy heralded the development of two different regimes
to protect privacy: one statutory and one constitutional. Today,
informational privacy derives its force from a panoply of federal,
state, and regulatory guidelines, 46 many of which emerged from
47the Code of Fair Information Practices over twenty years ago.
43 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977).
44 Since the Court found that the New York statutory scheme evinced a proper respect for
an individual's privacy, it declined to consider the effects of an unwarranted disclosure, prefer-
ring instead to limit its holding under the Fourteenth Amendment to the facts before it. Id.; see
Francis S. Chalpowski, Note, The Constitutional Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U.
L. REV. 133, 145-50 (1991) (noting that the balancing test outlined in Whalen has created a split
in interpretations of the right to informational privacy); Lisa Jane McGuire, Comment, Banking
on Biometrics: Your Bank's New High Tech Method of Identification May Mean Giving Up
Your Privacy, 33 AKRON L. REV. 441, 460-61 (2000) (calling Whalen the "closest the Court
came to identifying a right to information privacy").
45 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605. Nevertheless, in an interesting observation, the Court noted:
"We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of
personal information in computerized data banks or other massive government files." Id. It
then observed that the right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically accom-
panied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures, and "in
some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution." Id.
46 See, e.g., United States Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1974).
47 See KENT D. STUCKEY, INTERNET AND ONLINE LAW § 5.01 (1996). The Code was the
central contribution of the Health, Education, and Welfare Advisory Committee on Automated
Data Systems, and is considered to be among the governing principles of modem, informational
privacy. It includes the following directives: (1) personal data record keeping practices should
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These guidelines have created a set of norms of entitlements and
expectations of informational privacy, despite the lingering confu-
sion about the definition of informational privacy itself. These
complications - both definitional and functional - have only be-
come exacerbated as technology has grown more and more com-
plex, revealing the utter inability of law to keep pace with technol-
ogy in order to ensure the protection of privacy and identity, par-
ticularly in cyberspace.48
As the following sections will point out, the unanswered ques-
tion the Court left open in Whalen - that is, whether there is a con-
stitutionally protected right to informational privacy - is the very
question that animates the relationship between intellectual prop-
erty and privacy in the digital age.49 Instead of definitively provid-
ing an answer to this question, the law has opted to expand prop-
erty rights, rather than to create a comprehensive scheme to protect
individuals from unwanted surveillance. 50  Moreover, the relation-
ship between property and privacy becomes even more compli-
cated by the concomitant rise of piracy in cyberspace, a factor
which sets the stage for conflicts between them.
C. Peer-to-Peer Panopticism
The preexisting balance between property and privacy in real
space dramatically changes when one enters the intangible domain
of cyberspace. For the intangibility of digital space underlies
not be kept secret; (2) an individual should have the ability to find out what information about
him or her is on record and how it is disclosed, and should have the ability to correct it; (3) an
individual should have the ability to correct or amend a record of identifiable information about
him or her; (4) an individual should have the ability to limit the disclosure of information about
him or her that was obtained for one purpose from being disclosed for other unrelated purposes;
and (5) an organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of identifiable
personal data must guarantee the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take
precautions to prevent misuse of the data. See SEC'Y'S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED
PERSONAL DATA SYS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS
AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973), summarized at http://www.epic.org/privacy/consumer/
code fair info.html.
48 See generally Joel R. Reidenberg & Francois Gamet-Pol, The Fundamental Role of Pri-
vacy and Confidence in the Network, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105 (1995) (exploring the im-
plications of information technology on privacy).
49 After Whalen, the Court affirmed a related notion of privacy in Nixon v. Administrator
of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977), in which the Court concluded that President Richard
M. Nixon enjoyed a constitutional privacy interest in private communications with his family,
but not in records that involved his official duties. After these cases, however, the notion of a
constitutional right to informational privacy has remained distinctly unclear. As a result, some
courts have drawn analysis from other types of privacy law. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC
ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 189 (2003) (observing the right to information pri-
vacy's resemblance to common law prohibition against unreasonable publicity) (citing Smith v.
City of Artesia, 772 P.2d 373, 376 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989)).
50 For a helpful treatment of these issues, see Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual
Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (2000), along with the other articles in the symposium.
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many of the current debates facing digital intellectual property,
and creates the opportunity for tradeoffs between the protection of
privacy and property that ordinarily do not exist in real space.
Three interacting principles inform these tradeoffs in cyberspace:
architecture, anonymity, and panopticism.
1. Architecture
Consider peer-to-peer architecture. To begin with, intellectual
property lacks the "thinglike" tangibility of real property; thus,
architectural elements like borders and fences have different capa-
bilities when they are protecting information, rather than tangible
goods. 51 Yet, as Professor Jonathan Zittrain points out, both intel-
lectual property and privacy have something significant in com-
mon: "both are about balancing a creator's desire to control a par-
ticular set of data with consumers' desires to access and redistrib-
ute that data., 52 This similarity creates expectations of protection
and control for both the property owner as well as the consumer of
the material.
Generally, most content on the Internet - music, text, video,
and other fixed media - tends to be "served" from a central system
that responds to requests from a user. The user, or "client" re-
quests information, or content, from a server; the central server
then transmits the information to the user.53 In this model, visitors
to a Web site do not interact with each other.54 Information simply
passes from one entity to another, and the recipients of the infor-
mation do not connect.55 Consumers connect to the Web sites
from intermittently connected personal computers ("PCs"), which
are usually at the edges of a network.56
This form of client-server Web architecture, predicated on hi-
erarchical principles, has yielded extremely successful Internet
Service Providers ("ISPs"), which provide information to clients
from servers always connected to the Internet.57 Over time, a few
51 Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consis-
tency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1378-84 (1989).
52 Jonathan Zittrain, What the Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property and
Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privication, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (2000).
53 William W. Fisher III & Christopher Yang, Peer-to-Peer Copying, at Introduction, at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ilaw/P2P.html (Nov. 18, 2001).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Clay Shirky, Listening to Napster, in PEER-TO-PEER: HARNESSING THE POWER OF DIs-
RUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 21, 35 (Andy Oram ed., 2001) [hereinafter PEER-TO-PEER].
57 ISPs can further be broken down into two separate groups: Online Service Providers -
such as America Online, Prodigy and Compuserve, who provide both Internet access as well as
a system for posting and exchanging content - and Internet Access Providers, who simply pro-
vide direct access to the Internet.
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of these privileged servers, serving millions of clients, have in-
creasingly dominated the Internet.58 This model works for almost
all content, from streaming videos to interactive games to online
shopping.5 9 As a result, ISPs have developed into a relatively new
form of governance in cyberspace because they maintain a sub-
stantial amount of private, consumer information regarding users'
online activities, and because they often control the transmission
and distribution of requested information. 60  For these reasons,
many consider the ISP the principal repository for all identifying
information regarding individual users and their Web activities.
In contrast, a peer-to-peer framework essentially erases the
hierarchical division between client and server, thus turning the
idea of a network of Internet governance on its head. 61  A peer-to-
peer model creates a mode of communication that treats each ma-
62chine as a separate and equal entity in the sharing of information.
This model enables individual computers to interact with one an-
other by making it possible for one computer to "ask" other com-
puters directly for a specified type of file.63 Each computer then
forwards the request to a second tier of computers, which in turn
forwards the request to a third tier, and so on.64 When the re-
quested file is located, it is automatically transmitted to the origi-
nal user.65  In this manner, peer-to-peer fragments transform each
node on the network into both client and server, allowing a file
transfer (or download) to be performed by a direct connection be-
tween both users, instead of through a single channel.66
58 Nelson Minar & Marc Hedlund, A Network of Peers, in PEER-TO-PEER, supra note 56,
at 3, 3-9.
59 Id. at 9.
60 See SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUS. ASS'N, STRETCHING THE FABRIC OF THE NET: EXAMIN-
ING THE PRESENT AND POTENTIAL OF PEER-TO-PEER TECHNOLOGIES 3 (2001) (hereinafter
SIIA] ("Whatever entity controls the central server also controls the information - a valuable
commodity.").
61 See Minar & Hedlund, supra note 58, at 3. There are three main categories of peer-to-
peer systems: centrally coordinated, hierarchical, and decentralized. Id. at 4-8. In a centrally
coordinated system, a central server, like Napster, mediates coordination between peers. Id. A
hierarchical peer-to-peer system organizes peers into different levels, and a local coordinator
mediates communication among peers in the same group. Id. at 7-8. In a decentralized system
(a true peer-to-peer framework), the program provides users with a virtual underground railroad
to exchange and share files, and to evade direct, centralized control. Id. at 5-7.
62 Id. at 4.
63 Fisher & Yang, supra note 53, at Introduction. These peer-to-peer "nodes" operate out-
side of the traditional registry of domain names and with significant autonomy from central
servers. Shirky, supra note 56 at 22.
64 Fisher & Yang, supra note 53, at Introduction.
65 Kathy Bowrey & Matthew Rimmer, Rip, Mix, Burn: The Politics of Peer to Peer and
Copyright Law, 7 FIRST MONDAY 8, at Part One (Aug. 2002), at http://www.firstmonday.dk/
issues/issue7_8/bowrey/index.html.
66 Fisher & Yang, supra note 53, at Introduction; see also Gene Kan, Gnutella, in PEER-
TO-PEER, supra note 56, at 94, 94-95 (describing how Gnutella, which uses a decentralized
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Although peer-to-peer frameworks seem deceptively simple,
their implications, both legally and socially, are extraordinarily
complex. They signal, for some, the end to the efficacy of censor-
ship, copyright, and other types of legal governance. Because
these networks are extremely difficult to control, it is possible for
individuals to store and exchange information freely without gov-
ernment intervention, even if the information has been censored in
some manner. 67  True peer-to-peer networks are also extremely
difficult to shut down because the nature of the technology makes
it nearly impossible to track the movement of information.68
Peer-to-peer networks, however, also create a crisis of privacy
as well as property, because they potentially transform the bounda-
ries between public and private. Writing on the future of the
Internet, John Perry Barlow triumphantly declared, "legal concepts
of property, expression, identity, movement, and context do not
apply to us. They are based on matter. There is no matter here., 69
As Barlow's powerful rhetoric suggests, the natures of both prop-
erty and identity have become transformed by their intangible,
evanescent character in cyberspace. Since property in cyberspace
is almost always wholly intangible in nature, the material condi-
tions that support the "private" nature of ownership in real space -
locks, borders, territorial space, and seclusion - are widely varying
in their power and efficacy. 70  Actual seclusion is effectively im-
possible, since everything is linked through networks, software,
and hardware. And privacy and security in cyberspace depend
most often on consumer sophistication and technical knowledge,
rather than a simple preference for seclusion.
At the same time, however, several scholars have observed
the prevailing tendency of individuals to behave as if cyberspace is
a "place" like any other.7' Cyberspace is often characterized in
framework, transfers files from one user to another); Minar & Hedlund, supra note 58, at 17
(describing how Napster operates).
67 Damien A. Riehl, Peer-to-Peer Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella and
Freenet Create a Copyright Nirvana or Gehanna?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1761, 1763-66
(2001); see also Theodore Hong, Performance, in PEER-TO-PEER supra note 56, at 203, 204;
Shirky, supra note 56, at 35.
68 Fisher & Yang, supra note 53, at Introduction.
69 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, in CRYPTO AN-
ARCHY, CYBERSTATES, AND PIRATE UTOPIAS 27, 29 (Peter Ludlow ed., 200 1).
70 See Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
217. For excellent background reading on this topic, see HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL
COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER (1993); David R. Johnson &
David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996);
Timothy Wu, When Law and the Internet First Met, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 171 (2000).
71 See Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital AntiCommons, 91
CAL. L. REV. 439, 453 (2003); Mark Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521
(2003).
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terms of "private" and "public" spaces: Some parts of the Web are
public, as are many chat rooms, whereas email is private.72 The
law, too, has embraced this temptation; recent case law is replete
with examples of territorial metaphor.73
On the one hand, our tendency towards territorial metaphor in
cyberspace is understandable; after all, both property and privacy
are inextricably linked to concepts of spatiality and exclusion. Yet
these tendencies pose troubling questions when we apply them to
cyberspace, because they often assume that the architecture of cy-
berspace, like real space, adequately balances protections for both
privacy and property. Unlike real space, where architecture and
simple geography precluded neighbors and the government from
peering in on each other's activities, today, the architecture of the
Internet (quite unlike its brick and mortar counterpart) facilitates,
rather than prevents, informational invasions.74 Put another way, a
peer-to-peer connection reconfigures both public and private space
by enabling information stored in one's home or office to be made
publicly accessible.
Consider the implications of a program called "Desk Swap."
Desk Swap is a program that makes a person's online desktop
visible to others across the Internet. When the software begins, it
takes a photograph of whatever is on a person's desktop and sends
it to the developer's computer, where it then joins a host of other
images that are then made visible to others. Given the extent to
which individuals often place personal information on their desk-
tops, the possibility of unintended exposure is enormous. Yet the
point of the program is not to reveal others' personal information;
there is another objective. The programmer's purpose is to enable
its users "to feel anew this sense of panic about the loss of privacy
and control in the digital age, which may inspire them to be more
cautious about protecting their digital selves. 75
72 See Hunter, supra note 71, at 454 (listing both private and public areas of cyberspace).
73 See id. at 480-93 (discussing cases referencing territorial metaphor).
74 See Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, I VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 56-
58 (1999). Two elements characterize traditional privacy considerations: the "monitored" and
the "searchable." Id. The monitored refers to "that part of one's life that is watched," that is,
the regular or persistent watching of people or machines, irrespective of whether the activities
are considered public or not. Id. at 57. However, the searchable refers to "the part of one's life
that leaves . . . a record," which comprises both the technologies of searching and the legal
protections against the use of such technologies. Id. at 56-58. While the monitored is transient
and erasable from memory, the searchable establishes a permanent record largely available over
time and therefore deserving of some protection. Id.; see also Natalie L. Regoli, A Tort for
Prying E-Eyes, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 267, 269 (2001) (stating that the absence of
physical boundaries enables others to regularly invade the privacy - and property - of others
"with greater ease, efficiency and power than has been experienced in the physical world").
7- See Matthew Mirapaul, A Reality Show for Your Desktop, but There's a Catch, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at E2.
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Likewise, since peer-to-peer systems reconfigure the bounda-
ries of private and public space, they necessarily raise concerns
about security, as well as trust between peers. As one study notes
on peer-to-peer systems:
How secure can one feel in a decentralized network? Is it
possible for someone to look at what's on your hard drive
when you log into a peer-to-peer network? The answers to
these questions lie in which peer-to-peer environment one
joins. Some have built in firewall-like mechanisms to warn
of hackers trying to access your computers, while others
leave your computer wide open....
Most consumer applications request that you leave your PC
on and accessible all the time. In such "open" systems, you
are permanently leaving a back door open to your PC with all
of the attendant issues of privacy, virus attacks and other se-
curity concerns.76
Although it is technically possible to employ some measures, such
as firewalls, to protect one's computer from unwanted invasion,
they are usually considered to be counterproductive to a file-
sharing environment.77 Moreover, one study found that a majority
of peer-to-peer users of Kazaa are unable to tell what files they
were sharing (sometimes incorrectly assuming that they were not
sharing any files when in fact they were sharing all files on their
hard drive).78 Such lack of knowledge raises the (very real) risk
that other peers are capable of accessing extremely personal in-
formation stored on one's hard drive, particularly one's credit
card, email correspondence, and financial or social security infor-
mation.79
2. Anonymity
Nevertheless, the nature of peer-to-peer cyberspace also ush-
ers a contradictory complication: We act as though we have perfect
anonymity in cyberspace, when in fact, much of the information
we produce is also subject to a great degree of surveillance. As
Daniel Solove has observed, the Internet "gives many individuals a
false sense of privacy. The secrecy and anonymity of the Internet
76 SIAA, supra note 60, at 12.
77 Id.
11 Nathaniel S. Good & Aaron Krekelberg, Usability and Privacy: A Study of P2P File-
Sharing, at I, available at http://www.hpI.hp.com/shl/papers/kazaa/KazaaUsability.pdf (last
visited Jan. 20, 2004).
79 Id.
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is often a mirage., 80 Put another way, the Internet portends an al-
most limitless possibility of identities, expressions, and activities;
at the same time, it promises a vast array of monitoring mecha-
nisms to ensure that the work of record keeping quietly continues.
Consider the seductive power of apparent anonymity. Cyber-
space allows for an illusory level of anonymity that is practically
impossible to procure in real space. This ability to shield one's
identity, in turn, allows for the creation of a kind of intellectual
property that is permeated and infused with anonymity as a pre-
condition for creative possibility. Perceptions of anonymity in
cyberspace have enabled a level of participation in public dis-
course unlike anything before, allowing similar individuals with
limited financial resources to "publish" information and opinions
on matters of public concern.8'
Moreover, the more strongly people perceive their anonymity,
the more likely they are to feel free to create and express different
identities and views in cyberspace.82 As Professor Sherry Turkle
has written, "When we step through the screen into virtual com-
munities, we reconstruct our identities on the other side of the
looking glass. 83 Even outside of structured forums, a user can
adopt a multiplicity of gender, sexual, racial, or other categorical
identities, invent accompanying personal histories, and engage in
an assortment of acts that she would probably not perform in real
life.84 In other words, virtual space allows individuals to construct
identities they choose for themselves, rather than those acquired at
birth.85 This ability to adopt transitory and multiple identities is at
the heart of cyberspace's limitless possibility.86
Obviously, the creation of such identities draws heavily on
perceptions of informational privacy. Initially, informational pri-
vacy evolved under the notion that personal papers fully and trans-
parently identified the people whose lives they represented.87 Yet
10 Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1092 (2002).
81 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace,
49 DUKE L.J. 855, 860 (2000).
82 See Shawn Helms, Translating Privacy Values with Technology, 7 B.U. J. Sc. & TECH.
L. 288, 301 (2001) ("Privacy enables anonymity and anonymity is privacy realized.").
83 Turkle argues that the Internet has enabled us to think about identity in terms of multi-
ple selves, rather than in terms of a singular, unitary self. SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE
SCREEN 177 (1995).
84 Id. at 212.
81 Id. at 226, 240.
86 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 33 (1999) (noting that
whereas real space requires that you reveal "your sex, your age, how you look, what language
you speak, whether you can see, whether you can hear, [and] how intelligent you are," cyber-
space requires only that you reveal your computer address).
87 Philip E. Agre, The Architecture of Identity: Embedding Privacy in Market Institutions,
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today, the perception of informational privacy extends, at least in
cyberspace, to something quite different: It covers the very act of
creating fictive personalities, in addition to the possibility of
anonymously publishing information online.
Yet, despite the pronounced privacy interests at stake, the de-
velopment of cyberspace has been characterized by a slow erosion
of privacy in favor of property. For example, since the law confers
property rights over profiles of consumer information to collectors,
rather than to the individual subject herself, it creates substantial
incentives for surreptitious monitoring of consumer activity. And
this, in turn, alters the fragile balance of privacy and property by
permitting the accumulation of data that is often enabled by care-
less consumers who unwittingly consent to such collections, but
who continue to retain expectations of informational privacy.
These changes are attributable, in part, to an innate transfor-
mation in the value of information itself. Although information
has always served as a resource, it was always relegated to the po-
sition of supporting other resources.88 Today, however, since the
advent of computer technology, information has become a valuable
commodity in and of itself, leading to an immense shift towards its
commercialization. As a result, the economic base of society has
shifted from industry to information, giving rise to such labels as
the "Information Revolution" or the "Information Society. 89 Vast
amounts of personal information are now primed for harvest, dis-
tribution, and disclosure to third parties on the Internet, often
without the individual's knowledge.90 Use of this information al-
lows companies to perfect the creation of a "virtual persona," or
"electronic persona," which comprises a profile of an individual
user's tastes, purchasing habits, Web sites visited, and other identi-
fying information. 91
This transition towards third-party ownership, has, in turn,
radically altered the preexisting balance between privacy and
property contemplated in real space by subordinating the protec-
tion of informational privacy to the accumulation of database
property. Today, techniques of data collection are especially per-
nicious because they are subtle, ongoing, largely unregulated, and
inextricably linked to a person's online activities. 92 Various enti-
2 INFO. COMM. & SoC'Y 1, 1-25 (1999).
88 Mell, supra note 18, at 12.
89 Id. at 18.
90 Id. at 3.
9 Id.
92 See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193, 1195-99 (1998) (discussing how the private sector seeks to exploit data commercially for
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ties collect an enormous amount of personal information from us-
ers with scant attention to the moral and legal privacy implications
raised by its collection.93 Web sites use "tracking software" that
logs information about users, which is then used for a variety of
purposes.94 ISPs are capable of tracking software downloaded by
individuals.95 These records are a form of identification: Web
server logs show that an individual using a particular ISP visited a
Web site on a certain date and time, and the ISP usually keeps re-
cords of the identity of the IP address holders.96 Others use "Web
bugs," which are small, invisible graphics placed on Web sites or
email messages to monitor the activities of individual users.97 On
email messages, Web bugs allow the creator of the message to
know when the message was read, to detect the IP address of an
anonymous user, and to determine if and when the message is for-
warded to others.98 Such methods of collection are also important
for another reason: They can often provide the blueprint for strate-
gies of piracy surveillance, as I will discuss in the next section.
3. Panopticism
Indeed, from both an architectural as well as a philosophical
perspective, cyberspace networks, particularly of the peer-to-peer
database marketing); Jonathan Krim, Web Firms Choose Profit over Privacy; Policies Can Hide
Sale of Customer Data, WASH. POST, July 1, 2003, at AI (noting that many Web sites promise
to protect consumer information from sale to a third party, but instead often rent the information
to others). For other studies on the monitoring of information in cyberspace, see generally
Roger Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, available at http://www.anu.edu.aul
people/Roger.Clarke/DV/CACM88.html (1988); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52
VAND. L. REV. 1609 (1999).
93 One study conducted by the FTC found that ninety-two percent of the 674 Web sites it
visited collected personal information from their visitors, but eighty-six percent of those did not
disclose their reasons for collecting the information or share what they did with the data after
collection. Michelle Z. Hall, Note, Internet Privacy or Information Privacy: Spinning Lies on
the World Wide Web, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 609, 610 (2002) (citing FTC Releases Re-
port on Consumers' Online Privacy, at http://www.ftc.gov/opal1998/06/privacy2.htm (June 4,
1998)).
94 In a tracking software system, every time a user requests certain information from a
content provider, that request is stored on an "access log" that stores the user's Internet address,
computer type, requested page, date, and time, most of which are transmitted back to the pro-
vider in order to track the Web site requested, the information found, and levels of activity on
the site, along with other types of information. Id. at 616.
95 Marc Waldman et al., Trust, in PEER-TO-PEER, supra note 56, at 242, 244.
96 Id. at 250-51.
97 John MacDonnell, Exporting Trust: Does E-Commerce Need a Canadian Privacy Seal
of Approval?, 39 ALTA. L. REV. 346, 355-56 (2001) (describing the various ways third parties
employ "Web bugs" online).
98 Lynn Chuang Kramer, Private Eyes Are Watching You: Consumer Online Privacy Pro-
tection - Lessons from Home and Abroad, 37 TEx. INT'L L.J. 387, 394-95 (2002); see also
ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., PRIVACY & HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF
PRIVACY LAWS AND DEVELOPMENTS 60 (2002).
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variety, bear much similarity to the Panopticon. The Panopticon
refers to the design of a prison that facilitates constant surveillance
by placing guards in a central tower, thereby creating a sense of
"conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic
functioning of power." 99 The panoptic design, first mentioned by
Jeremy Bentham and then further developed by the French phi-
losopher Michel Foucault, applied to many different types of dis-
ciplinary surveillance, including rehabilitation and education.1°°
Foucault's commentary is consciously tied to Bentham's own de-
scription, which consists of a central tower, bordered by windows
that are made capable of gazing into various cells; each of those
cells is also made capable of looking into each others' spaces.10'
Each cell, therefore, creates an illusion of solitariness, but ensures
that the person senses that he or she is being watched at the same
time.I°2
The effect of this construction of space and enclosure, for the
inmate, induces "a state of conscious and permanent visibility that
assures the automatic functioning of power."' 1 3 Its primary effect
draws upon a disciplinary process by which individuals internalize
the overseeing gaze of authority figures, and then eventually disci-
pline their behavior to comport with expectations of these figures,
irrespective of whether or not they were actually present and
watching at the time. By creating the illusion of constant surveil-
lance, individuals begin to internalize the feeling of being ob-
served. "[I]t is at once too much and too little," Foucault wrote,
"that the prisoner should be constantly observed by an inspector."
Rather, "the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at
any one moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so.
' ' 04
Any individual can operate the Panopticon, and no motive is
required; anyone was eligible, wrote Foucault, including "the curi-
osity of the indiscreet, the malice of a child, the thirst for knowl-
edge of a philosopher who wishes to visit this museum of human
nature, or the perversity of those who take pleasure in spying or
punishing."'1 5 Indeed, the more anonymous and temporary obser-
vation can be, the greater the anxiety of the person who is being
99 OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL
INFORMATION 9 (1993).
't°MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200 (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1979); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS (Miran Bro-
zovic ed., 1995).
101 FOUCAULT, supra note 100, at 200.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 201.
104 Id.
"05 Id. at 202.
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watched.10 6 As Professor Daniel Solove notes, "by constantly liv-
ing under the reality that one could be observed at any time, people
assimilate the effects of surveillance into themselves. They obey
not because they are monitored but because of their fear that they
could be watched. This fear alone is sufficient to achieve con-
trol." 0 7  Surveillance is prophylactic, it prevents legal transgres-
sions by transforming an external gaze into an internal one.o
0 8
While the panoptic metaphor has been crucial to understand-
ing disciplinary processes in real space, I would argue that it is
especially useful when applied to the effects of surveillance on the
Web. In a world where individuals store more and more personal
information on computers, peer-to-peer searches can become espe-
cially intrusive, particularly since many individuals often do not
realize what they are sharing online.' °9
Moreover, in a peer-to-peer environment, the traditional dis-
tinction between private and public space readily collapses, leav-
ing open a vast minefield of possibilities for invasion. Suddenly
everything - communications, files, stored pictures, online activi-
ties - can be monitored, revealed, and recorded at the same time.
The file sharing revolution renders certain files stored on individ-
ual computers potentially accessible," 0 from the most personal to
the most public information, facilitating "invasion without physi-
cal invasion.""' The identities and activities we adopt in cyber-
space can become transparently visible, compromising privacy and
identity. Moreover, in a peer-to-peer system, there is no hierarchy:
Every computer has the same authority to access data as every
other computer, whether owned by a state or private entity. Con-
sequently, the possibilities for information gathering are enor-
mous, irrespective of who authorizes or initiates the investiga-
tion. 12
106 Id.
107 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Infor-
mation Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1415 (2001).
108 Martin Jay, In the Empire of the Gaze: Foucault and the Denigration of Vision in Twen-
tieth-century French Thought, in FOUCAULT: A CRrITCAL READER 192 (David Couzens Hoy
ed., 1986).
o9 Michael Adler, Note, Cyberspace, General Searches, and Digital Contraband: The
Fourth Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105 YALE L.J. 1093, 1096 (1996).
10 Indeed, while some peer-to-peer programs allow a person to segregate shared files from
private ones, the dependability of these barriers varies according to the program. SIIA, supra
note 60, at 13 (discussing the characteristics of various file sharing technologies).
I Lessig, supra note 74, at 59.
12 Aside from Kazaa's widely publicized use of spyware, one recent study reports that
forty-five percent of the executable files traded on Kazaa, one of the most popular file sharing
services, contain malicious code-like viruses and Trojan horses. Some code was designed to
infect other files marked for sharing; others installed programs that enabled the sending of sparn
through the computer; and still others stole personal information and passwords saved on the
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Yet there is a vexing and important difference between pan-
optic strategies for surveillance in the real world and those used in
the peer-to-peer world. Until just recently, most individuals erro-
neously thought they were completely immune from surveillance.
Indeed, during the earliest period of its development, the peer-to-
peer world, ironically, carried a massive potential for widespread
surveillance, as well as powerful, and widespread, social and tech-
nological norms that favored (illegal) exchanges of copyrighted
material. Clad in the cloak of perceived anonymity, most indi-
viduals downloading or uploading files thought they could easily
escape detection (or at least disable possibilities for detection) by
using fake names, pseudonyms, or false information when register-
ing to join a file sharing network. 113
More recently, however, a transformation has taken place.
Panoptic control has just begun in the peer-to-peer realm; but, like
wiretapping in Olmstead, it involves a level of intangible invasion
and technological surveillance that seemingly escapes legal regula-
tion. In the next section, I will outline some of the various ways
content industries have sought to utilize the panoptic potential of
peer-to-peer communication for two purposes: first, to detect and
deter would-be infringers; and second, to alter the governing social
norms that operate in favor of online infringement.
II. THE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW
Obviously, the seduction - and danger - of the peer-to-peer
world is that it enables the seemingly anonymous and widespread
distribution of content, such as film, music, software, and text.
Unsurprisingly, the potential for unauthorized transmission of
copyrighted works has led some to characterize the Internet, for
better or worse, as a "pirate utopia."'"1 4 Yet despite the clear risk
of panoptic surveillance discussed in the previous section, peer-to-
peer networks are permeated with a high perception of cooperation
and trust between users, which raises the question of why, in the
face of such risks, individuals continue to cooperate so readily in
sharing their files with others.' 15
computer. See Kim Zetter, Kazaa Delivers More than Tunes, WIRED NEWS, at
http:lwww.wired.comlnewslbusiness/0, 1367,61 852,00.html/wn-ascii (Jan. 9, 2004).
113 See generally supra Part I.B.
14 See Hakim Bey, The Temporary Autonomous Zone, in CRYPTO ANARCHY, CYBER-
STATES, AND PIRATE UTOPIAS, supra note 69, at 401 (comparing online communities to our
perception of pirate communities).
1 5 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of
Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 508 (2003).
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For some time, file sharers believed that no one was watching
and millions continued to upload and download copyrighted files
with impunity. According to Professor Lior Strahilevitz, an addi-
tional explanation for such cooperative behavior stemmed from
"charismatic code," which involves technologies that magnify co-
operative behavior and mask uncooperative behavior in peer-to-
peer networks." 16 Since peer-to-peer applications are designed to
encourage cooperation by as many users as possible, they har-
nessed actual members of the community to enforce norms of file
sharing and to encourage reciprocity.'' 7 Another explanation for
widespread complicity in copyright infringement is provided by
Professor Tim Wu, who argues that peer-to-peer networks exploit
an important ambiguity regarding ethics of home copying."
8
Unlike norms against stealing in real space, which are generally
well-established, peer-to-peer networks are designed to "look and
feel more like non-commercial home copying of copyrighted con-
tent," thereby blurring the distinction between "stealing" and
"copying."'1 9
Today, the RIAA, a trade association whose membership pro-
duces ninety percent of all sound recordings in the United States,
fights "a well-nigh constant battle against Internet piracy, monitor-
ing the Internet daily, and routinely shutting down pirate Websites
by sending cease-and-desist letters and bringing lawsuits."' 20 The
recording industry makes good on its suggestion of constant activ-
ity: Its armies of anti-piracy investigators routinely crawl through
the Internet, including university networks, searching and logging
presumed unauthorized uses of copyrighted material.
As part of this program, anti-piracy forces have also implicitly
equated Internet piracy with other types of undesirable criminality.
One method focuses primarily on consumer education; the RIAA
actively propagates the notion that downloading MP3s, or copying
other copyrighted works, is simply another form of theft.' 2' As
part of this attack on consumer downloading, the RIAA relies on
using the term "piracy" to denote an alarmingly expansive array of
"61d. at 510.
171d. at 534-75. In one example, a Gnutella screen falsely represented to users: "The
other half of Gnutella is giving back. Almost everyone on GnutellaNet shares their stuff." Id. at
550.
,,8 See Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 685 (2003).
t
9 Id.
120 Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th
Cir. 1999).
121 See RIAA, Penalties of Piracy, at http://www.iiaa.com/issues/piracy/penalties.asp (last
visited Oct. 17, 2003) (defining different copyrights and outlining possible penalties for copy-
fight infringement).
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activities. The use of piracy to refer to the unauthorized duplica-
tion of original commercial products, 22 or counterfeiting, 23 dates
back to the nineteenth century. 24  Today, however, the term also
suggests the growing power of content owners to discursively de-
fine much more expansive controls over content itself.12 5
Suddenly, for the RIAA's purposes, it seems that download-
ing music for personal purposes is "piracy," equated by sheer
rhetoric to organized, usually criminal, counterfeiting of intellec-
tual property. So, too, is sharing music, lending someone a tape,
or perhaps even recording a sample of music on an answering ma-
chine - all of these acts, seemingly innocuous and innocent just a
few years ago, today arguably fall under the rubric of "piracy," a
metaphor suggesting that these acts are somehow contemporane-
ously equivalent to crossing the high seas, invading a ship, stealing
its contents, and threatening life. The RIAA's Web site, for exam-
ple, declares that piracy is "old as the Barbary coast, new as the
Internet."' 12 6 Its announcement observes:
No black flags with skulls and crossbones, no cutlasses, can-
nons, or daggers identify today's pirates. You can't see them
coming; there's no warning shot across your bow.... To-
122Anderson v. Nidorf, 26 F.3d 100, 101 n.1 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting from Piracy and
Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982, 18 U.S.C. § 2311 (1982)).
123 As Judge Posner observed, "Piracy and the infringement of copyrights, titles (presuma-
bly of books, songs, products, services, and so forth), and slogans (advertising and other) are
simply different forms of theft (broadly conceived) of information." Curtis-Universal, Inc. v.
Sheboygan Emergency Med. Servs., Inc., 43 F.3d 1119, 1124 (7th Cir. 1994).
124 See Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454 (1818) (describing an alleged use of a flour
manufacturing machine as "piracy"); see also Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072 (dis-
cussing piracy as the unauthorized copying of copyrighted materials).
125 Indeed, the term "piracy" is now ubiquitous throughout media commentary on intellec-
tual property law, a largely unhelpful but rhetorically powerful term that is often bandied about
by lawyers and activists to denote a vast array of seemingly "illegal" activities. See Jessica
Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 342-50 (2002). Litman states:
Piracy used to be about folks who made and sold large numbers of counterfeit cop-
ies. Today, the term 'piracy' seems to describe any unlicensed activity....
Content owners argue that the reason consumers are now pirates is that tech-
nology now makes it possible for small-scale unauthorized users to commit grand
theft. From the so-called pirates' point of view, though, they are doing the same sort
of things unlicensed users have always done - making copies of things for their own
consumptive use, sharing their copies with their friends, or taking the works apart to
see how they operate. What has changed is not the behavior but the epithet. Con-
tent owners are understandably concerned that in a digital environment, conduct that
used to be harmless might have the same effect as the commercial sale of large
numbers of counterfeit copies. They have managed to persuade a substantial seg-
ment of the public that if behavior theoretically could have the same effect as piracy,
it must be piracy, and must therefore reflect the same moral turpitude we attach to
piracy, even if is the same behavior that we all called legitimate before.
Id. at 349-50.
126 RIAA, Anti-Piracy, at http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/default.asp (last visited Oct.
17,2003).
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day's pirates operate not on the high seas but on the Internet,
in illegal CD factories, distribution centers, and on the street.
The pirate's credo is still the same - why pay for it when it's
so easy to steal? The credo is as wrong as it ever was. Steal-
ing is still illegal, unethical, and all too frequent in today's
digital age. That is why RIAA continues to fight music pi-
racy. 127
In the first half of 2001, for example, the RIAA announced that its
efforts led to a record number of arrests, product seizures, and
guilty pleas and convictions.1
28
Part of the reason for the growth of such strategies ultimately
stems from the nature of copyright law itself. Copyright law has
traditionally relied on private entities - owners, private detectives,
creators - for its execution. Although the No Electronic Theft
Law Act ("NET Act"), 29 for example, provides for criminal prose-
cutions for infringement (even where no monetary profit or com-
mercial gain can be derived from the infringing activity), most
copyright actions tend to involve private, rather than public, modes
of enforcement. A decision to enter into a lawsuit over infringe-
ment is completely discretionary to the copyright owner,' 30 as is a
copyright owner's ability to silence the speech of others through
accusations of infringement. Moreover, copyright law has been
infused with gatekeeper concepts, in that third parties often play
key roles to prevent infringement.' 3' Following this model, copy-
271 Id. The RIAA defines music piracy in four specific categories: (i) pirate recordings, or
the unauthorized duplication of only the legitimate recordings, minus the trade packaging nor-
mally associated with the music product; (2) counterfeit recordings, or unauthorized recordings
of the prerecorded sound as well as the unauthorized duplication of original artwork, label,
trademark, and packaging; (3) underground or "bootleg" recordings, or unauthorized recordings
of live concerts or those broadcast on radio or television; and (4) online piracy, involving the
unauthorized uploading of a copyrighted sound recording to make it publicly available,
downloading the sound recording from the Internet site (even if it is not resold), or certain uses
of "streaming" technology from the Internet. Id.
128 See RIAA, RIAA Releases 2001 Physical Anti-Piracy Figures, at http://www.riaa.coml
newsnewsletter/040502.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2003) (discussing copyright enforcement
methods utilized in 2001).
129 No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147 (1997) (codified in sections of 17
& 18 U.S.C.). Under these provisions, individuals can also be held civilly liable for actual
damages of lost profits. Id. Online infringement of copyrighted music is punishable by up to
three years in prison and $250,000 in fines, or six years for repeat offenders. See Karen J. Bem-
stein, The No Electronic Theft Act: The Music Industry's New Instrument in the Fight Against
Internet Piracy, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 325 (2000) (discussing the NET Act and sentencing
guidelines under it); Michael Coblenz, Intellectual Property Crimes, 9 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH.
235, 250-52 (1999) (discussing changes in the criminal law after the passage of the NET Act);
Heather Jacobson & Rebecca Green, Computer Crimes, 39 AM. CRIm. L. REV. 273, 288-92
(2002) (discussing the NET Act and other acts regarding the illegality of online piracy).
130This observation extends to the patent context as well. See John R. Thomas, Liberty
and Property in the Patent Law, 39 Hous. L. REV. 569, 596 (2002).
131 See Reinier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strat-
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right law has traditionally imposed liability on parties who were
capable of copying and distributing works, like book publishers,
record manufacturers, film studios, and others capable of produc-
ing works on a massive scale.
32
Today, the seemingly intractable problem of piracy has led to
the creation of massive offensives - criminal, civil, and interna-
tional - spearheaded by private intellectual property owners in re-
cent years. Private companies routinely team forces with law en-
forcement officials to investigate and prosecute individuals for
trafficking in pirated materials. 33  The music industry has also
spawned a calculated attempt to shift the political and economic
costs of copyright enforcement onto third parties, particularly
ISPs.134  A constant drumbeat of threatened suits, both direct and
contributory, has resulted in a host of activities taken by ISPs out
of fear of liability for copyright infringement.
The results have been effective. Today, employers and uni-
versities have banned the use of file sharing software, fired em-
ployees for engaging in acts of copyright infringement at work,
and threatened to prosecute and expel students for their file sharing
activities.135  Some colleges refuse to permit individuals to send
MP3 files at all, irrespective of whether or not the files fall under
egy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53-54 (1986).
32 See Wu, supra note 118, at 712.
133 See RIAA, RIAA Releases Mid-year Anti-Piracy Statistics, at http://www.riaa.com
news/newsletter/press200l/lOO9Ol.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2003) (reporting that the RIAA
works closely with federal, state, and local officials, and that it aided in 1,762 arrests and in-
dictments in the first six months of 2001). In 1999, for example, Jeffrey Levy, a student at the
University of Oregon, pled guilty to criminal copyright infringement for his use of school com-
puters to post software and music on the Web for others to download. Ashbel S. Green, Net
Piracy Gets First Conviction: UO Student, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Aug. 21, 1999, available at
1999 WL 5367412. In announcing the prosecution's case, Assistant Attorney General James K.
Robinson declared:
Mr. Levy's case should serve as a notice that the Justice Department has
made prosecution of Internet piracy one of its priorities .... Those who engage in
this activity, whether or not for profit, should take heed that we will bring federal re-
sources to bear to prosecute these cases. This is theft, pure and simple.
Id.
134 See RIAA, What the RIAA Is Doing About Piracy, at http://www.riaa.comissues/
piracy/riaa.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2003) (describing the RIAA's strategy of using subpoenas
that require ISPs to identify the operators of sites that host infringing files).
135 Consider the recent letter issued to students at Pennsylvania State University, which
warned:
The software, record, and movie industries are stepping up their enforcement
of. copyright laws. They are using computer technology to detect those who run
servers or simply download something they have no right to possess. The likelihood
of being caught is growing every day and prosecutions will become more fre-
quent.... Messing up your future is a steep price to pay for music or a video.
Rodney Erickson, Provost, An Important Message on a Key Issue from the Provost (Mar. 31,
2003) (on file with author).
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fair use or are taken from the public domain. 136  A multitude of
ISPs act immediately after receiving notice from intellectual prop-
erty owners, taking down Web sites and revealing the identities of
their subscribers without any concern for whether or not the al-
leged infringement is actually meritorious in character. 13' The
RIAA has attempted to threaten ISPs and universities with con-
tributory infringement suits if they do not act immediately to re-
veal the identity of subscribers, terminate the subscribers' Internet
connections, and issue generalized threats of criminal prosecution
to the student body.1 38 In April 2003, the RIAA took another step:
It filed suits against four college students accused of using internal
college networks to facilitate file trading, and announced its plan
to sue others. 39  Since then, over three hundred people have been
sued for copyright infringement, including a twelve-year-old
girl.'40
As a result, in the wake of Napster and the DMCA, peer-to-
peer file sharing has become the new proxy for criminality and
136 See Email from Rebecca Tushnet, Fordham University, to Sonia K. Katyal, Associate
Professor, Fordham University School of Law (Apr. I, 2003) (on file with author) (noting that
sending MP3s to university email accounts is not permitted).
1-7 See, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unsafe Harbors: Abusive DMCA Subpoenas
and Takedown Demands, available at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/20030926_unsafeharbors.php
(last visited Jan. 21, 2004) (offering examples of ISPs forced to take down specific, non-
infringing information); Privacy & Piracy: The Paradox of llegal File Sharing on Peer-to-Peer
Networks and the Impact of Technology on the Entertainment Industry: Hearing Before the
Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. I
(Sept. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Privacy & Piracy, Hearing Before the Senate Permanent Sub-
comm. on Investigations] (statement of Lorraine Sullivan) (observing that Time Warner, Sulli-
van's cable provider, was "forced" to release her personal information to the RIAA). Let me
emphasize here that I am not arguing for the protection of the anonymity of copyright infringers
at any cost. Instead, I am arguing that strategies of surveillance are overbroad by design; thus,
they ensnare both offenders and non-offenders, and provide little protection to those harmed by
such technologies. See infra Part II.
138 In 2003, the RIAA sent letters to every university and college in the United States, as
well as the top one thousand corporations, reminding them of their obligations as ISPs. See
RIAA, Actions Taken by U.S. Music Community to Step Up Public Education Efforts in Just the
Past Twelve Months, at http://www.riaa.comnnews/newsletter/062503-d.asp (June 25, 2003). In
September 2002, the administrators of the University of Southern California warned students
that using peer-to-peer file sharing networks could force the university to deny network access
to students, warning that the entertainment industry has been "obtaining snapshots" of Internet
IP addresses and a list of files being traded by people across the country. See Brad King, USC
to Students: No Sharing Files, WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/
0,1285,55159,00.html (Sept. 13, 2002).
139 See Reuters, RIAA Sues College File Traders, WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.coml
news/technology/0, 1282,58340,00.html (Apr. 3, 2003).
140In September 2003, the RIAA sued 261 people; in October, the RIAA sued another 80
individuals. See Katie Dean, RIAA Sues 80 More Swappers, WIRED NEWS at
http://www.wired.comnews/digiwood/0,1412,61028,00.html (Oct. 30, 2003); Katie Dean,
Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA, WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/
0,1412,60366,00.html (Sept. 10, 2003); Kristen Philipkoski, Battle Not over for File Sharers,
WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0, 1412,61714,00.html (Dec. 23, 2003).
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infringement.' 4' Just as the law's failure to protect individual pri-
vacy has facilitated the creation of consumer surveillance, it has
also enabled intellectual property owners to develop similarly pan-
optic strategies to address the problem of piracy. Intellectual
property owners have responded to peer-to-peer file sharing in a
way that exposes a clear synergy between consumer monitoring
and copyright enforcement. 42  They have done so by gradually
expanding the law to control the dynamics of Web architecture,
informational privacy, and anonymity, and by enabling intellectual
property owners to detect and defend their products against unau-
thorized uses. In the following section, I offer a new reading of
Napster, 43 arguing that the DMCA's treatment of contributory li-
ability - as well as other anti-piracy initiatives - perpetuates a con-
flict between privacy, speech, and intellectual property that feeds
into the creation of piracy surveillance.
A. Origins of Piracy Surveillance
Until Napster was announced, anti-piracy laws, though perva-
sive and expanding in power, largely escaped the public eye. Yet
on February 12, 2001, everything changed. The Ninth Circuit
dealt a substantial blow to the file sharing community when it is-
sued its landmark opinion, which affirmed in part a preliminary
injunction against Napster, Inc., a corporation that developed soft-
ware to facilitate the transmission of MP3 files.144  Napster's
search and "hotlist" functions allowed users to search for a particu-
lar song or to keep a list of previously accessed users handy so that
they could be notified if others from their hotlist were logged into
the system. Most significantly, Napster software maintained a
rough index of files available to facilitate transfer of MP3 music, a
factor that suggested an element of centralization to its peer-to-
peer format. 1
45
The RIAA claimed that Napster users were engaged in the
"wholesale reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works, all
141 See Aaron M. Bailey, A Nation of Felons: Napster, the NET Act, and the Criminal
Prosecution of File-Sharing, 50 Am. U. L. REV. 473 (2000) (offering an excellent treatment of
the criminal implications of illegal file sharing).
'
4 2 See generally PEER-TO-PEER, supra note 56 (discussing the impact of peer-to-peer and
where it will go in the future).
143 A&M Records Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
1441d. at 1011. See generally Michael W. Carroll, Disruptive Technology and Common
Lawmaking: A Brief Analysis of A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 5 (2002) (discussing the implications of the Napster decision); Stephanie Greene, Reconcil-
ing Napster with the Sony Decision and Recent Amendments to Copyright Law, 39 Am. Bus.
L.J. 57 (2001) (discussing the effects of the Napster decision on copyright law).
145Napster, 239 F.3d at 1012.
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constituting direct infringement."'' 46  In addition to Napster, the
suit named a number of anonymous Jane Does - consumers who
had been using Napster - and various universities, including Yale
University, the University of Southern California, and Indiana
University, alleging that they were complicit in the infringe-
ment. 47  The plaintiffs argued that these Napster users were in-
fringers who were facilitated by the company's software and sup-
port. 148 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed, observing that Nap-
ster's users violated two of the copyright holders' exclusive rights:
the rights of reproduction and distribution. 1
49
At the time, almost no scholars looked beyond the relationship
between law and technology to focus on the effect of Napster and
the DMCA on informational privacy and the protection of personal
identity, an omission that looms large four years later. Napster,
following the DMCA, has privatized the protection of copyright,
unwittingly creating incentives for content owners to engage in
self-help surveillance of consumer activities through peer-to-peer
frameworks. Napster's neat standard of contributory liability cre-
ated a power-sharing agreement of sorts, in which intellectual
property owners shouldered the responsibility to police the Internet
for evidence of unauthorized uses, and ISPs faced the responsibil-
ity of disabling access to these infringing works after receiving
proper notice under the DMCA. 5°
Following the DMCA, the Napster court established a set of
similar directives for ISPs to follow in addressing the infringing
activities of their users.' 5' Under these provisions, an ISP is re-
'461d. at 1013. In April 2000, when Metallica filed suit against Napster in Los Angeles
District Court for copyright infringement and racketeering, it delivered to Napster 60,000 pages
of documents identifying the usemames of people who made Metallica songs available online
and demanded that Napster block them from using the service. Fisher & Yang, supra note 53,
at Case Study 1: Napster. Napster complied and blocked 317,377 users from using its service
the following month. Id.
147 Bowrey & Rimmer, supra note 65, at Part One.
'
4 5Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013.
14 9 1d. at 1013-15.
'
50 See WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act; and Online Copyright Liability
Limitation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2180 Before the House Subcomm. on Courts
and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 89 (1997) [herein-
after WIPO, Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property] (state-
ment of Roy Neel, President, United States Telephone Association). As Neel explained:
We believe that the task of ferreting out copyright infringement on the Inter-
net should fall to the copyright owner. Today, copyright owners have access to a
large array of Internet search engines and "spiders" to sniff out material they know
belongs to them (unlike the ISPs, who cannot be certain who may have recently pur-
chased which copyrighted material). Once the copyright owners discover infringe-
ment, they can bring it to the attention of the ISPs. It is at this point that the ISPs
can sensibly act.
Id.
151 See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027-28; see also Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider
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quired either to identify the subscriber and/or to take down the
posting as long as minimal assertions of a "good faith" belief in
infringement are met. 5 2  The governing law has held that "one
who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be
held liable as a 'contributory' infringer."'' 53 Thus, if an ISP "learns
of specific infringing material available on [its] system and fails to
purge such material from the system, [it] knows of and contributes
to direct infringement."'' 54  Moreover, if the ISP engages in any
"personal conduct" that encourages or assists the infringement, it
is also liable for contributory infringement. 55 The actual words of
the DMCA, however, exempt an ISP from contributory liability for
copyright infringement unless the ISP has proper notice of the in-
fringing material and has failed expeditiously to remove it. 156 This
means that unless the ISP has notice that one of its sites contains
pirated MP3 files, it is under no obligation to search out such in-
fringing material on its servers. Liability is also limited where an
online provider is "unwittingly linking or referring users to sites
containing infringing materials."'
' 57
Taken together, these measures, at first glance, might suggest
that the DMCA was relatively responsive to the concerns of ISPs
in avoiding liability for the infringing activities of their subscrib-
ers. Yet, if one looks closer, it is clear something is missing from
this picture: an asserted commitment to consumer privacy. Al-
though the DMCA, as well as the Napster court, admirably at-
tempted to set forth a framework for contributory liability for ISPs,
building on the substantial body of literature and law on third-
party liability, it failed to establish or affirmatively suggest the
need for any privacy protections for individual subscribers, nor did
Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment,
88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1881-82 (2000). The DMCA also relieves ISPs of monetary liability for
temporary storage, passive transmission, or retransmission of materials, provided that the ISP
meets certain structural and technological requirements. The actual words of the DMCA ex-
empt an ISP from contributory liability for copyright infringement unless the ISP has notice of
the infringing material and has failed expeditiously to remove it. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(l)(A)-(C)
(2000).
152 See Yen, supra note 151, at 1881.
-53 Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
197 1) (footnote omitted).
'5Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
'551d. at 1019. In applying these tests, the court concluded that Napster "knowingly en-
courage[d] and assist[ed] the infringement of plaintiffs' copyrights," because Napster had both
actual and constructive knowledge that its users exchanged copyrighted music. Id. at 1020; see
also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (defining and discussing contributory infringement).
156 Fisher & Yang, supra note 53, at Readings.
157 Id. (quoting the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2000)).
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it offer any guidelines in detecting piracy. Nor did it even require
substantive judicial oversight or confirmation of a legitimate copy-
right dispute.
These problems become particularly acute when we turn to
the peer-to-peer world, which was "not even a glimmer in any-
one's eye when the DMCA was enacted."'' 58 Consider, for exam-
ple, the difficult relationship that ISPs have with their subscribers
after Napster. The DMCA has a section entitled "Protection of
Privacy," which provides that an ISP is not required to monitor its
service or to affirmatively seek facts indicating infringing activity,
except to the extent that standard technical measures require. 159
Yet the vast array of ways in which consumers' online activities
have been subjected to monitoring (as the next section will detail)
demonstrates that this provision has been violated regularly - not
by ISPs directly, but by intellectual property owners who have
embarked on an endless journey through the Internet to detect the
identities of those engaging in allegedly unauthorized uses of their
material.
Why has this occurred? Part of the answer involves the Nap-
ster opinion itself, which requires evidence of actual knowledge of
specific acts of infringement, but then fails to explain what consti-
tutes acceptable methods of searching for such information.'60 Ab-
sent specific information which identifies infringing activity, the
Napster court concluded that a computer system operator cannot
be held liable for contributory infringement merely because the
structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted
files. 161
158 In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 38 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Brief
of Amici Curiae Alliance for Public Technology, et al., at 6), rev'd, Recording Indus. Ass'n of
Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs. Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
'59 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (2000).
'6°Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021 ("[l]f a computer system operator learns of specific infring-
ing material available on his system and fails to purge such material from the system, the opera-
tor knows of and contributes to direct infringement."). Absent specific information that identi-
fies infringing activity, a court cannot hold a computer system operator liable for contributory
infringement merely because the structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted
material. Id. Despite this balance of interests between copyright owners and ISPs, some pri-
vacy advocates previously expressed concerns that the processes used to identify the direct
infringer gave "too much latitude to those who might pursue fishing expeditions" for evidence
of infringement. The WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House
Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 16 (1998) [hereinafter WIPO, Hearing on H.R. 2281 Before
the Subcomm. on Telecommunications] (testimony of Marc Rotenberg, Electronic Privacy In-
formation Center).
161 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020. Indeed, to the Napster court's credit, it did attempt to carve
out a small area for permissible peer-to-peer transmission by recognizing the possibility for
substantial non-infringing uses of Napster. The court declined to impute liability to Napster on
the basis of its peer-to-peer file sharing technology alone. Being governed by Sony Corporation
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Yet the Ninth Circuit's decision to shift the burden to the mu-
sic industry to identify infringing material symbolizes a crucial,
and overlooked, transition into piracy surveillance. 62 By placing
the burden on copyright owners to identify potential infringers,
Napster and the DMCA unwittingly expanded the reach of private
regimes of copyright enforcement. The DMCA's lack of clarity
has led to the creation of a new kind of surveillance that enables
content owners to search the Internet for unauthorized distributions
of their products and creations. An entire industry has sprung up,
seemingly overnight, that searches through individuals' hard
drives, Web sites, and chat rooms to find evidence of infringement.
Moreover, although there are some protections for ISPs under
the DMCA, these tend to exacerbate existing tensions between the
free speech and privacy interests of end users. Consider the no-
tice-and-takedown provision. Under the DMCA's "safe harbor"
provisions, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512, certain service providers
may avoid contributory liability if they engage in certain highly
specialized conditions. These safe harbors apply to ISPs that may
be: (a) transmitting, routing, or providing connections for infring-
ing material; (b) caching, or temporarily and intermittently storing
infringing material; (c) hosting a user who may store infringing
material on a network that is controlled or operated by or for the
ISP, as long as the ISP acts expeditiously to remove or deny access
to the material, among other requirements; and (d) linking or refer-
ring users to an online location that contains infringing material by
using information location tools like a directory, index, or hyper-
text link, among others. 1
63
Sections (b), (c) and (d), however, require ISPs to comply
with notice-and-takedown, which requires the provider to "expedi-
tiously remove or disable access to" infringing material upon re-
ceipt of a "notification of claimed infringement" from a copyright
owner that complies with certain requirements. 164 Once proper
of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), the Napster court observed,
"We are compelled to make a clear distinction between the architecture of the Napster system
and Napster's conduct in relation to the operational capacity of the system." Napster, 239 F.3d
at 1020.
162 The court decided that Napster's service could continue, as long as the music industry
provided notice to Napster of the unauthorized copyrighted works and files available on the
system. After the decision was remanded to the district court, the music industry began the
difficult process of filtering authorized from unauthorized titles, a project that was bitterly op-
posed by Napster executives, who continued to ask the Ninth Circuit for relief from the intrusive
measures used to search for files on the system. See Associated Press, Judge Keeps Heat on
Napster, WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,45184,00.html (July 12,
2001).
163 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (2000).
'
64 See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d
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notice is given, the burden of compliance then shifts to the service
provider. If the provider fails to comply with the notice-and-
takedown request, then it may lose its immunity under the
DMCA.'65
As a result of these guidelines, intellectual property owners
have undertaken a program of monitoring for piracy, and ISPs
have developed a response system that acts almost immediately to
"take down" allegedly infringing material in order to avoid allega-
tions of contributory liability. 166 As I have suggested, ISPs play a
key role in enforcing copyright law for two reasons. First, they
serve as the conduit by which the intellectual property owner iden-
tifies the subscriber, and second, under the DMCA, they are forced
either to take down the infringing material or to terminate Internet
access to the subscriber.167  Thus, they are often the only barriers
between ordinary citizens and the surveillance measures used by
content owners to identify them. 168  As a result, ISPs are often
caught between two conflicting motivations: the need to protect
1229, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
165 See Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Notice and Takedown Under the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 1I, 2002, at 3. The notice-and-takedown provisions have
two other aspects that are especially important: first, they are usually limited to situations where
the ISP is "hosting" an online site at its own servers; for this reason, the ISP receives a limited
scope of immunity as long as it removes or disables access to the site. Second, and equally
significant, the DMCA provision also provides for a "counter-notification" procedure that en-
ables the Web site owner to dispute accusations of infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(B)-
(g)(3) (2000). Finally, the statute also provides for limited damages and attorney's fees if mate-
rial is improperly removed as the result of a misrepresentation. See id. § 512(f).
166Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet Dis-
pute Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 151 (2000). Thornburg states:
The notice and take-down provisions of the DMCA are . . . privately-
operated. They depend on turning the ISP into the copyright holder's enforcer.
Thus a private copyright holder complains to a private ISP, which in turn privately
implements the remedy of disabling access to the challenged portions of a Web site.
Unless the Web site owner files a lawsuit, the entire process takes place out of the
public eye. It is commenced by a private party in a private setting and enforced by
another private party. There is no court, no hearing, and no decision on the issue of
copyright infringement.
Id. at 189.
167 See id. at 171.
168 See WIPO, Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property,
supra note 150, at 77 (statement of Robert W. Holleyman H1, President, Business Software Alli-
ance). Holleyman stated:
Often in conducting intemet anti-piracy cases, we can locate the source of the
material as a particular site on a service provider's system, but because the Internet
is essentially an environment replete with "aliases," we cannot determine the iden-
tity of the person. This makes it quite hard to proceed with prosecution, and it
would be a valuable addition to the approach taken by the bill for it to also provide
incentives for service providers to share information, under appropriate circum-
stances, about the infringer's identity.
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others' intellectual property and the need to protect their consum-
ers' privacy and freedom of expression.
Consider the Verizon case discussed at the outset of this pa-
per. In 2003, the RIAA issued a notice to Verizon regarding one
of its subscribers' activities in a test case that involved the reach of
the DMCA's special subpoena provision, known as Section
512(h). 69  In the past, these subpoenas (which disclosed the sub-
scriber's name, address, and contact information) almost always
involved individuals who stored the infringing material on the
ISP's own servers, thereby making it possible for the ISP to "take
down" the infringing material. However, in this case the allegedly
"infringing" information was stored on the user's own computer
hard drive, not on Verizon's servers.1
70
Consequently, Verizon refused to comply with the subpoena,
explaining, "[n]o files of the Customer are hosted, stored, or
cached by [Verizon].'' According to Verizon, the DMCA did
not authorize a subpoena when the offending material is stored on
a person's home computer, as opposed to the Verizon network,
since the applicable provision is addressed to "material that resides
on a system or network controlled or operated by or for [a] service
provider.' 72  Because the individual's files resided on the home
computer, and not the network, Verizon contended that it was "not
involved with its subscriber's activities, except at most, as a pas-
sive conduit within the meaning of subsection 512(a).' 7 3  It
claimed that the subpoena was limited only to "[i]nformation re-
siding on systems or networks at direction of users." 74  Again,
since the material was stored on a person's home computer, and
'69See DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(2)(C) (2000).
'7
0 See Brief for RIAA at 7, In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C.
2003) (No. 02-MS-0323). On July 24, 2002, the RIAA delivered a letter along with the sub-
poena alleging that a computer on Verizon's Internet service was "distributing to the public for
download unauthorized copies of hundreds of copyrighted sound recordings owned by RIAA
member companies." The letter, consistent with the notice requirements of the DMCA, speci-
fied the subscriber's IP address, along with a list of the recordings it made available for
downloading. Apparently, the individual in question made these files available by Kazaa, a
peer-to-peer file sharing mechanism. See Brief for Verizon at 6, In re Verizon (No. 02-MS-
0323).
'71 Brief for RIAA at 8, In re Verizon (No. 02-MS-0323).
172 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) (2000); Brief for Verizon at 3, In re Verizon (No. 02-MS-
0323); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 29
(D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Verizon as stating that "'The allegedly infringing contents of the
[downloaded files] do not reside on any system or network controlled or operated by [Verizon],
but ... are stored on the hardware of the Customer."). For this reason alone, Verizon argued
that neither § 512(c)(3)(A) or §512(h) was applicable. Brief for Verizon, In re Verizon (No. 02-
MS-0323).
173 Brief for Verizon at 3, 7, In re Verizon (No. 02-MS-0323).
1
74 Id.
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not Verizon's servers, Verizon contended that the DMCA did not
require it to release the subscriber's identity to the RIAA.
According to Verizon, the RIAA was seeking to expand Sec-
tion 512(h) notification to cover "all Internet users" who stored
material on their home servers, not just ISPs who stored infringing
material on their networks. 175 Verizon stated that the RIAA pro-
posed "a dazzlingly broad subpoena power that would allow any
person, without filing a complaint, to invoke the coercive power of
a federal court to force disclosure of the identity of any user of the
Internet, based on a mere assertion in a form . . that the user is
engaged in infringing activity."
1 76
In response, the RIAA threatened to subject Verizon to a suit
for contributory infringement, explaining that the safe harbor pro-
visions of the DMCA only protect an ISP from liability for its own
acts of copyright infringement, and not from refraining to respond
to a valid subpoena seeking the identity of one of its subscribers.
177
In response, Verizon claimed that the DMCA provisions clearly
demonstrate that Congress contemplated the material residing on
its system. Verizon explained that if the material were stored on
the person's individual computer, and not Verizon's network, it
would have been impossible to disable access to it. Indeed, the
only way Verizon could conceivably comply with the DMCA's
provisions would be to cancel the user's subscription account, an
overbroad sanction that would terminate the user's access to appli-
cations that had nothing to do with the alleged infringement.
78
Had Congress intended such a result, it responded, it would have
drafted a clearer statute towards that intention. 79  "If all that is
required is an assertion of suspected infringement and a 'freestand-
ing' notice of infringement," Verizon predicted, "any copyright
owner could issue such a subpoena."
'180
Given the fact that almost everyone can be a copyright owner
in cyberspace, Verizon contended that the RIAA's construction
175 Id. at 3.
176 Verizon argued:
Even if only users to the Kazaa peer-to-peer file-sharing software are considered,
RIAA's proposed construction of subsection 512(h) would allow RIAA to obtain
subpoenas requiring service providers to identify any or all of the more than 100
million users who have downloaded Kazaa software, one million of whom are Veri-
zon subscribers.
Id. at 3-4. Alternatively, Verizon proposed a solution: The RIAA should initiate a "John Doe"
lawsuit against the individual, and then issue a discovery-based subpoena under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to force Verizon to identify the infringer. Id. at 5.
'77 Brief for RIAA at 14, In re Verizon (No. 02-MS-0323).
71 Brief for Verizon at 5, In re Verizon (No. 02-MS-0323).
179 Id. at 16.
180 Id. at 21.
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would result in a world where anyone who wants to assert copy-
right infringements may do so and obtain the identity of another
person through the DMCA's subpoena power.18' The result would
potentially expose anyone's identity in cyberspace.18  As one let-
ter from a coalition of ISPs warned:
We are concerned that the RIAA's legal strategy - using a
subpoena process in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to
obtain personal information about subscribers of basic Inter-
net service - may have legal and technical consequences that
exceed the stated purpose of this effort. Little is known or
understood about this initiative, how individuals are being
targeted, what is being done with the information, what is be-
ing done to facilitate compliance with subpoena requests and
pay for the resulting costs, how long the information will be
kept, and how it is being protected.1
In the end, the district court's decision accomplished just what
Verizon feared most: It found that the subpoena power in the
DMCA applied to all ISPs within the scope of the DMCA. 84 The
court rejected any distinction between material stored on Verizon's
servers and those stored on home computers. It concluded that the
subpoena provisions applied both to those ISPs that just offered
connections to the Internet, as well as those who stored informa-
tion on their servers at their users' direction. 85 To justify its posi-
tion, the court cited another provision of the DMCA that clearly
defined "service providers" to include both types of ISPs - those
that merely offered the transmission, routing, and provision of
connections and those that also stored information on its servers. 186
The court stated that one had to evaluate the applicability of the
subpoena in line with the statute as a whole, not by a piecemeal,
constrictive interpretation. 187
181 Id. at 21-22.
182 Id. at 23.
183 See Letter from Kevin S. McGuiness, Executive Director, NetCoalition.Com, to Mr.
Cary Sherman, President, RIAA (Aug. II, 2003) (on file with author).
11wn re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26 (D.D.C. 2003).
1851d. at 32-33.
186See id. at 31 (discussing the textual definition of "service provider").
187 The court explained:
[The DMCA subpoena provision] is written without limitation or restriction as to its
application. It is entitled "Subpoena to identify infringer" - not "Subpoena to iden-
tify infringer storing copyrighted material on a service provider's network." .. If
Congress intended to restrict or limit the subsection (h) subpoena authority based on
where the infringing material resides, one would expect to see that limitation spelled
out in subsection (h). And if Congress intended to limit subsection (h) subpoenas
strictly to service providers under subsection (c), it certainly could have made such a
limitation explicit.
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As a result of the initial ruling, copyright owners were able to
obtain a subscriber's identifying information based on an asserted
good-faith belief of copyright infringement. The district court's
interpretation of the DMCA did not require any notice to be given
to the subscriber in the event of a subpoena. Nor did the DMCA
subpoena provision, in and of itself, offer any mechanism for the
subscriber to assert any substantive rights on his or her behalf.
Likewise, there were no provisions for damages should the sub-
poena result in the improper revelation of a person's identity; and
finally, and perhaps most important, little judicial oversight ex-
isted to ensure that only meritorious disclosures of the subscriber's
identity took place.1
88
In the end, the Verizon case went to the D.C. Circuit on appeal
and was reversed, but only after nearly four hundred individuals
had already been sued by the RIAA, their identities publicly ex-
posed to the media. 89 The appeals court resoundingly rejected the
district court's construction, concluding that both the terms of Sec-
tion 512(h) and the overall structure of Section 512 directs that a
subpoena may only be issued to an ISP that is actually storing the
infringing material on its servers. 90 Given that Verizon was not
storing the information on its own servers, the RIAA could not
identify the relevant "material to be removed or access to which is
to be disabled" under the terms of the DMCA.' 91 The court ex-
plained:
No matter what information the copyright owner may pro-
vide, the ISP can neither "remove" nor "disable access to"
the infringing material because that material is not stored on
Id. at 33.
18 See Brief for Appellant at 30-31, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet
Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Nos. 03-7015, 03-7053) (consolidated appeals).
Since the district court's interpretation provided for little judicial oversight (indeed, the district
court's oversight over a subpoena is largely ministerial, rather than substantive), a number of
unfortunate disclosures could happen. One example was offered by Parry Aftab, Executive
Director of WiredSafety.org, an organization that works towards greater online security. He
suggested that as a result of the DMCA subpoena provision, stalkers, sexual predators, and
perpetrators of online fraud will be able to pierce the anonymity of individuals by finding their
IP addresses, asserting a belief of copyright infringement, and obtaining a DMCA subpoena for
their name and address. Aftab offers the sobering example of a violent child rapist who used the
Internet to find a map and layout of a boys' school dormitory, predicting that the DMCA sub-
poena provision radically raises the risk of in-person confrontations between predators and
potential victims. Declaration of Parry Aftab at 2, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon
Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003) (No. 03-MS-0040).
189See Kristen Philipkoski, Battle Not over for File Sharers, WIRED NEWS, at
http://www.wired.conmnews/digiwood/0,1412,61714,00.html (Dec. 23, 2003).
190 Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229,
1231 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
'91 Id. at 1234-35 (quoting DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) (2000)).
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the ISP's servers. Verizon can not remove or disable one
user's access to infringing material resident on another user's
computer because Verizon does not control the content on its
subscribers' computers."'
The court explained that the language of the DMCA also clearly
distinguished between actually terminating a subscriber's account
and removing or disabling access by others to the infringing mate-
rial resident on the subscriber's computer. 93 Moreover, the court
found that the notice-and-takedown section squarely applied to
situations where the ISP hosted, cached, or stored infringing mate-
rial; it did not apply to situations where the ISP is simply routing
infringing material to or from a personal computer (as in the peer-
to-peer context). 194
Moreover, as Verizon shows, the DMCA and Napster each
failed to issue a clearly defined standard for proper notice of a
user's infringement, an omission that has led to substantial confu-
sion regarding the required substance of an accusation. 95  Is an
ISP required to wait for a court order to terminate access to an in-
dividual when notified by a copyright owner that she has traded
files on Napster or Kazaa, assuming that she is engaging in direct
infringement, to avoid liability as a contributory infringer? Or,
should an ISP immediately terminate a user's subscription if it re-
ceives notice of infringement? If so, what constitutes proper no-
tice? 196 ISPs face a classic difficulty in this context: whether they
192 1d. at 1235.
193 Id. Given that these two different remedies were clearly specified by the terms of the
DMCA, the court found that Congress must have intended to distinguish the two. Id.; see
DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(l)(A)(i) (2000) (authorizing injunction restraining ISP "from pro-
viding access to infringing material"); id. § 512(j)(l)(A)(ii) (authorizing injunction restraining
ISP "from providing access to a subscriber or account holder ... who is engaging in infringing
activity.., by terminating the accounts of the subscriber or account holder").
191See Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1237.
195 The Verizon court observed:
Nothing in the Act itself says how we should determine whether a notification
"includes substantially" all the required information .... Clearly, however, the de-
fect in the RIAA's notification is not a mere technical error; nor could it be thought
"insubstantial" even under a more forgiving standard. The RIAA's notification
identifies absolutely no material Verizon could remove or access to which it could
disable, which indicates to us that § 512(c)(3)(A) concerns means of infringement
other than P2P file sharing.
Id. at 1236.
196 Moreover, although the DMCA does provide some guidance for proper notice require-
ments, they are actually much more difficult to ascertain than they seem. For example, in order
to provide "effective notice," the DMCA requires a written communication that includes a num-
ber of elements, such as: identification of the copyrighted work or works claimed to have been
infringed (or a list of such works at the site); information "reasonably sufficient" to permit the
service provider to locate the material, as well as the complaining party; and, most significantly,
a "statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the
manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law." 17
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should side with their customers, requiring a court-ordered injunc-
tion to terminate a person's subscription under the rubric of pro-
tecting privacy; or whether they should remain ever-vigilant
against piracy and terminate an account holder's subscription
based on mere notice from the copyright owner. Largely due to
this conflict, some ISPs might refrain from engaging in active con-
tent detection of their users' accounts, choosing instead to wait
until they receive notice of infringement from law enforcement
officials. Others, of course, might prudently relent at the first ac-
cusation of infringement, handing over their subscribers' identities
and taking down information at the first possible opportunity.'97
One might rightfully ask why the law should even attempt to
protect the interests of individuals who are engaging in massive,
illegal (and often criminal) levels of copyright infringement.
Shouldn't they be held accountable, and why should privacy mat-
ter here at all? The obvious answer to the former question is yes;
indeed, it is absolutely true that the RIAA has restricted its use of
the subpoena provision, to date, to the most egregious infringers,
situations where a court would likely agree with the RIAA's as-
sessment of liability in most cases.198 However, aside from these
cases, there is substantial confusion over what, exactly, constitutes
"copyright infringement" in other contexts, and this is why privacy
becomes so important. Napster's immediate conflation of file
sharing with copyright infringement masks a host of complexities
regarding the extent to which fair use defenses, or space shifting,
might conceivably apply in such contexts. While the RIAA has
admirably shown some restraint in choosing to pursue only egre-
gious uploaders of multiple files, the DMCA provisions allow
anyone to invoke these procedures to unmask a speaker's identity.
U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iv)-(v) (2000). The Napster court failed to further clarify these provi-
sions, referring only to the need for copyright owners to refer to "specific infringing files."
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001). Since Napster, three
cases have noted substantial confusion regarding this point. See ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ
Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001); Arista Records, Inc. v. Mp3Board, Inc., No.
00 CIV. 4660(SHS), 2002 WL 1997918 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002); and Hendrickson v. Ebay,
Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
197 For a helpful explication from an ISP point of view, see Sjoera Nas, The Daily Practices
of an ISP in Dealing with Complaints About Illegal Content, Presentation in Brussels (Nov. 12,
2002), available at http://www.xs4all.nlI/overxs4all/auteursrecht/lezing.html (transcript of pres-
entation by Sjoera Nas, Public Affairs Officer of XS4ALL Internet Rightswatch Conference,
stating that "[p]roviders are systematically tom in splits between freedom of expression and
requests to take down offensive, damaging or illegal content").
198 Privacy & Piracy, Hearing Before the Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations,
supra note 137, at 7-8 (testimony of Mitch Bainwol, Chairman and CEO, RIAA) ("RIAA is not
seeking a subpoena as to everyone who is illegally distributing copyrighted recordings. Rather,
at this time, RIAA is focusing on egregious infringers, those who are engaging in substantial
amounts of illegal activity.").
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Moreover, the DMCA subpoena standard offers no formal
procedure for those who might wish to oppose or investigate such
accusations of infringement, or to challenge determinations made
by a copyright owner. 199 The statute does little to ensure that the
allegations are meritorious prior to disclosure of a person's iden-
tity. In dealing with the large numbers of notice-and-takedown
requests they receive, few ISPs have the time or ability to investi-
gate whether the substance of the accusation is meritorious or not.
In sum, the DMCA offers disclosure of a person's identity in ex-
change for an extrajudicial determination of infringement, with
little opportunity for an adversarial disposition on the merits of the
suit at issue.
Thankfully, as a result of the Verizon ruling on appeal, the
RIAA and others are now required to file a lawsuit against the in-
dividual pursuant to Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, and then to institute normal discovery-based procedures in
order to determine the identity of a purported infringer.200 Because
a copyright owner is now required to file a lawsuit against the pur-
ported infringer, a judge will have substantive discretion over
whether to grant the subpoena. 0 '
However, even despite these recent developments, fear of
suits for contributory infringement has led to regimes of institu-
tional monitoring from ISPs, colleges, and private entities. °2 An
ironic example: In August 2001, the Ninth Circuit, in a debate of
unprecedented visibility, refused to install certain software that
would enable monitoring of their computers to detect the
downloading of music, streaming video, and pornography. 2 3 The
software was a filtering device ostensibly designed to prevent
199 As I have stated, however, the Verizon appeals court judgment effectively requires the
RIAA to invoke the "John Doe" procedures under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather
than the DMCA, in order to ascertain an alleged infringer's identity. It remains to be seen,
however, whether the DMCA will be rewritten to afford copyright owners a way around this
interpretation.
200 In contrast to Section 512(h) of the DMCA, which does not expressly require the filing
of a complaint, Rule 27 requires the filing of a petition that demonstrates that "the petitioner
expects to be a party to an action cognizable in a court of the United States but is presently
unable to bring it or cause it to be brought." FED. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(1); see infra Part IV.
201 See Philipkoski, supra note 189.
2m A related problem also involves protection of student records. Under the Family
Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2) (2000), educational
institutions cannot disclose personally identifiable information about a student from an "educa-
tion record" except where a subpoena has been lawfully issued, and as long as the educational
institution notifies the student in advance of complying with the subpoena. This issue was
raised in the MIT litigation. See Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Misc.
Act. No. 1:03-MC-10209-JLT (D. Mass. Aug. 7, 2003).
203 See Neil A. Lewis, Rebels in Black Robes Recoil at Surveillance of Computers, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8,2001, at Al.
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overloading the network system - but the judges believed that the
alleged purpose behind its installation was broader. They feared
that third parties would use such "content-detection" monitoring
policies to identify individuals who engaged in file sharing or
other potentially nefarious activities at work. A firestorm of con-
troversy ensued. The judges ultimately defied the administrative
order, disabled the software, and issued a host of statements pub-
licly criticizing the administrative decision.204 As Judge Kozinski
put it:
At the heart of the policy is a warning - very much like that
given to federal prisoners - that every employee must surren-
der privacy as a condition of using common office equip-
ment. Like prisoners, judicial employees must acknowledge
that, by using this equipment, their "consent to monitoring
and recording is implied with or without cause."...
The proposed policy tells our 30,000 dedicated employees
that we trust them so little that we must monitor all their
communications just to make sure they are not wasting their
work day cruising the Internet.2 °5
Even though the larger policymaking body of the federal court
system, the Judicial Conference, disagreed with the Ninth Circuit,
and chose to continue using the monitoring software, its decision
angered some federal workers, highlighting the tradeoffs that many
universities and employers have made in order to prevent being
saddled with a lawsuit for contributory liability. 206 As the next
section will discuss, these monitoring strategies, implemented by
both ISPs and content industries, have exacerbated the privacy
concerns Judge Kozinski initially raised.
B. Specters of Piracy Surveillance
As the Ninth Circuit example suggests, the problem of piracy
has led some private entities to respond even more forcefully than
necessary, seeking to destroy not only the peer-to-peer networks
that have sprouted across the Internet, but the very boundaries of
privacy, anonymity, and autonomy in cyberspace. Even though
the original Napster is now completely defunct - having filed for
204/Id.
205 Alex Kozinski, Privacy on Trial, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2001, at A22.
206 See Judges Bar Use of Court Computers for Pornography, Large Personal Files, 70
U.S. L. WK. 2183 (2001) (reporting that that the administrative court banned Gnutella, Napster,
Glacier, and Quake from court computers claiming that it had found no legitimate court use).
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bankruptcy after a long standstill while it tried to launch a legiti-
mate service - a host of replacements, each more decentralized
than the previous one, have risen up to take its place. Kazaa, for
example, has sixty million users around the world and twenty-two
million in the United States, and has enabled far more illegal
downloading than Napster ever did.20 7
This Article defines piracy surveillance to encompass particu-
lar types of monitoring that are: (1) performed by private, non-
government entities; (2) encompass extrajudicial determinations of
copyright infringement; and (3) are extralegal in nature; that is, the
surveillance takes place entirely outside of ongoing litigation.
As this section will illustrate, the advent of piracy surveil-
lance alters the definition and application of intellectual property
rights. As Part I suggested, property rights have traditionally
served to shield - and to protect - the privacy interests of individ-
ual owners as well as third parties. In contrast, piracy surveillance
radically transforms - and extends - the reach of intellectual prop-
erty rights by enabling copyright owners to detect, deter, and pre-
vent acts of potential infringement by third parties. The RIAA de-
fends its efforts, maintaining that it:
is acting no differently than anyone in this country whose
property rights have been violated and who is faced with a
decision whether to press a legal claim: we are making a
judgment as to whether pursuing a particular lawsuit is ap-
propriate given the circumstances. 08
Yet there is a crucial difference between this analogy between
property rights in real space and intellectual property rights in cy-
berspace: freedom of expression. Because these methods of sur-
veillance often involve extrajudicial determinations, they necessar-
ily involve speech-based judgments, often enabling a copyright
owner to determine for himself or herself whether or not individu-
als are engaging in fair use. Under the DMCA, there are no regu-
lations governing the detection of alleged acts of infringement
through file sharing, or through any other medium. The RIAA is
not required to explain, justify, or even share its detection methods
with the public. Nor does the DMCA require any performance of
207 Todd Woody, The Race to Kill Kazaa, WIRED, Feb. 2003, at 104, 106. "In the first six
months of 2002, CD sales fell I I percent - on top of a 3 percent decline the year before."
Charles C. Mann, The Year the Music Dies, WIRED, Feb. 2003, at 90, 92, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/l 1.02/dirge.html. At the same time, sales of blank CDs
jumped forty percent last year. Id.
208 Privacy & Piracy, Hearing Before the Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations,
supra note 137, at 8 (testimony of Mitch Bainwol, Chairman and CEO, RIAA).
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"due diligence" to ensure that infringement is occurring; the Act
provides little substantive definition of "good faith infringement."
Thus, piracy surveillance methods, for all of their asserted effi-
cacy, also herald the growing encroachment of panoptic architec-
ture over constitutionally protected values like speech, privacy,
and due process. Finally, measures of piracy surveillance also
unwittingly ascribe to a logic of vigilantism: As they are designed
and implemented by private, non-state entities, they invite equally
intrusive counter-surveillance responses from ordinary citizens.
1. Monitoring
Copyright owners in cyberspace rely heavily on the use of
"smart agents" to identify acts of perceived infringement, and,
coupled with the outcome of Verizon, copyright owners can now
quickly identify and contact a perceived infringer directly. In cy-
berspace, the RIAA maintains a team of Internet specialists and an
automated twenty-four-hour Web crawler, a "bot" that continually
crawls through the Internet to identify allegedly infringing activi-
ties.209 A "bot" is a shortened term of "robot" and essentially re-
fers to a program that is capable of crawling from one server to
another, compiling lists of Web addresses that possess certain
characteristics (in this case, those that offer unauthorized titles of
copyrighted material). 210 One Web crawler, run by Copyright.net,
crawls through a person's hard drive looking for uploaded copies
of particular songs in peer-to-peer networks like Gnutella, Aim-
211
ster, and Napster. It singles out individual hard drives contain-
ing an uploaded copyrighted song, matches the computer's Internet
address to its ISP, and serves notice to the ISP, requesting that the
ISP terminate the person's online connection until she removes the
offensive copy.212 The RIAA's software robot, dubbed Copyright
Agent, has served more than one million copyright violation no-
tices to ISPs on behalf of seven hundred and fifty song writers and
performers.2t 3
209 See RIAA, What the RIAA Is Doing About Piracy, at http:/Awww.riaa.com/issues/
piracy/riaa.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2003).
210 See What's a Bot, at http://www.botspot.concommon/whatsbot.html (last visited Oct.
17, 2003) (describing "bots" as a form of artificial intelligence that digs through data).
211 See Dawn C. Chmielewski, Software Foils Bootleg Tunes, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Feb. 28, 2001, at IC (describing a new technology that detects bootlegged songs on personal
hard drives). As one report stated, "[the] Ranger [bot] is scouring the globe - Web sites, chat
rooms, newsgroups and peer-to-peer file-sharing sites - spanning 60 countries, searching in
English, Chinese and Korean. . . . Ranger is 24-7. Ranger is relentless." Frank Ahrens,
"Ranger" vs. the Movie Pirates: Software Is Studios' Latest Weapon in a Growing Battle,
WASH. POST, June 19, 2002, at HI.
212 Ahrens, supra note 211, at HI.
213 Id. See Robert G. Gibbons & Lisa M. Ferri, The Legal War Against Cyberspace Pi-
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Many of the RIAA's tactics, however, remain shrouded in se-
crecy, prompting one Congressman to hold hearings on the scope
and method of the recording industry's tactics. 21 4  In one recent
case, in which a Brooklyn woman was accused of offering more
than nine hundred songs on Kazaa, the RIAA used a library of
digital fingerprints, called "hashes," as well as metadata tags,
which are often relied upon by forensic investigators in computer
hacking cases, to rebut her claim that the songs shared on her com-
puter were from compact discs that she had legally purchased.
Using these tools, the RIAA traced several song files on the
woman's computer to files she had downloaded through the Nap-
ster service.15 The fingerprints were used to dispute her claims of
legitimate space shifting, and to show that the source for file shar-
ing did not involve a legitimate purchase of CDs.2 16
Even before a judicial case is filed, these strategies of private
enforcement utilize a cleverly decentralized system, wherein the
copyright owner is burdened with the cost of detecting infringe-
ment, and the ISP is burdened with the need to balance threats of
racy, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 5, 1999, at 1 (observing that the American Society of Composers, Authors
and Publishers uses automated software to locate sites containing the music of any of its mem-
bers). Another program, known as MediaForce, uses similar tactics internationally as well. See
lain Ferguson, MediaForce Still Trying to Block Aust Piracy, at www.zdnet.com.au/news/
security/0,2000061744,20271820,00.htm (Feb. 5, 2003).214 See Associated Press, RIAA Tactics Under Scrutiny, WIRED NEWS, at
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,60460,00.html (Sept. 16, 2003). Senator Norm
Coleman held a series of hearings on September 30, 2003, entitled Privacy & Piracy: The Para-
dox of Illegal File Sharing on Peer-to-Peer Networks and the Impact of Technologies on the
Entertainment Industry. At the hearing, a music representative explained:
To gather evidence against individual infringers, RIAA typically uses soft-
ware that searches the public directories available to any user of a peer-to-peer net-
work. These directories list all the files that other users of the network are currently
offering to distribute. By logging onto these open networks and searching for re-
cordings owned by RIAA's members just like any other user, the software finds us-
ers who are offering to distribute copyrighted music files. When the software finds
such a user, it downloads a sample of the infringing files, along with the date and
time it accessed the files, and locates the user's Internet Protocol ("IP") address.
Additional information that is publicly available allows RIAA to then identify the
infringer's Internet Service Provider.
Privacy & Piracy, Hearing Before the Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, supra
note 137, at 8 (testimony of Mitch Bainwol, Chairman and CEO, RIAA).215 See Ted Bridis, RIAA Discloses Some Methods of Tracking, AP ONLINE, Aug. 28, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 62378104.216 See id. According to the RIAA, some of the files offered for download by one particu-
lar defendant (who operated under the pseudonym "nycfashiongirl") contained media informa-
tion that also suggested that they were "ripped" by someone other than the defendant. See Op-
position of Recording Industry Association of America to Motion of Intervenor to Stay Motion
and Enforce Subpoena at 11-13, In Re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 217 F.R.D. 239 (D.D.C.
2003) (Misc. Act. No. 03-MC-804-HHK/JMF), available at http://www.eff.orgIlPIP2PI
JaneDoe vRIAA/RIAA-opp.pdf. For other files, the RIAA matched hashes from the defen-
dant's sound files to those contained in a database of music downloaded from Napster in 2000.
Id. at 13.
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contributory infringement with the importance of protecting the
consumer from illegitimate threats and undue disclosure. Under
the DMCA's expedited subpoena provisions, the RIAA sends out
notices to ISPs to force them to identify the site operator, or end-
user.217  Once it identifies the site operator, the RIAA may send
that person a warning email, may send messages to the ISP, or may
even institute litigation. 8 At schools, automated Web crawlers
detect where downloading takes place.21 9 When it is located, the
RIAA sends letters asking the school to take action against the al-
leged infringer.220  To reinstate her account, the infringer must re-
move the offending title and replace it with an encrypted copy of
the song that allows the rights holder to restrict how it will be
used.22'
In this sense, monitoring techniques carry an almost perfect
explication of the panoptic metaphor regarding behavioral control.
Panoptic architecture offers a rather inexpensive means of produc-
ing discipline - no chains, locks, are needed; all that is required is
that the person perceive the risk of surveillance.222 The risk that
the copyright owner is always watching, always searching, always
monitoring, facilitates compliance.223
From the copyright owner's perspective, peer-to-peer surveil-
lance allows for near-perfect automated detection, and creates a
risk of disclosure that deters would-be infringers from sharing
files. Constant monitoring facilitates rapid internalization of
norms, ensuring a speedy alteration of behavior, particularly re-
garding the sharing of copyrighted material. Under this technol-
217 See RIAA, What the RIAA Is Doing About Piracy, supra note 209.
218I1d.
219 At universities, the RIAA has instituted a "Soundbyting campaign," which it claims to
have resulted in a fifty-five percent drop in the number of music sites on university servers
offering illegal downloads. Id. According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the University
of Wyoming used a program that "fingerprinted" all network traffic in order to detect unauthor-
ized copying. The program also copied everything sent over the network in order to detect the
exchange of sound files - emails, grade reports, documents, and the like, including the collec-
tion of unauthorized information. See Elec. Frontier Found., Universities Should Resist Network
Monitoring Demands, at http://www.eff.orglIP/P2P/university-monitoring.pdf (last visited Jan.
30, 2004).220Liza Porteus, Beware of the Music Downloading Spies, U-WIRE, at
http://www.uwire.com (Oct. 26, 2000). Monitoring goes beyond just looking at the name of a
file. Id. Other companies have devised ways to identify music files based on their actual sound.
Jon Healey, New Technologies Target Swapping of Bootlegged Files, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20,
2001, at Cl. Still other companies, such as Cyveillance, Ewatch, and Cybercheck, assist cus-
tomers in protecting their brands by using customized software to track trademark infringement,
copyright infringement, counterfeiting, and the bootlegging of music and movies. See Gibbons
& Ferni, supra note 213. These companies may also search for any association of brand names
with pornography, and search for any damaging rumors in chat rooms. Id.
221 See Gibbons & Ferri, supra note 213.
222 FOUCAULT, supra note 100, at 202.
223 GANDY, supra note 99, at 10.
2003]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
ogy, it matters little whether or not the RIAA is actually investi-
gating or monitoring file transfer: The goal of such strategies is to
create a perceptible risk of detection. The risk of detection and
disclosure, in turn, is precisely what facilitates compliance. Con-
sider, for example, the reports that suggested that file sharing
dropped by nearly half since the filing of the initial Verizon law-
suit. 224  By utilizing technologies that facilitate constant monitor-
ing of file-sharing activity, the music industry has capably man-
aged to deter infringement and instill fears of identity disclosure
among file sharers.225
Before the Verizon case was filed, peer-to-peer norms contin-
ued to support the sharing of files, ostensibly because file sharers
perceived that they faced little risk of prosecution or disclosure of
their identities. Yet peer-to-peer technology has ironically turned
out to be the industry's greatest weapon, as well as its greatest foe,
in deterring piracy, enabling intellectual property owners to model
their efforts to replicate methods of consumer surveillance.226 Af-
ter Verizon, peer-to-peer networks are no longer anonymous,
amorphous communities characterized by unique social norms and
noncompliance with copyright laws.227 Rather, the use of smart
agents, coupled with the risk of identity disclosure, has pierced the
protection of anonymity that many file sharers expect.
Techniques of piracy surveillance can be used, either directly
or indirectly through an intermediary, to detect infringement or to
penalize perceived infringers. Most significantly, each of these
techniques are private in character, in the sense that each of these
methods are administered and utilized by a non-government entity,
and are governed by few restrictions. Since surveillance activities
are usually extrajudicial in character - that is, no judicial determi-
224 See Jefferson Graham, Lawsuits Help Cut Song-Swapping in USA by Half, USA TO-
DAY, Jan. 5, 2004, at IB (reporting on a study finding that unauthorized online song swapping
has been cut in half since record companies started suing swappers in the fall of 2003); Associ-
ated Press, Lawsuits Slow Music Downloads, WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/news/
technology/0, 1282,61790,00.html (Jan. 5, 2004).
225 Graham, supra note 224. Aside from demonstrating panoptic strategies of surveillance,
these techniques also rely on strategies of discretionary nonenforcement. Recently, the RIAA
announced that it had decided to pursue investigations against individuals who offer "substan-
tial" amounts of music online to others over peer-to-peer services. See Privacy & Piracy, Hear-
ing Before the Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, supra note 137, at 7-8 (testimony
of Mitch Bainwol, Chairman and CEO, RIAA). Yet it did not to elaborate on what it meant by
"substantial," presumably hoping to deter everyone from sharing files - from the person who
offers thousands of song titles to the college student offering only a few songs. See id.
226 See generally Privacy & Piracy, Hearing Before the Senate Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations, supra note 137 (testimony of Mitch Bainwol, Chairman and CEO, RIAA).
227For excellent reading on this topic, see Strahilevitz, supra note 115 and Wu, supra note
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nation of infringement has been made - little recourse exists to
defend oneself against an accusation.
There are significant drawbacks to such surveillance. Even
though the RIAA claims to engage in due diligence to confirm
evidence of infringement, the technology can easily mistake le-
gitimate files for copyrighted works.22 8 This can impose a great
burden on an author's freedom of speech that extends to anyone
targeted by monitoring technologies. For example, Warner Broth-
ers, owner of the copyright to Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's
Stone, sent a notice to ISP UUNet asking it to disable a user's
Internet access because of a single (allegedly infringing) file titled
harry potter book report.rtf.229  Just recently, the Business Soft-
ware Alliance incorrectly targeted a company that used software
called OpenOffice, notifying the company that it was making unau-
thorized copies of Microsoft Office available, simply because its
"bot" detected the use of the word "office" in the program.
230
In another, more public incident, the RIAA sent out more than
two dozen letters that incorrectly targeted institutions suspected of
posting copyrighted music on their servers.23' In one example, the
RIAA's Web crawlers had zeroed in on an MP3 copy of a song by
a group of astronomers posted by an astrophysics professor named
Peter Usher, which the RIAA confused with the artist Usher.232 In
another example, the RIAA apologized to a national broadband
provider for sending a cease and desist letter that alleged illegal
activity on a subscriber's File Transfer Protocol site.233 Yet the
contents of the letter read that the site illegally "offers approxi-
mately 0 sound files for download., 234 In another instance, Wal-
Mart sent a Section 512(h) notice to a comparison-shopping Web
site that allowed consumers to post prices of items sold in its
228 See generally Privacy & Piracy, Hearing Before the Senate Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations, supra note 137, at 8 (testimony of Mitch Bainwol, Chairman and CEO, RIAA)
(observing that an RIAA employee "manually reviews and verifies the information"); Piracy of
Intellectual Property on Peer-to-Peer Networks: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 23-
33 (2002) [hereinafter Piracy of Intellectual Property, Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on
Courts] (statement of Gigi B. Sohn, President, Public Knowledge).
229 Piracy of Intellectual Property, Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, supra
note 228, at 23-33 (statement of Gigi B. Sohn, President, Public Knowledge).
230 See Declan McCullagh, BSA (Microsoft) Screws Up, Targets OpenOffice Distribution,
POLITECH, at http://www.politechbot.comp-04511 .html (Feb. 28, 2003).231 Gil Kaufman, RIAA Admits Piracy Goof ROLLING STONECOM, at
http://www.rollingstone.comnews/newsarticle.asp?nid=18053 (May 14, 2003).
232 Id.
233 Declan McCullagh, RIAA Apologizes for Erroneous Letters, CNET NEWS.COM, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1025-1001319.html (May 13, 2003).
234 Id. The letter continued, "Many of these files contain recordings owned by our member
companies, including songs by such artists as Creed." Id.
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stores, claiming incorrectly that its prices were copyrighted when
they were in fact uncopyrightable facts.235 Other "bots" have gen-
erated DMCA notices for films or court documents that are part of
the public domain.236
These problems have become exacerbated, rather than miti-
gated, by the recent filing of lawsuits against individuals engaged
in copyright infringement. In one situation, the RIAA obtained the
identity of an individual, and proceeded to file a copyright in-
fringement action against her, alleging that the individual had
downloaded over two thousand songs.237 Yet the defendant was a
66-year-old grandmother who has never downloaded any songs
and does not even own a computer equipped to operate the relevant
file-sharing software.238 In another case, the RIAA used a DMCA
subpoena to sue an individual whose IP address allegedly did not
239
match the one the RIAA investigated for downloading songs.
Moreover, many individuals poorly assess the risk of online
surveillance and continue to engage in online activities without
realizing the risk of exposure. ° Many people have no idea what
they are sharing online, and with whom. In such circumstances,
like the Olmstead case discussed in Part I, the law rarely steps in
to validate consumer expectations of privacy or to educate citizens
regarding the limits of their rights in cyberspace. To illustrate this
point, consider this case. On July 2, 1999, a customer-support
specialist for Road Runner, a high speed ISP, received a call from
an anonymous male who told the specialist that he was at a
friend's house, scanning other computers, and had viewed child
pornography on a computer that he believed Road Runner ser-
viced. 24' The computer's owner had activated its peer-to-peer file
sharing mechanism, which allowed others to view the images
235 See Brief of Amici Curiae Alliance for Public Technology, et al., in Support of Appel-
lant Verizon Internet Services and Urging Reversal at 12, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v.
Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Nos. 03-7015, 03-7053) (consoli-
dated appeals); Declan McCullagh, Wal-Mart Backs Away from DMCA Claim, CNET NEWS, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-976296.html (Dec. 5, 2002).236See McCullagh, supra note 235. In one instance, the Internet Archive was sent a
DMCA notice by a copyright owner who mistook films in the public domain for a copyrighted
movie. Id; see also Universal Studios Stumbles on Internet Archive's Public Domain Films, at
http://www.chillingeffects.org/notice.cgi?NoticelD=-595 (last visited Jan. 30, 2004) (containing
a DMCA notification of unauthorized use of Universal Motion Pictures).
237 Chris Gaither, Recording Industry Withdraws Suit: Mistaken Identity Raises Question
on Legal Strategy, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 2003, at CI.238 ld.
239Joseph Menn, Group Contends Record Labels Have Wrong Guy, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2003, at C2.
24 See Good & Krekelberg, supra note 78.
241 United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1106 (D. Kan. 2000).
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stored on its hard drive.242 The caller gave the specialist the com-
puter's IP address, the directory, and the file names in which the
images were located.243 Shortly afterward, the specialist located
the computer with the corresponding IP address and viewed two
images of a sexual nature involving children.2 "
Road Runner then contacted the FBI and recommended that it
obtain a court order to procure the subscriber's information.245
The United States Attorney's Office complied and located the sub-
scriber's home address, telephone number, email address, and gen-
eral account information. 246 A special agent then called the home
and spoke with one of the email subscribers, Michael Kennedy,
who stated that he always left his computer on and connected to
the Internet.247 When asked if he could share any "concerns" with
Road Runner's service, Kennedy responded that he "thought the
company should warn customers about the possibility of someone
else trying to enter their computers through the Internet. 248 After
the FBI obtained a search warrant and officials went to search the
house, Kennedy admitted that he had downloaded onto his hard
drive pictures of young boys engaging in sexual acts. 249  He
claimed not to know the identity of the person from whom he had
downloaded the images, and that he did not think that anyone
250would discover he had downloaded the pictures. Shortly after a
grand jury returned an indictment for his arrest, Kennedy turned
himself in.2
Notably, the court resoundingly rejected every argument Ken-
nedy raised in support of his expectation of privacy, suggesting
that individuals who engage in file-sharing activities essentially
have no right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment's right to
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The court
rejected Kennedy's assertions that Road Runner trampled on his
Fourth Amendment rights when it divulged his subscriber informa-
tion to the government because he had failed to demonstrate an
"objectively reasonable legitimate expectation of privacy in his
242 Id. at 1107 n.7.
243 Id. at 1106.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 1107.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 ld. at 1108.
249 Id.
25 Id.
251 Id.
2003]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
subscriber information," since he had activated his computer's file
sharing mechanism.
252
The Kennedy court analyzed the privacy issues Kennedy
raised by turning to the test articulated in Katz v. United States, in
which the Court established that a "search" takes place only when
a government violates an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy. 253  "[W]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection," the Kennedy court repeated, quoting from Katz.254 In
other words, because Kennedy had voluntarily "turned over" in-
formation to third parties, like the ISP, the court concluded that he
had no legitimate expectation of privacy in any of his online ac-
tivities:
When defendant entered into an agreement with Road Run-
ner for Internet service, he knowingly revealed all informa-
tion connected to the IP address 24.94.200.54. He cannot
now claim to have a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in
his subscriber information.255
The court's recitation of Katz highlights some of the most severe
difficulties with protecting informational privacy in the informa-
tion age. Kennedy demonstrates the discontinuity of expectations
of privacy and anonymity; a person might share information under
a subjective expectation of anonymity (supported, perhaps by the
ISP's assurances of consumer privacy), even though a court might
reach the opposite conclusion.256
In sum, under Katz, it appears unclear whether a person can
cognizably possess a reasonable expectation of anonymity and en-
gage in file sharing at the same time, even though, culturally
speaking, many individuals persist in retaining this combination in
cyberspace. The court suggested that Kennedy's use and activa-
252 Id. at 1110.
3 Id. Under Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967), the test for a constitu-
tionally "unreasonable search" is two-fold: first, it requires that a person exhibit a subjective
expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation of privacy be one that society also rec-
ognizes as reasonable. In analyzing the second question, the Court later opined that "'[t]he test
of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly "private" activity,' but
instead 'whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values
protected by the Fourth Amendment."' California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986) (quot-
ing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S 170, 181-83 (1983)).
254 Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1110 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
255 Id.
256 In some of the cases relied upon in the Fourth Amendment context, a person's identity
is already known or ascertained through other means, and usually protected by additional regu-
lations to support privacy. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737, 741 n.5 (1979) (noting
that the pen register did not disclosure the content of Smith's communications).
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tion of a file sharing mechanism essentially meant that files con-
tained within his hard drive could be considered public, not only
his numerical subscription information, but the actual content of
his files as well. 7 Yet as one author observes, a person's expecta-
tions of privacy in such circumstances may be wildly varied, sug-
gesting that many do not understand the extent to which the tech-
nology itself collects information or monitors the online activities
of an ISP's subscribers.258 As we will see, Kennedy's gutting of
Fourth Amendment protections carries special weight when we
turn to the question of criminal copyright infringement for peer-to-
peer distribution of music and other copyrighted media. When
private citizens act in a law-enforcement capacity, as the ISP or the
anonymous caller did in Kennedy, they can further limit the scope
of an individual's protections under the Fourth Amendment.259
In turn, these disparate expectations transform the boundaries
between private and public: Rather than validating or correcting a
person's expectations of privacy, the law eviscerates them. As this
case illustrates, it is entirely possible for an individual to possess a
subjective expectation of ISP protection of one's identity and for a
court to dismiss those expectations in light of Katz. Complicating
this further is the territorial aspect of home computer use: Several
cases have held that a person can have spatial expectations of pri-
vacy in the content stored on her individual computer hard drive.26
These factors combine to promote expectations of informational
privacy, even though the activities of commercial entities and law
enforcement may detract from those perceptions.
One might argue, following Kennedy, that such monitoring
techniques do not raise privacy implications at all, especially con-
sidering that the "bots" are programmed to specifically search the
Internet only for information that is publicly available, and not re-
stricted in a particular fashion. Yet here is where the panoptic
metaphor is so prescient. Constant monitoring alters online behav-
ior in inescapable ways - one's speech, surfing habits, use of cul-
tural products, and even identity itself. In this sense, piracy sur-
257 Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1110; see also United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793,
2000 WL 1062039, at *4 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000) (holding that there is no legitimate expectation
of privacy in information which is voluntarily conveyed to a third party).
258 See Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach, I I
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97, 102 (2000).259 The test for determining whether or not a person is acting as an agent of the government
is whether the private party "in light of all the circumstances of the case, must be regarded as
having acted as an 'instrument' or agent of the state [when the search or seizure occurred]."
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971).
260See Bailey, supra note 141, at 524-29 (discussing cases that found expectations of pri-
vacy in computer hard drives).
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veillance has deleterious implications for autonomy. Consider
Lawrence Lessig's commentary on this point:
If you walked into a store, and the guard at the store recorded
your name; if cameras tracked your every step, noting what
items you looked at and what items you ignored; if an em-
ployee followed you around, calculating the time you spent
in any given aisle; if before you could purchase an item you
selected, the cashier demanded that you reveal who you
were - if any and all of these things happened in real space,
you would notice. You would notice and could then make a
choice about whether you wanted to shop in such a store ...
In cyberspace, you would not. You would not notice such
monitoring because such tracking in cyberspace is not simi-
larly visible.261
Under Kennedy and the DMCA, the same is true: A person's
communications, their pseudonymous address, and the material
stored on their home computer are largely rendered transparent.
The DMCA, as it is written, contains no protection for anonymous
speakers in the face of accusations of infringement; thus, anyone
claiming to be a copyright owner can use a subpoena to determine
262the identity of a proposed infringer. For this reason, the preva-
lence of monitoring techniques, coupled with the import of the
DMCA, make it effectively impossible to speak anonymously; at
all times, the watcher is made aware of the potential to unmask the
speaker's identity. And, as the examples above demonstrate, the
risk of exposure is not limited to pirates alone, but to anyone who
may be mistakenly caught within the panoptic Web of copyright
enforcement.
In sum, the Kennedy case, and others like it, often highlight a
troubling contradiction regarding perceptions of informational pri-
vacy online: Individuals poorly assess the reality of transparency,
leading them to expect anonymity, even when engaging in illicit
activities that are open to private surveillance. Using peer-to-peer
technology, a third party can view files left available on a person's
hard drive, and set in motion a series of investigations culminating
in her arrest.
263
261 Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 501,504-05 (1999).262 For elaboration of this point, see infra Part 11.
263 In the Kennedy case, for example, the defendant argued that the initial warrantless
searching of his computer files violated his Fourth Amendment rights because government
actors did them. United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1111-12 (D. Kan. 2000). The
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2. Management
Digital rights management ("DRM") is another kind of piracy
surveillance that harnesses similar trajectories of monitoring and
264record collection. Unlike the technology explored in the previ-
ous section, DRM requires an affirmative act by the consumer to
inform the company of her identity prior to using a copyrighted
product.265 Thus, in this sense, DRM cannot function without
some encroachment on a user's privacy: Copyrighted products that
contain DRM cannot operate without constant verification of the
user's identity.266
Some DRM strategies are designed to set and automatically
enforce limits on user behavior, like a music delivery format that
prevents copying (even for space-shifting purposes) or restricts the
type of devices used for playback. 67 Today, DRM also encom-
passes encrypted media files, watermarks that identify their users,
counters that keep track of each playback or viewing, and copy-
codes that control the duplication of files, thereby allowing a copy-
right owner to track whether or not a file is uploaded or digitally
shared with others.268  Content-scrambling system algorithms can
also add a further, geographic restriction that ensures that DVDs
only play in designated regions. 269  Still other technologies can
court soundly rejected this argument on the grounds that the government neither knew of, nor
acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and that Kennedy had made no showing that the govern-
ment involvement was significant enough to change the conduct into government searches. Id.
264 For an excellent summary on the legal and policy issues on DRM, see Symposium: The
Law & Technology of Digital Rights Management, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 487-771 (2003).
265 For a helpful, historical piece justifying digital controls, see Jane C. Ginsburg, From
Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright
Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 113 (2003) (arguing that the right to control access to a
work is an integral right of copyright law).
266 See Jeff Howe, Licensed to Bill, WIRED, Oct. 2001, at 140, 147, (describing the tech-
nology behind DRM and its potential for revenue), available at http://www.wired.comwired/
archive/9.10/drm.html?pg=l. In another case, Blizzard Entertainment, a games developer,
admitted that in an attempt to deter software pirates, it collected the names and email addresses
of gamers without their knowledge. See Gamemaker Under Fire for Invasion of Player Pri-
vacy, COMPUTERGRAM INT'L, May 6, 1998, available at http://www.findarticles.comlcfO/
m0CGN/n3404/20578 10 1/p I/article.jhtml.
267 See Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 580 (2003).
268 Howe, supra note 266, at 142. The code, however, that enables the anti-piracy software
is widely believed to be installed in home and office hard drives, thereby opening the door to
more anti-piracy measures. See Privacy Advocates Slam Industry Plan for Hard Drives, WALL
ST. J. EUR., Jan. 18, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2840879. In 2001, television makers endorsed
a new copy-protection scheme that installs certain technology in television sets to block the
making of digital copies of television shows. See Jube Shiver, Jr., TV Makers Take a Side on
Anti-Piracy Technologies, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2001, at C5 (describing how television makers
are backing a new copy-protection scheme). The technology, known as FireWire, uses a com-
bination of user-authentication and encryption to determine whether digital content should be
transmitted from one device and can limit the number of copies generated. Id.
269 Cohen, supra note 267, at 581.
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report back on the activities of individual users, which can be used
for a variety of purposes, including marketing. zT Other programs
can be designed to disable access to a work after detecting an un-
authorized use, ensuring that constant monitoring takes place to
ensure compliance with the terms and conditions of a license. 27'
It makes sense, both economically and practically, to ask a
copyright owner to internalize the costs of enforcement through
such management systems. Yet these systems often involve the
ability to preclude fair use, one of the key limitations on a copy-
right holder's exclusive scope of rights.272 As two commentators
observe, "[u]nless DRM systems include a 'judge on a chip,' they
will remain incapable of determining whether a user is copying
part of a work for purposes of piracy or parody. 273  Moreover,
since many of these strategies also fail to protect consumer pri-
vacy, they also display a striking convergence of piracy and con-
sumer surveillance. Consider the use of anti-piracy technologies
that prevent users from converting, or "ripping," software tracks
into an MP3 format from a CD. Such technology, called Digital
Content Cloaking Technology, requires users who desire digital
copies to provide personal information in order to track the cus-
tomer's listening habits. In one suit over the use of such technol-
ogy, labels attached to the product failed to disclose that the com-
pany tracked, stored, and disseminated personal identifying infor-
mation of the consumer.274
2 70 Id.
271 Id. The Uniform Commercial Code validated self-help provisions in its Uniform Com-
puter Information Transactions Act (UCITA), formerly known as U.C.C. 2B. The provisions,
which covered contracts in "computer information," provided that upon material breach of a
contract, the licensor can prevent a licensee from using the product and repossess the property;
another provision permitted the use of other self-help remedies as long as they could be accom-
plished without a breach of the peace. Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA), §§ 701, 815(b) (last revisions or amendments completed 2002), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/2002final.htm. See also Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and
the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1089 (1998); Craig Dolly, The Elec-
tronic Self-Help Provisions of UCITA: A Virtual Repo Man?, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 663
(2000); David Friedman, In Defense of Private Orderings: Comments on Julie Cohen's "Copy-
right and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help," 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1151, 1154 (1998).
272See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use v. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Manage-
ment on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557 (1998).
273 C.J. Alice Chen & Aaron Burstein, Foreword to Symposium: The Law & Technology of
Digital Rights Management, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 487, 491 (2003).
274 See Benny Evangelista, Suit Challenges CD Copyright Scheme, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 11,
2001, at C3 (reporting on a lawsuit claiming that consumer rights were violated by new anti-
piracy technology). In the end, the copyright owner agreed to ensure that its digital downloads
were anonymous, to purge all of its customers' identifying information, and to place a warning
label on further CDs that the CD in question would not work in DVD or CD-Rom players from
then on. See Consumers Win One Against Copy Protection, at http://www.polarityl.coml
pcrrl6.html (Feb. 22, 2002); Tom Spring, Face The Music: Suits Pending over Copy Controls,
at http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,93904,00.asp (Apr. 1I, 2002); Sunncomm and
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Such lawsuits raise the important question of how courts, leg-
islators, and intellectual property owners can balance these inter-
ests of privacy and prevention of piracy. In a similar observation,
Julie Cohen has argued for the protection of "intellectual privacy,"
a principle that embraces consumer acquisition and use of materi-
als as well as protection from disclosure. 5 Cohen's concept of
intellectual privacy is a useful starting point to frame the conflict
between privacy and property regarding DRM.276 Intellectual pri-
vacy, in Cohen's formulation, applies to protect the consumption
of intellectual property products within demarcably private spaces,
and the nexus between intellectual exploration and private physical
277
space. Central to this principle are three underlying themes:
autonomy, informational privacy, and spatial privacy.278 As Cohen
points out:
Just as spatial privacy allows for physical nudity, so it also
allows for metaphorical nudity; behind closed doors, one may
shed the situational personae that one adopts with co-
workers, neighbors, fellow commuters, or social acquaintan-
ces, and become at once more transparent and more complex
than any of those personae allows. Spatial privacy affords
the freedom to explore areas of intellectual interest that one
might not feel as free to explore in public. It also affords the
freedom to dictate the circumstances - the when, where, how,
and how often - of one's own intellectual consumption, un-
observed and unobstructed by others.279
With piracy surveillance, however, the law either fails to step
in, or when it does, it risks enabling a degree of self-help that is
both invasive and replicates the panoptic structures I identified
earlier. In theorizing this point, particularly the panoptic overlap
between piracy and consumer surveillance, consider the following
example. SONICblue makes ReplayTV digital video recorders
("DVRs") which enable television viewers to make digital copies
of copyrighted television programs, to skip commercials, and to
send copies of televised programs to other ReplayTV users. 280 The
Music City Records Agree to Resolve Consumer Music "CD-Cloqueing " Law Suit by Providing
Better Notice and Enhancing Consumer Privacy, available at http://www.techfirm.coml/
sunnsett.pdf (Feb. 22, 2002) (press release).
275 Cohen, supra note 267, at 576-80.
2 76 Id.
277 Id. at 576.
278 Id.
279 Id. at 579.
210 Brief of Amici Curiae Civil Liberties and Consumer Groups in Support of Defendants'
Objections to Magistrate Judge's Discovery Order at I, Paramount Pictures Corp. v. ReplayTV,
Inc., No. CV 01-9358FMC(EX), 2002 WL 1315811 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2002), available at
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plaintiffs in a recent action, mostly motion picture studios, filed
suit, arguing that the activities of DVR owners constituted direct
copyright infringement, and that the makers of the DVRs were
contributorily liable as well.28'
To prove their claims, the plaintiffs demanded all documents
and information that SONICblue possessed on its customers, par-
ticularly the television shows they recorded, and other data show-
ing their viewing habits.282 Even though SONICblue did not pos-
sess this information, the plaintiffs demanded that it reengineer its
product to collect the data. 83 SONICblue refused, contending that
it feared the information gathered could be used to file a host of
suits against private individuals for acts of direct infringement. 84
The magistrate judge overseeing the case agreed with the plaintiffs
and ordered SONICblue to install surveillance software to detect
possible infringement and to record the viewing habits of individu-
als. 285 Not surprisingly, the magistrate judge's order unleashed a
firestorm of controversy. "To require companies to spy on their
customers in order to report suspicious activity to the movie stu-
dios is a complete invasion of privacy, particularly to those indi-
vidual customers who don't even have the option of opting out,"
observed one representative of a free speech watch group. 86 The
order was swiftly reversed by a district court judge, who concluded
that such requests "impermissibly require[] defendants to create
new data which does not now exist. 287
Although the surveillance issue was not directly decided, the
outcome of the dispute illuminates the tradeoff between privacy
and piracy identified with respect to DRM technologies. Creators
of intellectual property may seek to utilize consumer surveillance
methods to detect instances of piracy. In the wake of such con-
http:llwww.epic.org/privacy/replaytv/amici brief-eick-order.pdf.
281 Id.
282 Id. Ironically, SONICblue had previously decided not to monitor its subscribers' usage
due to cost and privacy considerations (especially given the public outcry over reports that one
of their competitors, TiVo, used such monitoring practices). See id. at 3.
213 1d. at 1.
2
m Jane Black, Faceless Snoopers Have the Upper Hand, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, at
http://www.businessweek.con/technology/content/j un2002/tc2002065_27 l0.htm (June 5,
2002).
285 Paramount Pictures Corp. v. ReplayTV, Inc., 2002 WL 1315811 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 29,
2002); see Court Reverses Order for ReplayTV to Collect and Turn over Customer Usage In-
formation, ADLAW BY REQUEST, at http://www.adlawbyrequest.com/inthecourtsReplay
TV061002.shtml (June 10, 2002) (on file with author).
26 Court Reverses Order for ReplayTV to Collect and Turn over Customer Usage
Information, supra note 285.
787 Order on Parties' Motions for Review of Magistrate Judge's Discovery Order of Apr.
26, 2002, at 3, Paramount Pictures Corp. v. ReplayTV, Inc., No. CV 01-9358FMC(EX), 2004
WL 57219 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9,2004).
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flicts, the law becomes integrated with the predatory potential to
traverse boundaries between private and public, creating a pan-
optic governance over individual acquisition and use of copy-
righted material. Moreover, copyright holders may be able to
force ISPs to reveal private information, including logs of the pro-
grams downloaded by individuals, any record of consumer activ-
ity, and Web sites visited. And it may not matter whether the in-
dividual actually committed acts of copyright infringement - the
accusation itself may be sufficient to warrant exposure of one's
personal identity, as the DMCA provisions illustrate.
Yet Congress itself, in the pre-Internet age, already expressed
a strong concern about the moral and administrative difficulties
behind private enforcement of copyright in the home. In the
1970s, home-use recording from radio and television broadcasts
was discussed in committee hearings, floor debates, and reports
from the Office of Copyrights, and each evinced similar concerns
regarding invasion of the spatial privacy of the home and the en-
forcement issues it would create.288 For example, during one col-
loquy, Barbara A. Ringer, a representative from the Office of
Copyrights, recognized the potential problem of unauthorized
video recordings finding their way into the market. At that time,
she stated that although this was a problem that Congress might
face in the future, it could not be met by carrying copyright en-
forcement into the home. Her testimony observed:
But I do not see anybody going into anyone's home and pre-
venting this sort of thing, or forcing legislation that would
289
engineer a piece of equipment not to allow home taping.
The Office of Copyrights continued to hold this view throughout
the years of legislative revision.290  As the original Sony court ob-
28 For example, in June 1971, Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judici-
ary met in hearings on the sound recording amendment. Representative Beister of Pennsylvania
engaged in the following revealing dialogue with Ms. Barbara Ringer, then Assistant Register of
Copyrights:
MR. BEISTER. I can tell you I must have a small pirate in my own home. My son
has a cassette tape recorder, and as a particular record becomes a hit, he will retrieve
it onto his little set. Now, he may retrieve in addition something else onto his re-
cording, but nonetheless, he does retrieve the basic sound. And this legislation, of
course, would not point to his activities, would it?
MISS RINGER. I think the answer is clearly, "No, it would not." I have spoken at
a couple of seminars on video cassettes lately, and this question is usually asked:
"What about the home recorders?" The answer I have given and will give again is
that this is something you cannot control. You simply cannot control it.
Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings: Hearings on S. 646 and H.R. 6927 Before Subcomm.
No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 22 (1971) (statement of Barbara A.
Ringer, Assistant Register of Copyrights).
289 Id.
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served, this position developed in part from a concern about inva-
sion of the individual's privacy in the home:
As Ms. Ringer testified, home recording simply cannot be
controlled. Nobody is going into anyone's home to prevent
it.... Of course, not all activity is made legal by virtue of
occurring in a private home. Congress can constitutionally
legislate against some activity which may occur in the home,
but doing so necessarily requires caution. Here, legislative
history shows that, in balance, Congress did not find that
protection of copyright holders' rights over reproduction of
their works was worth the privacy and enforcement problems
which restraint of home-use recording would create.
Looking back, it is resoundingly clear that the advent of tech-
nology has changed this original determination, particularly where
the DMCA is concerned. Today, DRM technologies and other
forms of piracy surveillance routinely govern and restrain one's at-
home activities regarding usage of cultural products. DRM allows
for the privatization of copyright enforcement; it eliminates judi-
cial oversight and precludes an adversarial forum for the con-
sumer's protection.292 These systems operate automatically and
panoptically, without the benefit of a complaint, response, third-
party determination, or even a modicum of judicial involvement.293
In other words, copyright enforcement has encroached, and inte-
grated itself, into the home.
3. Interference
A final method, significantly more unilaterally aggressive
than the others, involves the use of smart agents that interdict
transmissions. Here, companies use similar "bot" technology to
search for a file and then, once found, drown the connection with
so many requests that it prevents anyone from accessing any of the
person's files, legitimate or not.294 Other technologies simply in-
290See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 446 (C.D.
Cal. 1979), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
291 Id. (emphasis added).
292 See Matt Jackson, Using Technology to Circumvent the Law: The DMCA 's Push to Pri-
vatize Copyright, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 607, 609 (2001).
293See Thomburg, supra note 166, at 189.
294 See Piracy of Intellectual Property., Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Courts,
supra note 228, 23-33 (statement of Gigi B. Sohn, President, Public Knowledge) (discussing
interdiction); see also Matt Bai, Hating Hilary, WIRED, Feb. 2003, at 95, 97 (discussing several
anti-piracy techniques), available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/I 1.02/
hating.htmlpg= 1.
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terrupt a download as it occurs.295 According to one company that
produces interdiction software:
MediaDefender's computers hook up to the person using the
P2P protocol being targeted and download the pirated file at
a throttled down speed. MediaDefender's computers just try
to sit on the other computers' uploading connections as long
as possible, using as little bandwidth as possible to prevent
others from downloading the pirated content....
The goal is not to absorb all of that user's bandwidth but
block connections to potential downloaders. If the P2P pro-
gram allows ten connections and MediaDefender fills nine,
we are blocking 90% of illegal uploading.296
Note how the speaker assumes that all ten connections involve
infringing files. Still other software creates spoofing, which in-
volves the creation of phony media files and dumping them, en
masse, onto peer-to-peer networks.297 Spoofed files are often cor-
rupt or damaged, and produce static, popping, cracking noises, or
complete silence.298 Another strategy involves redirection, which
draws upon the use of a decoy song file that activates a Web
browser that takes the person to a legitimate site to purchase mu-
sic.299
Interdiction and spoofing are currently widely used through-
out the peer-to-peer file sharing community, and have vastly in-
creased in use during the last several months. They were also the
primary subjects of a bill, introduced in the summer of 2002 by
Congressman Howard Berman, which would award copyright
holders an exemption from various laws proscribing computer
break-ins when seeking perceived pirates.3° (Interdiction, for ex-
29 Healey, supra note 220, at Cl. For example, once IpArchive's technology spots an un-
authorized transfer, it can stop the transfer and send a notice directing the user to an authorized
source for the file. Id. Importantly, the company will not identify the sender or the recipient,
for privacy reasons, Id. In contrast, Vidius does identify the Internet addresses of the senders
and recipients, and can often access names and contacting information if the ISP complies with
the request. Id.
296 Piracy of Intellectual Property, Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, supra
note 228, at 156 (2002) (testimony of Randy Saaf, CEO, MediaDefender).297 See Bai, supra note 294, at 97.
298 See Stephanie C. Ardito, The Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act, INFO. TODAY, Sept.
2002, at 18 (describing the countermeasures that copyright holders have employed to combat
the growth of P2P networks). Moreover, because most users who upload MP3 files usually
make all of their files immediately available to others, spoofed files can quickly spread beyond
the RIAA's own servers, and infect the entire network. See Strahilevitz, supra note 115, at 584-
85.
299 Ardito, supra note 298, at 18.
30 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Protection Act, H.R. 5211, 107th Cong. (2002); see also James S.
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ample, bears strong resemblance to a traditional "denial of service
attack," a crime which is illegal under state and federal anti-
hacking statutes, including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act).30 1
Representative Berman argued that the vast increase in piracy,
coupled with the continuing decentralization of peer-to-peer net-
works, made such efforts necessary, pointing out that the law has
long allowed property owners to use self-help to protect their
property and citing examples of DRM to support his position.3 °2
One possible advantage to these "interference" methods of
surveillance is that they do not carry the same risks of identity dis-
closure as the other two methods, because they are focused on pre-
venting infringement from occurring (rather than penalizing or
monitoring the infringer). A peer-to-peer connection is simply
disabled, rather than identities recorded and exposed. But it is
easy to imagine the likelihood of copyright owners creating other
programs that do carry these risks.30 3 One potential avenue, for
example, involves the spreading of "snitch" files that would ac-
tively collect information, such as the identity of the infringer, a
list of files available for uploading, and the IP addresses of recipi-
ents of infringing uploads.3° It could also be programmed to rep-
licate itself as others accessed certain files, and could be passed on
to other infringers. 30 5  This incriminating information could con-
ceivably be used to generate cease and desist letters or criminal
referrals. 3°
As these strategies suggest, the creation of safe harbors for
such "corporate vigilantism" involves some risk that copyright
owners might easily overstep their boundaries by extrajudicially
Humphrey, Debating the Proposed Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act: Should Copyright
Owners Be Permitted to Disrupt Illegal File Trading over Peer-to-Peer Networks?, 4 N.C. J.L.
& TECH. 375, 375 (2003); Alex Salkever, Taking the Piracy Fight Too Far, BUS. WK. ONLINE,
at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jul2002/tc2002079_7636.htm (July 9,
2002).
30 See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000).
-02 Salkever, supra note 300; see Press Release from Howard L. Berman, Berman Intro-
duces Legislation to Foil Peer to Peer Piracy (July 25, 2002), available at
http:llwww.house.gov/appsllistlpress/ca28 bermanlpiracy-prevention-act.html (citing software
companies that make their software inoperable if their terms of use are violated, and cable op-
erators that use electronic countermeasures to thwart the theft of their signals).
303 See Privacy & Piracy, Hearing Before the Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investiga-
tions, supra note 137, at 1-3 (statement of Derek S. Broes, Executive Vice President of World-
wide Operations, Brilliant Digital Entertainment, Inc. and Altnet, Inc.) (criticizing programs that
have "hacked applications and broken ranks with accepted rights of privacy on the Internet to
spy on user behavior, analyze their files and generally divert intended actions of technology
solutions selected and being used by end users").
34 See Joseph D. Schleimer, Electronic Countermeasures to Copyright Infringement on
the Internet: Law & Technology, J. INTERNET L., Nov. 2001, at I, 3.
W Id.
06Id. at 3-4.
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determining that infringement has occurred, and damaging a com-
puter or Internet connection as a result. Piracy surveillance tech-
niques are developed and purchased by industries that seek to real-
ize significant profits by inventing ways to deter and detect in-
fringement. Under these regimes, the consumer becomes a help-
less entity, unable to negotiate or even contact the copyright owner
when a person's online activities are detected.
In the absence of public rules governing such behavior, or of
the parties' abilities to engage in discussions with one another,
both offenders and non-offenders will become governed and moni-
tored by the same regime. Fair use defenses can be circumvented
by private control. Moreover, because so much piracy surveillance
takes place extralegally and outside of the boundaries of govern-
ment regulation, I predict that the "private" regime of piracy sur-
veillance will be rewarded with another, equally protective indi-
vidual self-help regime by individuals, particularly through the
form of encryption, which creates a kind of "robust anonymity"
that can sever the link between certain types of personal informa-
tion and the person to whom it relates.3°7
Obviously, encryption is a type of privacy-enhancing technol-
ogy that aids both law abiding and law evading citizens. But, as
applied to the piracy surveillance scenario, encryption will have
distributional consequences on the nature of legitimate speech in
cyberspace. Risk-averse individuals who are fearful of detection
from copyright enforcers (either because they are actually pirating
materials or are treading on a "grey area" of fair use) will be en-
couraged to encrypt their messages or files to escape detection. As
such, files that normally would be broadcast in cyberspace will be
kept from the viewing eye of the public. In some circumstances,
where the files represent perfect replications of copyrighted songs,
the use of encryption might be desirable, because encryption pre-
vents use by the general public, thereby reducing the number of
infringing transactions. On the other hand, where the file repre-
sents something that arguably falls within a "grey area" of fair use
(like the song in question in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music),3 8
risk-averse creators might opt for encryption to avoid detection in
cyberspace. This narrows the scope of the audience reached for a
07 As Jerry Kang explains, encryption uses a cryptographic algorithm and a key to encode
a message into ciphertext. The intended recipient uses a key to decode the message back into its
original form. If the cryptographic algorithm is strong, and the key properly selected and kept
secret, it is infeasible for an unauthorized party to intercept the ciphertext and decrypt it back
into plaintext. See Kang, supra note 92, at 1242.
308 510 U.S. 569, 574-75 (1994) (deciding whether 2 Live Crew's parody of "Oh, Pretty
Woman" constituted fair use).
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work, reducing the demand for certain works and eventually dele-
teriously affecting the incentive to create.
Moreover, as Professor Jerry Kang points out, the legality of
these methods is often uncertain, and these methods are potentially
subject to government regulation. 30 9 They also have the undesir-
able effect of encouraging a particularly wasteful "arms race" be-
tween entities that may attempt to develop technologies to over-
come encryption and those that seek to develop ways to protect it.
The constant use of resources towards the protection and fencing
of information is socially undesirable, but it appears to be one of
the few ways in which individuals might be able to protect them-
selves from unwanted surveillance. Moreover, while these surveil-
lance activities fall within the twilight boundary between the pro-
tection of privacy and property, they also implicate a radically dif-
ferent view of copyright law than has been previously thought pos-
sible, altering the costs and benefits of copyright enforcement, as I
will discuss in Part III.
III. TOWARDS A REGIME OF PANOPTIC PUBLICATION
In Part II, I outlined a number of ways in which intellectual
property owners have privately sought to enforce copyright restric-
tions on cultural products and to detect unauthorized uses of their
products. This result has significant effects on privacy, freedom of
speech, and copyright itself. As the protection and control of intel-
lectual property expands, the protection of informational privacy
shrinks. As a result, speech suffers. Consumers are forced to in-
ternalize the costs of their loss of anonymity and will curb their
expression by restricting their conduct to that which is unques-
tionably insulated from liability. This phenomenon, in turn, can
reduce the number of works created and disseminated, but it also
quite drastically affects the way individuals experience and use
cultural products.
This section argues that the nature of copyright has become
fundamentally altered by the use of piracy surveillance in a regime
of "panoptic publication." Under this regime, anyone who pub-
lishes information in cyberspace - whether a commentary on a par-
ticular book, or a work that draws upon existing work - can be
subjected to an extrajudicial determination of infringement. In this
way, copyright's bundle of rights becomes extended in two major
ways. First, a copyright owner, through the guise of piracy sur-
veillance, is endowed with a near-perfect ability to control and
309See Kang, supra note 92, at 1242.
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monitor others' use of a work, circumventing fair use or other First
Amendment considerations; and second, a copyright owner, under
the DMCA, becomes endowed with the ability to unmask the iden-
tity of any author on the Internet, as long as a bare accusation of
infringement is made under the DMCA. 1 °
As I have suggested, piracy surveillance methods involve
some relative tradeoff between an individual's interests in using,
expressing, or disseminating intellectual property (and in protect-
ing her identity from disclosure), and the interests of a third-party
copyright enforcer. Just as an individual might place a high value
on protecting her privacy or autonomy from invasion, a third-party
enforcer may place a high value on protecting her property from
unwanted use or infringement. The question, then, is how judges
and legislators should balance these interests appropriately.
In this section, I will analyze both the arguments for and
against such surveillance, and argue that any proposed, private
benefits to individual copyright owners have not considered the
substantial social costs for such surveillance programs on non-
offending individuals. Obviously, one benefit of piracy surveil-
lance is somewhat clear: a reduction in the harm caused by copy-
right infringement. But this benefit must also be weighed against
the various costs involved, which include the potential of piracy
surveillance to: block access to certain types of legitimate informa-
tion, prevent fair use of cultural products, expose anonymous
speakers, mistake legitimate files for illegitimate ones, and cast a
wide net of groundless accusation. As this section will argue, pro-
ponents of such systems often fail to recognize the substantial
costs of compliance for non-offenders, such as risk-aversion, the
possibility of mistake, and overdeterrence of speech and fair use.
Let me begin by clarifying that I am not arguing that the types
of piracy the RIAA seeks to deter are - or should be - legally im-
mune from liability. Rather, my concern in this Article is to pro-
tect other types of expression - fair use, anonymous speech - that
can become wrongly caught within the panoptic web of surveil-
lance. The very purpose of copyright is to ensure that a balance
exists between control over private ownership and expression in
order to create incentives for more speech and more creation. Yet
piracy surveillance eviscerates this balance between control and
310 This risk has softened somewhat in the wake of Verizon, but the actual words of the
DMCA, still unclear, could give rise to a contrary interpretation by another court. See Re-
cording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs. Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1233 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (noting that under the DMCA, "a subpoena may be issued only to an ISP engaged in
storing on its servers material that is infringing or the subject of infringing activity," not to an
ISP that is merely serving as a conduit for data transmitted between two Internet users).
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expression, leading to an inescapable logic of vigilantism. Instead
of protecting the creation of cultural products, this section argues
that piracy surveillance has transformed copyright into a panoptic
regime where copyright owners are legally empowered with a va-
riety of means to identify, classify, and threaten potential pirates;
and, in doing so, are made capable of controlling the public's ac-
cess to cultural products to an unprecedented degree, thereby re-
ducing the incentives for further speech and creation.
A. Real Space Analogies
The underlying logic behind piracy surveillance is inextrica-
bly tied to real space principles, suggesting that intellectual prop-
erty is equivalent, in both form and content, to other types of prop-
erties in real space. In real space, for example, property rights are
generally characterized by an agglomeration of privileges, includ-
ing the right to possess, the privilege to use, and the power to
transfer any and all of these rights and privileges.31' Proponents of
piracy surveillance point out that comparable measures of legal-
ized self-help (like the right of repossession or defense of prop-
erty) are traditionally available to property owners in real space;
thus, the same should be available to intellectual property owners
in cyberspace.3t 2 This is true: A property owner is permitted, un-
der the law, to take certain actions to recover stolen possessions,
and is granted some immunity from trespassing on others' land for
that purpose.
Yet there is a crucial difference between such strategies in
real space as opposed to cyberspace: Self-help methods in real
space are traditionally premised on maintaining, not destroying,
preexisting boundaries between private and public space. For this
reason, self-help strategies in real space reify, rather than erode,
the architecturally-created balance between spatial protections for
privacy and protection of property discussed in Part I of this Arti-
cle. Indeed, both the common law and the U.C.C. have extended
self-help allowances to property owners with a few important ca-
veats: Both bodies of law limit the right to enter private property
in order to repossess items to those circumstances where some de-
31" See Charles Donahue, Jr., The Future of the Concept of Property Predicted from Its
Past, in PROPERTY 28, 32 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
312See Email from Alec French, Minority Counsel, House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, on behalf of Rep. Berman, to Declan McCullagh,
Chief Political Correspondent for CNET News.com (Sept. 4, 2002) (explaining the copyright
protection provided by the Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act), available at
http://www.politechbot.comp-03949.html.
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gree of consent or acquiescence has been shown, and usually in
circumstances where an existing contract has been breached.
31 3
Thus, given that the law traditionally creates exceptions to the
law of trespass to permit self-help repossession of chattels kept on
private property, courts usually justify these limitations only if the
actors can accomplish them without a breach of the peace, and
with the consent of the private property owner.31 4 Other cases re-
quire some notification before taking unilateral action.3t 5 More-
over, case law from real space suggests that even trespassers enjoy
some expectations of privacy from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. 316  Above all, any force must be reasonable under the cir-
cumstances, and a person is liable for any harm done in the exer-
cise of these privileges.31 7 And no case has ever held that an entry
into one's home, without the consent of the owner, is justifiable
self-help.318
In contrast, the use of piracy surveillance scenarios in cyber-
space shatters this traditional balance between the protection of
property and the protection of privacy. After all, intellectual prop-
erty is not real property, and a number of particularized rules gov-
ern the use of intellectual property, and a host of statutory excep-
tions (including fair use) limit an owner's exclusive control over
intellectual property. 319  Thus, self-help analogies from real space
313 See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1089, 1101-02 (1998); Pamela Samuelson, Embedding Technical Self-Help in Licensed
Software, COMM. OFTHE ACM, Oct. 1997, at 13.3 14 Samuelson, supra note 313, at 15; see generally Douglas Ivor Brandon et al., Self-Help:
Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges and Remedies in Contemporary American Society, 37 VAND. L.
REV. 845 (1984) (exploring the permitted use of self-help in various legal areas).
315 See, e.g., Jon K. Wactor, Self Help: A Viable Remedy for Nuisance? A Guide for the
Common Man's Lawyer, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 92 (1982) (collecting case law on this point).316See People v. Schafer, 946 P.2d 938, 944-45 (Colo. 1997) (recognizing trespasser's
rights to privacy in sealed tent); see also Luke M. Milligan, Comment, The Fourth Amendment
Rights of Trespassers: Searching for the Legitimacy of the Government-Notification Doctrine,
50 EMORY L.J. 1357, 1360 (2001) (discussing trespasser privacy expectations and protection
provided by state and federal courts).317Brandon, supra note 314, at 861; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 198
(1965) (discussing "Entry to Reclaim Goods on Land Without Wrong of Actor").
318 See James R. McCall, The Past as Prologue: A History of the Right to Repossess, 47 S.
CAL. L. REV. 58 (1973); Eugene Mikolajczyk, Comment, Breach of Peace and Section 9-503 of
the Uniform Commercial Code - A Modern Definition for an Ancient Restriction, 82 DICK. L.
REV. 351, 352 (providing a historical background of the self-help remedy). Repossessors are
usually barred from forcibly entering a person's home, for example. See Butler v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 829 F.2d 568, 570 (5th Cir. 1987); Dearman v. Williams, 109 So. 2d 316, 321 (Miss.
1959); Kirkwood v. Hickman, 78 So. 2d 351, 356 (Miss. 1955).
319See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). For example, "although one enraged musician testified to
Congress that copyright infringement was 'theft,"' the literal equivalent of someone "walk[ing]
into a record store, grab[bing] what they wanted and walk[ing] out," that is not precisely the
case, as even the Supreme Court has recognized. Bailey, supra note 141, at 488; see also
Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 217 (1985) ("[I]nterference with copyright does not
easily equate with theft, conversion, or fraud.").
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often fail to consider the costs of such invasion on a non-offending
individual. Instead of serving as a passive constraint to protect
from invasions of real property (like a lock or fence), some piracy
surveillance techniques (like the use of smart agents for monitor-
ing) are instituted without probable cause or notice to the user and
320
carry the potential to eviscerate one's anonymity.
Proponents of piracy surveillance, particularly where monitor-
ing is concerned, contend, following Kennedy, that a person does
not enjoy any reasonable expectation of privacy in material that he
or she might leave open for public view, display, or use, especially
music files that can be uploaded to others. The Verizon trial court
echoed this point, observing, where an ISP subscriber "opens his
computer to permit others, through peer-to-peer filesharing, to
download materials from that computer, it is hard to understand
just what privacy expectation he or she has after essentially open-
ing the computer to the world.",32 ' But this point fails to consider
the other policy concerns that turn on the importance of protecting
non-offending individuals from unwanted surveillance in cyber-
space. Unlike analogies in real space, piracy surveillance does not
entail formal notice, consent, or negotiation between the parties.
Nor does it protect constitutional assurances of anonymity. Indi-
viduals who are caught within the panoptic Web of piracy surveil-
lance have little protection: Any of their uses of cultural products,
or expression, is subjected to the governing, extrajudicial gaze of a
copyright owner.
For this reason, as Julie Cohen points out, technologies that
force changes in user behavior decrease the zone of autonomy that
all users enjoy with respect to the enjoyment of intellectual
goods:
322
320 Consider a real space example. In one piracy surveillance strategy, researchers created
equipment that detects the faint radio signals emitted regularly by computers. A special code
installed in the software would allow monitors to identify the software the computer is currently
using by broadcasting certain signals. Using the technology, anti-piracy groups could detect the
number of signals emanating from a company's office to determine infringement. New British
Anti-Piracy Solution Based on Intelligence Techniques, TELECOMWORLDWIRE, Mar. 2, 1998,
available at 1998 WL 5141163. Now, compare this with recent Supreme Court jurisprudence,
which only just recently observed that the use of sense-enhancing technology to gather informa-
tion about the interior of a home constituted a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, pointing out that the very core of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence involved the
right of a man to retreat into his own home, free from governmental intrusion. Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-34 (2001). Indeed, Kyllo holds that the use of devices that are not used
in general public to explore details of a home is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.
Id. at 40.
321 In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 267 (D.D.C. 2003).
322 Cohen, supra note 267, at 580.
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Both by directly constraining private behaviors related to in-
tellectual consumption and by enabling creation of detailed
and permanent records of such consumption, these technolo-
gies have the potential to change dramatically the way people
experience intellectual goods.
Under the DMCA subpoena provision, for example, it does
not matter whether the person has actually infringed on a copyright
or not - all that matters is that the owner has a "good faith belief'
that the infringement has occurred.3 24 The same can also be said of
DRM technologies, which entirely circumvent judicial oversight in
favor of automatic copyright enforcement.
A piracy surveillance advocate might argue that these areas of
copyright enforcement and surveillance are no different than moni-
toring activities taken in real space to protect one's property. Af-
ter all, if someone publishes something on the Internet, or makes
certain files available, he or she should know that intellectual
property owners will routinely monitor such uses in order to pro-
tect copyrighted work from unauthorized reproduction. But there
is a difference in cyberspace: anonymity. Piracy surveillance cre-
ates a world in which copyright owners can set the terms of use,
police consumers, record and expose their personal information,
and penalize potential infringers - all, to a varying extent, outside
of the boundaries of state control.
How does piracy surveillance affect the incentives for creativ-
ity? Imagine that every activity you did on the Internet that in-
volved the use of someone's copyrighted work - viewing a photo-
graph, creating a collage of copyrighted expressions, quoting cer-
tain texts, commenting on existing texts - was immediately subject
to the permission of the copyright owner or, worse yet, the copy-
right owner was capable of recording your activities and prevent-
ing them if it deemed them to constitute "infringement." Where
would your rights lie, particularly with respect to your freedom of
expression or right to defend your activities from scrutiny? One
risk-averse response might be to curb your behavior to prevent
embarrassing or unwanted intervention from copyright owners.
323 Id.
324 DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (2003). But see Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am.,
Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs. Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the
RIAA's attempts to obtain the identity of Verizon subscribers accused of unauthorized sharing
of copyrighted files is not authorized under the DMCA's subpoena provision); Katie Dean,
RIAA Strikes Again at Traders, WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/
0,1412,61989,00.html (Jan. 21, 2004) (describing the RIAA's filing of 532 "John Doe" suits
against individuals it has accused of illegal file-sharing, in response to the D.C. Circuit's ruling
that the DMCA does not authorize the RIAA's attempts to subpoena ISPs to obtain the personal
information about the ISPs' subscribers).
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You might, then, erase references to cultural products in your writ-
ing, avoid using language that resembles copyrighted speech,
maybe even avoid commentary, parody, collage, or sampling en-
tirely. The eventual result would be a gradual chilling of creative
behavior; the constant, silent, assertion of surveillance for in-
fringement might eventually deter you from speaking at all.
B. Institutional Competence
Another justification that may be offered for granting the
province of piracy surveillance to individual copyright owners,
rather than an ISP or the government, turns on institutional compe-
tence and efficiency considerations: A private copyright owner,
rather than another entity, should internalize the costs of his detec-
tion of infringement because the copyright owner has the appropri-
ate incentives to do so. Two concerns weigh against creating the
type of privatized regime of copyright enforcement that currently
exists under the DMCA: the first turning on identity; the second
turning on the importance of judicial oversight.
Professors A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell explain
that the rationale for public law enforcement often turned on the
role of information about the identity of violators.325 When vic-
tims of harm naturally know who injured them, allowing private
suits for harm will motivate victims to initiate legal action and use
that information to enforce law. 326 (That is why the enforcement
of tort and contract law is private in nature.) In contrast, if victims
do not know who injured them, or if it is difficult to identify or
apprehend perceived criminals, public enforcement may be more
desirable.327 According to Polinsky and Shavell, public enforce-
ment is made even more desirable if inducements to private parties
to supply information are somehow inadequate, in the sense that
they encourage wasteful efforts to locate violators, or if they en-
courage the use of force in gathering information and capturing
violators, for example.328 Thus, public enforcement is usually pre-
ferred when effort is required to identify and apprehend viola-
tors. 3 29
These observations become particularly important when we
consider the effects of the DMCA subpoena power on citizen ex-
pression in cyberspace. DMCA notices are served and signed off
312 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of
Law, J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 46 (2000).
326 !d.
327 Id.
328 Id.
329 Id.
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with almost no judicial oversight. The DMCA section, as it is
written, empowers anyone who alleges "unauthorized" use of a
copyrighted work to obtain a subpoena with the identity of any
Internet user - without the institution of ongoing or anticipated
litigation, or even notice to the user herself.330  Moreover, piracy
surveillance techniques, in and of themselves, do not demonstrate
a predisposition towards the kind of discretionary nonenforcement
that is typically demonstrated by public prosecutors and law en-
forcers.331 Instead, piracy surveillance methods are calibrated to
be overbroad by design in order to deter the widest possible
breadth of infringement.
Returning to Polinsky and Shavell's point, the problem of
anonymity, coupled with the low standard of proof, lays the
groundwork for the possibility of "overfishing" for violators. The
fact that it is of little cost for the copyright owner to file and serve
a DMCA subpoena means that it is not necessary that the copy-
right owner have a high probability of success in filing suit.332
Rather, the copyright owner only needs to have a high probability
that the offending expression itself will be deterred after the notice
is served. Given that the responsibility for enforcing a copyright
rests with the ISP, who then faces the responsibility of "taking
down" the infringing material, cutting off Internet access to the
client, or facing contributory liability, the ISP might respond im-
mediately, and in some cases fail to afford prior notice or enable
an impartial, independent determination.333
Indeed, the need for judicial oversight becomes particularly
pronounced where fair use and speech are concerned. As anyone
who practices copyright litigation will attest, sorting out compet-
ing claims of infringement and fair use is time-consuming, fact-
specific, and deeply prone to strategic manipulation. Yet piracy
surveillance allows copyright owners to circumvent access to a
fair, adversarial, and impartial forum; instead, mere accusations of
330 Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant Verizon Internet Services and Urging
Reversal at 2, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (Nos. 03-7015, 03-7053) (consolidated appeals). Verizon may have softened
this risk, however. See Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d at 1236-37 ("[T]he subpoena
power of § 512 [of the DMCA] applies only to ISPs engaged in storing copyrighted material and
not to those engaged solely in transmitting it on behalf of others.").
331 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 42-43 (1975).
332 See Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Error, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS,
VOLUME I: THE HISTORY AND METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1029, 1038
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) ("In general, the higher the costs which a
victim must incur in suing an injurer the greater must the probability of success be for the victim
to sue.").
333 See Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d at 1234.
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infringement can displace court-ordered determinations. More-
over, piracy surveillance techniques also fail to consider two sig-
nificant costs to non-offenders: overdeterrence of speech and evis-
ceration of fair use. These two elements, taken together, paradoxi-
cally convert copyright from a regime that governs the illegitimate
use of private properties into a regime that governs all speech and
expression in cyberspace, even when it is only tangentially related
to the copyright owner in question.
The effect of this transformation cannot be understated - both
with respect to copyright law, as well as the nature of cyberspace
itself. To understand its effects, it is helpful to recall that fair use
cures a market failure in copyright that may be created because the
possibility of consensual bargain may have broken down in some
way, either because transaction costs are too high or because
agreement is otherwise impossible.334 Piracy surveillance, how-
ever, eclipses judicial enforcement of fair use, because a private
entity's determination under the DMCA circumvents access to a
fair and impartial forum. Because private, rather than public, enti-
ties are now capable of determining whether a use is fair or not,
the correction of market failure is largely impossible. Instead,
Section 512(h), the subpoena provision at issue in Verizon, pro-
vides no protection for expression that may be determined, at a
later point, to be fully protected speech.335
As I have shown, Napster placed the responsibility to detect
infringement with intellectual property owners, and the DMCA's
standard for a notice-and-takedown request is surprisingly subject
to manipulative assertions of copyright infringement. Conse-
quently, overdeterrence of speech is a relatively straightforward,
and realistic, risk. Uncertain legal standards, as John Calfee and
Richard Craswell remind us, deter socially desirable behavior
through overcompliance.336 In these circumstances, an extrajudi-
cial determination of infringement is efficient, quick, but often
prone to mistake, thus laying the groundwork for the uncertainty
that may motivate an over-deterrence of speech. Applying Calfee
and Craswell's observations, the rising probability of extrajudicial
enforcement, coupled with the apparent uncertainty of an extraju-
dicial determination, risks deterring expression.
334 See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analy-
sis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1613 (1982).
335 See Brief for Appellant at 32, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet
Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Nos. 03-7015, 03-7053) (consolidated appeals).336 See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance
with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 966 (1984).
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Piracy surveillance advocates might respond by pointing out,
first, that the subpoena provision does not target actual expression,
only one's identity; and second, that most of the cases falling un-
der the recording industry's purview concern actual infringement,
which is traditionally outside of the purview of the First Amend-
ment.33 7 But these arguments also presume a clarity between in-
fringement and fair use that is often illusory. This line may be
fairly easy to draw if we are considering the liability of someone
who is uploading hundreds of files of copyrighted music (some-
thing that courts generally agree constitutes infringement), but it is
much harder to draw in cases that involve someone who might be
downloading music for parody, fair use, space shifting, or trans-
formative purposes. Here, a fair determination often turns on the
forum and the precise facts of each case. Consider some of the
following examples of "mistaken" DMCA notices, or situations in
which accusations of infringement were made in order to silence
particular expression:
* Notice ID No. 232: Church of Scientology aims to re-
move links written by individuals who publish criticisms of its
work.
0 Notice ID No. 310: Individual attempts to use DMCA
to assert trademark claims, rather than copyright claims, in order
to take advantage of its takedown provisions.
B Notice ID No. 94: Copyright owner for the character
Barney threatens a DMCA notice in order to try to remove photo
that allegedly "incorporates the use and threat of violence to-
wards the children's character Barney without permission."
* Notice ID No. 348: DMCA claim made against indi-
vidual who posted public court records containing copyrighted
images.338
In one recent case, an electronic voting machine company
flooded ISPs with DMCA notices claiming copyright infringement
in order to remove embarrassing internal emails that were critical
of the company. Even though such documents were arguably cov-
337 Brief of Amici Curiae Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., et al., in Support of
the Recording Industry Association of America and Urging Affirmance at 12, Recording Indus.
Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Nos. 03-7015,
03-7053) (consolidated appeals) ("Infringers... do not create speech, they copy it.").338 See Brief of Amici in Support of Verizon's Opposition to RIAA's Motion to Enforce at
9-10, In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2003) (No. 02-MS-0323).
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ered by fair use, many ISPs removed the material without chal-
lenging the initial determination.339
As these examples demonstrate, the DMCA's notice-and-
takedown provisions are often used for a host of reasons that do
not always match up with a meritorious assertion of copyright in-
fringement. Moreover, the exceedingly complex, inconsistent, and
ambiguous case law regarding copyright can often lead individuals
to chill potential expression out of the fear of liability, particularly
when they recognize the potential to unmask anonymous speech
under the DMCA subpoena provisions.
C. Privacy, Autonomy, and Anonymity
The factors I have identified above flow evenly into a third
area of concern, which stems from constitutional values. Even if it
is efficient and desirable to place the burden on a copyright owner
to detect infringement, the need for robust judicial safeguards are
obvious, particularly where values of speech, expression, and fair-
ness are implicated. The point of copyright law is not to create a
stand-alone, self-contained regime, where copyright issues are re-
solved without attention to other common law or constitutional
values, like due process, freedom of speech, or privacy. Yet the
DMCA propagates an isolationist tendency by failing to require
copyright owners to conform its efforts to the constitutional pro-
tections normally afforded to citizens under the First, Fourth, or
Fifth Amendments. The Verizon trial court maintained, in con-
trast, to this view:
[T]he DMCA neither authorizes governmental censorship nor
involves prior restraint of potentially protected expression.
Section 512(h) merely allows a private copyright owner to
obtain the identity of an alleged copyright infringer in order
to protect constitutionally-recognized rights in creative
works; it does not even directly seek or restrain the underly-
ing expression (the sharing of copyrighted material). Thus
the DMCA does not regulate protected expression or other-
wise permit prior restraint of protected speech. It only re-
quires production of the identity of one who has engaged in
unprotected conduct - sharing copyrighted material on theInternet.34
339 See Paul Roberts, Diebold Voting Case Tests DMCA, PC WORLD NEWS, at
http://www.pcworld.comlnews/articleO,aid, I 13273,00.asp (Nov. 4, 2003).
340In re Verizon Intemet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 261 (D.D.C. 2003).
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This observation, at first glance, is rhetorically powerful, par-
ticularly as applied to the facts in Verizon. But the statement also
overlooks the interplay of three other elements: (1) the gatekeeper
role of the ISP, which faces the threat of contributory infringement
if it does not act immediately to silence the offensive conduct; (2)
the potential for strategic motives of a copyright owner, who may
be tempted to file notices for spurious reasons; and (3) the fact that
the subpoena provisions are not limited solely to individuals who
upload copyrighted songs (an admittedly clearer issue of infringe-
ment), but apply to anyone who offers, obtains, or creates alleg-
edly infringing material on the Internet. Since the words of the
DMCA permit a preliminary unveiling of identity, Section 512 can
give rise to serious due process concerns, for the accused herself as
well as the ISP.
34 1
Moreover, piracy surveillance implicates two particular rights,
both connected to autonomy: first, the right to speak anonymously;
and second, the right to receive information. To its credit, the Ver-
izon trial court admitted that the First Amendment recognized a
right to anonymity, both in real space and on the Internet.342 But
the court limited the scope of this right by pointing out that courts
have usually embraced a right to anonymity in situations involving
"core First Amendment expression," like political speech, and not
situations that deal with copyright infringement per se. 3 43  By
drawing this unduly stark line between First Amendment rights of
expression and copyright infringement, the court mistakenly pre-
sumed that the individual in question - indeed, every individual
potentially subject to a DMCA notice - was already guilty of in-
fringement, and thus was not entitled to any First Amendment pro-
344tections.
Extrajudicial determinations of copyright liability are particu-
larly precarious, especially where disclosure of anonymity is at
risk.345 In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, the Supreme
34' See Brief of Amici Curiae United States Industry Association et al. at 5, In re Verizon
Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003) (No. 02-MS-0323). The due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees a party adequate procedural safeguards before a
deprivation of a property or liberty interest. The seminal requirements of due process have been
set forth for years: "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise inter-
ested parties of the pendency of the action and [to] afford them an opportunity to present their
objections." Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
3421n re Verizon, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 259.
343 ad.
3 11d.
345 Yet as one lawyer observes, "many people converse on the Interet anonymously un-
aware that they have become the subject of a subpoena seeking their identity before it is too late
to quash the subpoena." EFF & Liberty Project Defend Anonymous Poster Against Third-Party
Identity Subpoenas to ISPs, 14 EFFECTOR I (Feb. 7, 2001) (quoting Nicole Berner, counsel for
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Court found that an Ohio law violated the First Amendment be-
cause it prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign litera-
346ture. In that case, the Court held that when a statute places bur-
dens on "core political speech," it will apply a heightened degree
of scrutiny to the statute, and uphold it if it is "narrowly tailored"
to advance an "overriding state interest. '347 This recommended
balancing test is essential to preserving the important discursive
values supported by anonymity, and necessitates a careful balanc-
ing of the rights of the speaker with the interests of law enforce-
ment. In stark contrast, in Verizon, the district court blithely re-
jected this view, observing:
[T]his is not a case where Verizon's customer is anony-
mously using the Internet to distribute speeches of Lenin,
Biblical passages, educational materials, or criticisms of the
government - situations in which assertions of First Amend-
ment rights more plausibly could be made.... [T]he purpose
of protecting anonymous expression is to safeguard those
"who support causes anonymously" and those who "fear
economic or official retaliation," "social ostracism," or an
,,348
unwanted intrusion into "privacy.
Yet the court missed the significance of the issue at stake. By
short-circuiting consideration of the appropriate balancing test that
McIntyre advocates, the Verizon trial court assumed, without de-
ciding, that the individual's activities in question constituted direct
infringement, and thusly were undeserving of anonymity. Yet by
ascribing to a private, extralegal determination of infringement, the
court failed to perform the balancing test that McIntyre recom-
mends, and deferred instead to the judgment of a private party.
While it is certainly true that the First Amendment does not
provide a defense to copyright infringement, mere accusations of
infringement, without more, implicate First Amendment values
because they provide powerful mechanisms for silencing others
under the DMCA. As Professor Jed Rubenfeld has emphasized,
copyright restrictions inherently raise First Amendment concerns
because they turn speech into property; and by doing so, they are
capable of making people liable for speaking, thus creating a "pri-
vate power over public speech. 349  So, although an actual in-
the Liberty Project), at http://www.eff.org/effector/HTML/effect I4.0l.html#I.
346514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
347 Id. at 347.
348 In re Verizon, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 43 (quoting, in part, Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y
of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165 (2002)).
349 Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE
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fringer cannot assert a First Amendment defense, the DMCA's
provision, coupled with the increasing spectre of piracy surveil-
lance, wrongly presumes guilt before innocence, thereby eviscerat-
ing protection for anonymity.35 °
Second, aside from the failure to balance protections for ano-
nymity with copyright, piracy surveillance also raises concerns
about autonomous access to information. In real space, for exam-
ple, a consumer of copyrighted material enjoys anonymity: The
copyright owner does not know the identity of the person who
reads, listens, or watches certain material. 35' However, some
forms of piracy surveillance alter this critical balance of interests
between the consumer and creator, permitting a copyright owner to
have the right to unmask the identity of an end user, raising clear
First Amendment implications.352
In Stanley v. Georgia,353 a case which suggested the impor-
tance of intellectual privacy, the Supreme Court held that the First
and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited making private possession
of obscene material a crime. In that case, the Court recognized
that the valid governmental interest in dealing with the problem of
obscenity could not justify its insulation from other constitutional
rights, particularly those implicated in a statute forbidding the
mere possession of obscene materials.354 As the Court observed:
This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of
their social worth, is fundamental to our free society. More-
over, in the context of this case - a prosecution for mere pos-
session of printed or filmed matter in the privacy of a per-
son's own home - that right takes on an added dimension.
For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very
limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intru-
sions into one's privacy.355
Those values easily translate into the context raised in this Ar-
ticle, where the DMCA's provisions extend piracy surveillance
into the home activities of many citizens, resulting in a tradeoff in
L.J. 1, 25 (2002) (emphasis omitted).
310°As one court observed, "If Internet users could be stripped of... anonymity by a civil
subpoena enforced under the liberal rules of civil discovery, this would have a significant chill-
ing effect on Internet communications and thus on basic First Amendment rights." Doe v.
2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
351 See WIPO, Hearing on H.R. 2281 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, supra
note 160, at 12 (statement of Marc Rotenberg, Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center).
3521d. at 14.
353 94 U.S. 557 (1969).
354 Id. at 568-70.
355 Id. at 563-64 (citation omitted).
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the autonomy and freedom of ordinary citizens to access informa-
tion. This is particularly true with respect to DRM, but similar
analysis could also underline the other surveillance techniques I
have identified. In Stanley, the appellant asserted the right to read
or observe what he pleases, to satisfy his own intellectual needs in
the privacy of his own home.356 Importantly, the Court rejected
the proposition that the obscene character of the materials meant
he had no right to possess them, observing, "[w]hatever may be the
justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not
think they reach into the privacy of one's own home. 3 57
The same observations apply to the effects of piracy surveil-
lance, where a person could be precluded from undertaking a host
of activities involving the use and possession of copyrighted mate-
rial in one's own home. The effect of piracy surveillance without
probable cause affects a person's right to receive information and
runs the risk of chilling legitimate expression and fair use of copy-
righted materials in both real space and cyberspace.
Private copyright enforcement thus exacerbates the risk of in-
trusion, particularly in a university environment, where, as Gris-
wold has pointed out, the "right of freedom of speech and press
includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to dis-
tribute, the right to receive, the right to read and freedom of in-
quiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach - indeed the free-
dom of the entire university community. 358 As one university rep-
resentative has testified regarding the DMCA:
[T]he legislation's notice and takedown procedure would
have a different impact on institutions of higher education
than it would on commercial service providers .... Enforcing
the "takedown" of material in response to a notice of alleged
infringement would have the appearance of suppression of
speech, particularly in a setting where fair use makes the le-
gality or illegality of a particular infringement claim less than
crystal clear ....
Consider the implications of the music industry's request to
allow its computer experts to scan all computers at the University
of Melbourne for sound files and email accounts so that it could
gather evidence of copyright infringement.36° Under Stanley and
356 Id. at 565.
357 Id.
358 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (citations omitted).
359 See WIPO, Hearing on H.R. 2281 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, supra
note 160, at 73-74 (1998) (statement of Charles E. Phelps, Provost, University of Rochester).
360 See Lamont, supra note 7, at 3.
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McIntyre, a court should have to perform a balancing test to exam-
ine whether the incursion of privacy was justified by the assertion
of copyright infringement. "If the First Amendment means any-
thing," the Stanley Court powerfully observed, "it means that a
State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house,
what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government
the power to control men's minds.",361 By performing a balancing
test, a court or legislator might consider areas of fair use and pri-
vacy that deserve protection under Stanley's reasoning.
In sum, the premise of piracy surveillance suggests the need
to revisit the importance of recognizing the cost of technologies of
invasion on consumer autonomy and access to information.
IV. RECONCILING PRIVACY AND PROPERTY
In cyberspace, intellectual property and privacy are at an im-
passe. There is no way out - each area faces inherent conflicts
with another. Throughout the development of copyright in cyber-
space, intellectual property rights have slowly and quietly ex-
panded to take precedence over the privacy and expressive rights
of ordinary citizens. Part of this is due to the expansion of prop-
erty rights over areas of intangible information and the absence of
strong legislative protections of informational privacy. Yet, part
of it is also due to a failure among lawmakers and judges to con-
ceptualize a deeper relationship between property and privacy;
there is a current tendency, shared by many, to separate intellectual
property rights from privacy and to create a hierarchical relation-
ship between the two. In other words, the law has displayed a per-
sistent failure to recognize that expansions of control of intellec-
tual property cause tradeoffs in other areas of consumer protec-
tion - particularly where privacy is concerned. As a result, we
have created a world in which the property rights of copyright
owners are valued over the liberty, property, and privacy rights of
others, suggesting that those principles are somehow less valuable
than those involving commercial self-protection.362
Today, even in the wake of Verizon, the rivalry between intel-
lectual property and privacy persists, even though the factual sce-
nario has changed. In prior sections, I argued that copyright law
has been irretrievably altered by this panoptic transformation, be-
cause the DMCA (among other areas of copyright) enables content
361 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
362 See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1390 (2000).
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owners to patrol and monitor the end user's subsequent expression
with little judicial oversight. In turn, as the Napster and Verizon
cases suggest, copyright owners' ability to monitor peer-to-peer
communications also incurs the potential to unmask the activities,
identities, and expressions of all citizens who post information in
cyberspace. Consequently, the risk of implicating non-offenders
within the panoptic snare of piracy surveillance raises the danger
of silencing speech and expression in cyberspace. Thus, rather
than property rights taking precedence over privacy, this section
will argue that the three rights in question - privacy, property,
speech - should be equally valued and protected. For treating
copyright protection (and the DMCA) as a stand-alone regime ob-
scures all of the ways in which its regulatory mechanisms affects
constitutional areas like expression, privacy, and due process.
An adequate starting point, then, is to reexamine copyright's
relationship to privacy. Indeed, the great irony of this situation is
not the intractability of the conflict between privacy and intellec-
tual property in cyberspace, but the inability of legislators to fash-
ion a solution that squares with other constitutional values of prop-
erty, personhood, and autonomy under the DMCA. Thus, under
my proposed solution, the law would attempt to reconcile these
values with copyright enforcement by creating a series of entitle-
ments based on the need for personal protection and anonymity in
the face of piracy surveillance.363 These changes are meant to
serve as overlapping, reinforcing, and non-mutually exclusive
methods to alter and enforce the protection of informational pri-
vacy and speech by increasing the scope of public governance and
oversight over piracy surveillance.
A. Internet Speech and Broadcast Freedoms
As I have suggested throughout this piece, laws protecting in-
tellectual property must be harmonized with other, mostly consti-
tutional, values. Here, the Fourth Amendment could serve as a
guide, particularly since its jurisprudence has historically sought to
reconcile the tension between protecting the interests of the public
with individual civil liberties. Following this view, pre-Internet
laws that flow from the mantle of the Fourth Amendment, such as
the Privacy Protection Act ("PPA") can offer a path to follow in
creating some much-needed balance between privacy and intellec-
tual property.
363 See GANDY, supra note 99, at 235.
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The PPA requires a special subpoena when First Amendment
interests in news reporting might be affected by an ongoing inves-
tigation. The origins of the PPA echo of the same concerns raised
by piracy surveillance strategies today. In 1971, a demonstration
at Stanford University Hospital turned into a violent clash between
the participants and police. The Stanford Daily, a campus newspa-
per, managed to photograph a number of participants in the dem-
onstration. 364 Two days afterward, it published a series of photo-
graphs of the clash between the police and the demonstrators. Af-
ter it published the photographs, the police obtained a search war-
rant to seize material that might constitute evidence of the criminal
365activity under investigation. Hence, at Stanford Daily, the po-
lice searched wastebaskets and rummaged through photographic
negatives. 366 The event so incensed the employees at Daily that
they filed suit, contending that the First Amendment barred the use
of a search warrant under circumstances where the entity in ques-
tion is a news gatherer not implicated in the criminal conduct. The
Supreme Court disagreed with their position and held that the First
Amendment was not a bar to the use of a search warrant under
those facts.36 7 In that case, the Court held that the Fourth Amend-
ment did not prohibit police from undertaking searches of evidence
held by innocent third parties.368
Congress, reacting to the Court's opinion, enacted the PPA.
The PPA requires intimate judicial involvement and oversight: It
provides for a special subpoena in cases where there is a danger of
interference with the First Amendment interests of an innocent
publisher. It also establishes a general rule preventing the search
and seizure of certain types of materials, specifically called "work
product" materials, intended for publication:
Notwithstanding any other law, it shall be unlawful for a
government officer or employee, in connection with the in-
vestigation or prosecution of a criminal offense, to search for
or seize any work product materials possessed by a person
reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the
public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of
364 Mark Eckenwiler, Applications of the Privacy Protection Act, 8 SETON HALL CONST.
L.J. 725, 725 (1998).
365 Id.
366 ld.367 Id. at 726; Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 567-68 (1978).
368Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 567-68.
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public communication, in or affecting interstate or foreign369
commerce ....
The definition of "work product" excludes contraband, fruits,
or instrumentalities of crime, and the PPA actively requires that
suspects of crime be treated with the same probable cause guide-
lines that animate the Fourth Amendment. 370 Though the PPA has
not regularly been applied to Internet-related disputes, it has been
successfully employed in a case where the Secret Service, with the
aid of several U.S. attorneys, seized a multitude of computer-
related evidence owned by the operators and users of a computer
bulletin board who also published books and materials.37'
The PPA should serve as a baseline guiding force in response
to the DMCA's overreach into privacy and First Amendment ex-
pression. For the reasons I have offered, DMCA subpoenas re-
garding file sharers on peer-to-peer networks can raise similar con-
stitutional concerns that can activate PPA remedies. Thus, the
PPA's concern with protecting a First Amendment right to broad-
cast is justifiably applicable to the Internet, particularly in a peer-
to-peer context, because everyone "publishes" information on the
Web. On the Web, everyone is essentially an author and publisher,
empowered with the ability to disseminate messages to others.
Moreover, the PPA balances the protection of individual civil lib-
erties with those of expressive freedom: At the outset, the law is
meant to be applied in conjunction with the Fourth Amendment,
which provides for basic protections of probable cause and judicial
oversight for suspects of infringement.372 These basic Fourth
Amendment principles - probable cause, freedom from search and
seizure, protection of privacy - can and should also serve as base-
line governing principles to govern private modes of copyright en-
forcement.
Thus, if a copyright owner wanted to determine the identity of
a person who might be transmitting or downloading materials for
infringing purposes, the DMCA, like the PPA, could also require a
similar subpoena that raises the standard of judicial oversight.373
369 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a) (2000).
370 See Eckenwiler, supra note 364, at 728.
37' Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 816 F. Supp. 432, 440-41
(W.D. Tex. 1993), affid, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
372 Under the PPA, materials may not be seized unless they constitute fruits or instrumen-
talities of crime, if there is a danger of physical injury, or if the person possessing the material
probably committed a crime. See E. Judson Jennings, Carnivore: U.S. Government Surveillance
of Internet Transmissions, 6 VA. J.L. TECH. 10, 63-67 (2001), at http://www.vjolt.netlvol6/
issue2/v6i2-a 10-Jennings.html#_PrivacyProtectionAct.
373 Moreover, even though piracy surveillance, at present, involves private actors, a DMCA
notice is signed off by a district court. Thus, state action is arguably present, from the moment
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This provision should track the PPA in several major respects.
First, following the PPA, the DMCA could establish that it is ille-
gal for private piracy surveillance measures to force an ISP to
seize or silence expression that falls under fair use or First
Amendment protection without first requesting a court order. By
making immediate seizures of protected material illegal, the pro-
posed provision shifts the cost of mistaken surveillance and silenc-
ing to the copyright owner or bounty hunter. Moreover, by raising
the costs of mistaken detection, and creating greater incentives to
reduce their occurrence, this provision would also ensure greater
protection for fair use and First Amendment interests. Thus, the
proposed amendment would require copyright owners to request a
preliminary injunction or specific court order before asking an ISP
to either take down material, remove the subscriber's access, or
disclose a person's identity. It could also provide for compensa-
tion in the event of a mistaken determination or disclosure.
Second, the DMCA, following its own notice-and-takedown
provision, could provide for a requirement of notice to be given to
the end user prior to disclosure of identity, and could provide for
specific procedures to challenge the disclosure of one's identity in
the event of an asserted fair use defense. Some may argue that the
outcome of Verizon accomplishes many of these goals by essen-
tially requiring the filing of actual litigation prior to disclosure of
the alleged infringer's identity. Yet, I would recommend that fu-
ture courts go further than the Verizon court did, by also integrat-
ing the DMCA subpoena procedure with a constitutional concern
for anonymity. Thus, just as the PPA or other "John Doe" actions
require more than enough evidence to withstand a motion to dis-
miss, the DMCA's use of a subpoena should reflect the need for
heightened standards of justification.374 In such situations where
First Amendment concerns are triggered, the DMCA could require
the immediate appealability of any proposed termination of access,
the use of specially trained magistrates or marshals to carry out
Internet searches, and other procedures that reflect a concern for
individual civil liberties and expression, instead of the unilateral
goal of protecting copyright above all else.375
Third, it bears noting that none of the anonymity issues are
particularly new in the Internet context - many courts have already
of identity revelation to the moment where an ISP terminates the person's access to the Internet
or disables the account. And the spectre of criminal copyright infringement under the NET Act
could easily provoke Fourth Amendment concerns.374 See Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3,775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).375 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,
806(1994).
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dealt with the question of how to protect the anonymity of a
speaker in the face of a civil suit. In defamation cases, for exam-
ple, courts have continued to develop methods to integrate First
Amendment protections of anonymity with the need for legal reso-
lution. Those methods easily apply to the DMCA subpoena provi-
sion. In one such case, for example, the New Jersey Superior
Court set forth a stringent test for the disclosure of one's identity,
requiring the following elements:
[T]he trial court should first require the plaintiff to undertake
efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they are the sub-
ject of a subpoena or application for an order of disclosure,
and withhold action to afford the fictitiously-named defen-
dants a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to
the application. These notification efforts should include
posting a message of notification of the identity discovery re-
quest to the anonymous user on the ISP's pertinent message
board.
[Second, t]he court shall also require the plaintiff to identify
and set forth the exact statements purportedly made by each
anonymous poster that plaintiff alleges constitutes actionable
speech.
[Third, t]he complaint and all information provided to the
court should be carefully reviewed to determine whether
plaintiff has set forth a prima facie cause of action .... [and]
must produce sufficient evidence supporting each element of
its cause of action, on a prima facie basis, prior to a court or-
376dering the disclosure ....
Applying this test (the Dendrite test), if the plaintiff has pre-
sented a valid cause of action, the court must balance the First
Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the strength of
the prima facie case presented, and the necessity for the disclosure
of the anonymous defendant's identity to allow the plaintiff to
properly proceed. The nature of this inquiry is therefore both sub-
stantive and procedural, but enables the speaker to remain pro-
tected from anonymous disclosure for spurious reasons.
The solution I have outlined accomplishes three primary
goals. First, the special subpoena provisions operate to raise the
standard of proof to protect against spurious claims, and deter the
"overfishing" scenario I have described in Part III. Second, the
proposed burden-shifting and damage award provisions help to
376Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760.
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compensate wrongly accused infringers, thereby making piracy
surveillance and meritless accusations more costly. 377  Finally,
there is another reason for the adoption of this test in piracy sur-
veillance scenarios: the need to raise the standard of proof in
DMCA subpoenas after Verizon. Traditional "John Doe" lawsuits
require the presentation of enough evidence to withstand a motion
to dismiss, whereas the Dendrite test goes a step further by requir-
ing an additional level of scrutiny. The court observed that in
cases that implicate First Amendment rights to anonymity, "appli-
cation of the motion-to-dismiss standard in isolation fails to pro-
vide a basis for an analysis and balancing of Dendrite's request for
disclosure in light of John Doe No. 3's competing right of ano-
nymity in the exercise of his right of free speech. 378 Under the
Dendrite test, those suspected of copyright infringement or other
illegal acts would not receive extra protection behind the shield of
anonymity, but do receive an additional recognition of the need for
actual (rather than asserted) proof to unmask potential infringers.
B. Increasing Public Governance over Private Enforcement
As this Article has suggested, piracy surveillance implicates a
curious type of private ordering that merges the boundaries of pri-
vate and public. While the standards governing copyright in-
fringement, fair use, and the DMCA were drafted by Congress
(and the judiciary), the actual implementation of these rules often
gets left to the amorphous and decidedly variant motives of copy-
right owners. Moreover, in most copyright cases, the Constitution
rarely makes an appearance if both parties are private, non-state
entities. 379 However, under the state action doctrine, constitutional
guarantees can limit the activities of a private party if the conduct
in question is entwined with traditional state functions, such as
education, adjudication, fire, and police protection, or if the activ-
ity is controlled or substantially facilitated by the government.38 °
For these reasons, one sees strong arguments for the idea that
state action is present in almost every stage leading up to a sub-
poena or takedown request in the DMCA context. Congress
drafted the relevant provisions, and a judicial body enforces them
377 In this way, these procedures reflect similar concerns that are also governed by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which requires a lawyer to make a reasonable inquiry into the fac-
tual and legal grounds of any filed document. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 586-91 (6th ed. 2003).
378 Id. at 770.
379 See John R. Thomas, Liberty and Property in the Patent Law, 39 Hous. L. REV. 569,
592 (2002).
380Id. at 593 (citing Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 161-63 (1978)).
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after a cursory examination; indeed, the unveiling of a person's
identity is performed by an ISP pursuant to a court order.
381
Moreover, much of these issues seem particularly poignant in light
of New York Times v. Sullivan,382 in which the Supreme Court
overturned a libel decision regarding a paid advertisement that
criticized a Montgomery city official. The Court resolved the state
action issue by concluding that "although this is a civil lawsuit be-
tween private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state rule
of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on the
constitutional freedoms of speech and press. 383
The very same concerns that animated the New York Times
case are relevant here. The property rights of the original copy-
right owner can be used to trample the copyright/fair use rights of
other creators. As I have suggested, piracy surveillance involves a
clear delegation to the private citizen to determine what constitutes
infringement and what constitutes fair use. As a result, the DMCA
creates a silent web of public and private interdependence, in
which public functions are virtually ministerial, and private deter-
minations are largely adjudicative. Given the substantial risk of
strategic enforcement of infringement, the only way to balance the
increasing encroachment on privacy protections is to ensure some
level of hybridity between public and private enforcement.
By raising standards of proof for copyright infringement, en-
suring judicial enforcement, as well as the cost of mistaken detec-
tions, courts and legislators can aim to strike a much-needed bal-
ance between property, speech, and privacy. There must be
greater public and administrative oversight over piracy surveil-
lance. To allow private parties to circumvent constitutional safe-
guards in order to silence others' speech is precisely what the
DMCA provisions were designed to prevent. Consequently, more
due process - a higher standard of proof, more judicial scrutiny,
and the use of special subpoenas that embrace First Amendment
values - is necessary. The answer is more regulation over surveil-
lance, not less, and more judicial recognition of the value of ano-
nymity to the marketplace of speech.
One may argue that these solutions are still somewhat narrow
in the sense that they protect the anonymous speaker alone, and
fail to address the other types of monitoring I have addressed that
involve DRM and interference. As I have shown, piracy surveil-
381 See id. at 614 (describing the delegation of enforcement authority by the patent office to
private entities).
382376 U.S. 254 (1964).
383 Id. at 265.
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lance also, problematically, unilaterally permits private copyright
owners to interpret the rules governing copyright and to prevent
their violation.384 Yet while the private copyright industry may be
in the best position to invest in the technology to guard against and
detect infringement, courts, not private entities, are in the best po-
sition to determine actual liability. To resolve these difficult sce-
narios, I propose the institution of alterations to the DMCA that
seek to clarify the standard of fair use and help to ensure its
protection from intrusion or evisceration by extrajudicial forms of
surveillance. Here, the DMCA could also be revised to specify
protection for the downloading of files containing small portions
of copyrighted material (e.g., samples or film clips); or files ex-
changed for educational purposes; or even those that involve space
shifting, commentary, parody, satire, or other purposes that have
not yet been expressly clarified for protection in the technological
context.385
Clarification of the scope of fair use in such contexts is neces-
sary for several reasons. First, clarification helps to provide notice
to future individuals of allowable activities in the face of new
technologies, and it helps to clarify the many "grey areas" that of-
ten arise in difficult cases, like those listed above. This reduces
the likelihood that individuals will engage in overcompliant behav-
ior and avoid exercising their rights of freedom of speech and fair
use. Second, clarification also enables all parties to recognize the
importance of protecting an individual's entitlement to fair use in
the face of technologies that may impede or prohibit it. It forces
individual manufacturers to carve out certain areas for allowable
uses, and allows the individual to engage in those uses without
risking liability. Third, it also helps to reduce the power, signifi-
cance, and scope of extrajudicial determinations. By ensuring that
certain activities remain protected for fair use purposes, private
copyright owners will be prevented from defining for themselves
what constitutes fair use, and will instead be forced to ask a court
to make a particular determination when needed.
Finally, defining the scope of fair use under the rubric of
greater public oversight also advances the goal of due process.386
384 See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Man-
agement" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1021 (1996) (suggesting that the pub-
lic/private distinction that forms the basis of the state action doctrine is particularly problematic
as applied to copyright law).
385 See Julie Hilden, Should Universities Crack Down on File Swapping?, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20030304.html (Mar. 4, 2003).
386 Traditionally, due process principles require courts to balance the government's interest
in using the procedures at issue, the risk of error in those procedures, and the private interest that
is affected by the challenged procedures. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35
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As this Article has suggested, piracy surveillance implicates seri-
ous due process concerns, particularly in the scenarios that I have
outlined here: the risk of error is exceptionally high; the likelihood
of strategic, spurious enforcement is similarly pronounced; and the
standard to protect individuals from unwanted surveillance or ex-
trajudicial determinations is exceptionally low. Moreover, the
reach of piracy surveillance extends beyond actual copying of an
existing work in its entirety, and could potentially reach the full
gamut of expression on the Internet that implicates fair use of
copyrighted works (like text files that use titles that correspond to
copyrighted works, or written text that builds on prior references).
In short, the DMCA provisions govern much more than piracy -
they govern the very essence of speech itself. As I have suggested,
however, by clarifying the scope and entitlement of fair use, and
by precluding extrajudicial determinations, we can come to a
greater balance between privacy, property, and protection of ex-
pression.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that our ceaseless expansions of
intellectual property protections must be reconciled with the exist-
ing protections for informational privacy and personal expression.
It is imperative that we begin to restore the fragile balance be-
tween property and privacy that real space originally intended. If
we fail to strike the proper balance between intellectual property
rights and privacy in cyberspace, our constitutional values of free-
dom of speech and due process may be sacrificed.
The upshot of this switch will be a severe diminishment of le-
gitimate creation and expression. As such, one solution to the
problem of copyright's panoptic overbreadth involves infusing a
similar potency in our government's protection of privacy and ex-
pression. In order to curb copyright's growing encroachment on
these rights, we must restore the original balance that existed be-
tween them.
Because the proper boundaries of both privacy and intellectual
property are not sufficiently understood in this digital age, it is al-
together understandable why government and the marketplace
have eroded one to protect the other. But this insufficiently theo-
rized choice, while significant today, will reach a crisis as property
rights expand at the expense of personhood, autonomy, and the
expressive expectations of consumers. The only way to resolve
(1976).
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these tensions is to return to the values that animated the letter and
spirit of our constitutional protections, and to attempt to use those
values to return some desperately needed balance to the relation-
ship between privacy and intellectual property. By doing so, we
can, in short, come to a greater understanding of the need for limits
on the power of intellectual property to govern our everyday lives,
and the need for a more nuanced understanding of how the expan-
sion of property rights can deleteriously affect the vitality of pri-
vacy.

